IT 

\s 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Class 


THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 


BY 


ST.  GEORGE  MIVART,  F.R.S. 

H 


NEW     YORK 

HARPER   &    BROTHERS   PUBLISHERS 
1895 


T5  53 


Copyright,  1895,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 

All  rights  reserved. 


THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 


Ipart  31 

IT  has  been  said  reproachfully  that  man 
is  fond  of  novelty.  The  reproach  is  unrea- 
sonable, since  change  is  essential  to  both 
our  bodily  and  mental  health.  Only  through 
changes  in  its  surroundings  is  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  child  first  awakened,  and  only 
by  the  aid  of  fresh  external  or  internal  mod- 
ifications is  consciousness  maintained  in  ac- 

4 

tivity. 

Moreover,  though  analogous  social  and 
political  conditions  frequently  recur,  it  is 
impossible  that  any  past  experience  can 
ever  be  truly  repeated,  and  this  not  only 
on  account  of  the  ceaseless  changes  of  our 
environment,  but  also  from  the  very  condi- 


224214 


;'  fcEIJFIrtJL  'SCIENCE 

tions  of  our  bodily  frame.  A  nerve  contin- 
uously stimulated  fails,  after  a  time,  to  re- 
spond to  the  stimulus,  and  thus  it  is  that  our 
appetite  becomes  jaded  by  an  unceasing 
supply  of  what  might  at  first  have  been  the 
object  of  keen  pursuit,  and  positive  aversion 
often  succeeds  desire.  Our  taste  changes 
again  and  again  as  we  travel  from  childhood 
to  old  age,  and  education  and  culture  noto- 
riously modify  man's  inclinations  and  senti- 
ments. 

Thus  it  is  simply  inevitable  that  the  feel- 
ings, tastes,  and  intellectual  occupations  of 
succeeding  centuries  must  always  be  more 
or  less  divergent,  although  analogous  recur- 
rences may  again  and  again  take  place. 

That  conditions  should  so  recur  is  at  least 
as  desirable  as  it  is  inevitable.  For  of  the 
many  objects  which  merit  our  attention,  all 
cannot  at  the  same  time  be  attended  to  in 
the  degree  they  merit.  Thus  it  is  that  in 
each  age  some  objects  may  be  not  only  un- 
duly neglected,  but  even  disliked,  so  that 
they  need  to  be  subsequently  recalled  to  the 
attention  of  succeeding  times.  After  the  aes- 


CHANGES    OF   TASTE   AND   CONDITION  3 

thetic  outburst  of  Hellas  came  the  wondrous 
jurisprudence  and  political  sagacity  of  Rome, 
paving  the  way  for  those  noble  creations  of 
mediaevalism,  feudal  honor,  devoted  asceti- 
cism, majestic  worship,  and  the  keenest  polish 
which  the  human  intellect  has  ever  received. 

Then  blossomed  that  great  "  recurrence," 
the  Renascence,  once  more  bringing  Plato 
into  fashion,  with  a  love  for  physical  science 
akin  to  that  which  had  existed  in  the  mind 
of  Aristotle.  Therewith  there  naturally  arose 
a  feeling  of  aversion  from  what  had  charmed 
men  before,  with  a  neglect  of  one  depart- 
ment of  nature,  just  as  another  department 
had  been  previously  neglected  by  mediaeval 
students. 

Political  freedom  and  social  amelioration 
were  the  next  objects  of  pursuit  among  civ- 
ilized mankind,  and  they  have  continued, 
with  physical  science,  to  be  the  main  occu- 
pation of  those  not  absorbed  in  seeking 
wealth ;  for  wealth,  as  a  source  of  pleasure 
and  for  its  own  sake,  has  doubtless  been  the 
pursuit  of  most  men  since  the  first  human 
society  arose. 


4  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

The  occupations  of  the  immense  majority 
of  that  part  of  mankind  which  is  raised  above 
the  sordid  need  of  seeking  its  daily  bread, 
and  is  not  merely  devoted  to  pleasure,  may 
be  said  to  be  travel,  politics,  philanthropy, 
the  promotion  of  progress,  useful  knowl- 
edge, physical  science,  and  art  —  all,  vari- 
ously and  in  different  degrees,  good  and 
laudable.  They  are  also  practical  pursuits. 
They  are  concerned  with  "  doing  "  as  well  as 
with  "  knowing."  What  is  practical  has  spe- 
cial charms  for  us,  for  the  English-speaking 
races  of  mankind  are,  in  all  climes,  eminent- 
ly doers.  Our  profound  respect  for  work, 
for  "  doing  "  (as  has  been  before  remarked), 
is  shown  by  the  familiar  usage  of  our  moth- 
er-tongue. We  English  speakers  greet  each 
other  with,  "  How  do  you  do  ?"  A  French- 
man says,  with  an  implied  regard  for  appear- 
ances, "  How  do  you  carry  yourself  ?"  A 
German  ascends  at  once  to  the  highest  ab- 
stractions, and  asks,  "  How  goes  it  ?"  A 
Spaniard,  as  one  who  first  crossed  the  At- 
lantic, inquires,  "  How  do  you  go  f"  while 
the  Italian,  for  so  long  a  time  unprogressive, 


SCIENCE    FOR    ITS    OWN   SAKE  5 

says,  "  How  do  you  stand?"  or  even  insinu- 
ates the  dolce  far  niente  by  asking,  "  How  do 
you  exist  ?"  Only  the  English-speaking  man 
seems  instinctively  to  feel  that  you  cannot 
be  in  a  satisfactory  state  unless  you  are  doing 
something.  To  those  who  are  aware  they  so 
feel,  and  are  therewith  content,  these  papers 
are  addressed.  Their  aim  is  to  be  eminently 
practical. 

But  readers  who  know  anything  of  the 
present  writer  may  reply :  "  You  are  not 
practical  yourself.  You  are  no  politician  or 
mechanician,  no  lawyer  or  medical  practi- 
tioner, not  even  an  artist ;  you  pursue  sci- 
ence for  its  own  sake!"  The  statement  is 
true,  but  has  no  force  as  an  objection ;  for 
we  know  how  often  the  most  solid  and  ex- 
tensive practical  gains  have  been  due  to  ab- 
struse and  seemingly  most  unpractical  exer- 
tions of  thought  and  endeavor.  In  America 
useful  deductions  from  abstruse  studies  have 
been  exceptionally  developed,  and  the  whole 
civilized  world  is  being  lighted — and  men  are 
invited  to  read,  to  play,  to  pray,  or  to  sin — 
through  the  help  of  Franklin's  brain. 


6  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

This  Will  be  universally  assented  to,  for  the 
value  and  the  trustworthy  progress  of  phys- 
ical science  are  unquestioned.  Many  fool- 
ish discussions  are  carried  on  in  the  world 
about  us ;  but  certainly  no  one  is  so  foolish 
as  to  question  the  value  of  such  science  or 
the  fact  of  its  progress.  Certainly  I,  who 
have  loved  it  from  my  earliest  years  and  de- 
voted such  small  powers  as  I  possess  to  its 
service,  have  no  disposition  to  undervalue  it. 
I  well  know  that  the  study  of  living  organ- 
isms has,  since  I  tan  recollect,  made  great 
progress,  and  I  see  grounds  for  absolute  cer- 
tainty now  about  many  zoological  facts  and 
laws  which  were  doubtful  or  undreamed  of 
when  I  was  a  lad. 

Nevertheless  such  science  is  not  every- 
thing, and  I  am  profoundly  convinced  that 
there  are  deeper  questions  which  merit  the 
best  attention  of  all  practical  men. 

Some  may  here  exclaim :  "  Ah  !  you  mean 
religion.  It  is  true  that,  with  very  many  in 
Europe,  it  has  gone  entirely  out  of  fashion, 
save  as  a  ray  of  emotion  gilding  some  philan- 
thropic sentiment ;  but  it  is  not  so  in  Amer- 


INDEPENDENT  OF  CREED  AND  THEOLOGY    7 

ica,  where  so  many  creeds  count  such  multi- 
tudes of  followers,  and  where  respectable 
citizens  have,  as  a  rule,  respectable  church- 
sittings." 

But  my  object  is  neither  to  champion  nor 
to  combat  any  special  creed,  but  to  strictly 
confine  myself  to  the  sufficiently  wide  do- 
main of  science  external  to  denominational 
theology,  though  it  may  be  we  shall  find 
that  pure  reason  affords  a  sure  basis  for  the 
fundamental  beliefs  of  all  theology.  I  mean, 
therefore,  nothing  to  which  any  section  of 
my  readers  can,  I  venture  to  think,  reason- 
ably object,  whatever  their  theological  be- 
liefs or  disbeliefs  may  be.  I  desire  to  elim- 
inate all  such  questions  and  to  confine  myself 
purely  and  simply  to  matters  which  regard 
well -ascertained  scientific  truths.  I  desire 
but  to  call  attention  to  propositions  which 
must,  I  believe,  be  assented  to  by  every  con- 
sistent lover  of  science  who  is  convinced  that 
at  least  some  scientific  truths  have  been 
brought  to  our  knowledge — truths  on  which 
we  can  with  entire  confidence  rely.  But 
what  I  refer  to  has  a  much  wider  scope  than 


8  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

even  physical  science.  It  concerns  religious 
devotees  no  less  than  followers  of  fashion  or 
men  who  seek  their  many -million  pile,  It 
concerns  no  creed,  indeed,  directly,  nor  any 
pleasure,  policy,  or  art ;  and  yet  it  alone 
gives  value  to  each  and  all  of  them.  The 
essence  of  a  creed  is  something  to  believe ; 
yet  how  can  we  believe  what  we  in  no  way 
know  ? 

It  may  be  objected  that  "  belief  may  ex- 
ceed knowledge."  Yet  no  one  out  of  Bed^ 
lam  can  believe  anything  save  on  some 
grounds;  and  he  ought  to  know  the  grounds 
of  his  belief,  and  be  able  to  give  an  account 
of  the  faith  that  is  in  him.  Our  science,  then, 
concerns  no  particular  creed,  but  all  creeds ; 
no  art,  but  all  arts ;  no  science,  but  all  sci- 
ences ;  no  rule  of  conduct,  but  all  rules  of 
conduct.  It  is  the  most  fundamental,  but 
also  the  most  far-reaching ;  the  most  central, 
yet  the  most  centrifugal ;  the  most  intensely 
personal  and,  nevertheless,  the  most  univer- 
sal of  all  questions  and  of  all  truths. 

As  it  must  underlie  all  our  pleasures  no 
less  than  all  our  knowledge,  it  might  be 


SOCRATIC    METHOD   OF    TEACHING  9 

called,  what  indeed  it  has  been  termed,  "  the 
Gay  Science."  Yet  with  our  love  for  what  is 
practical,  and  with  our  recognition  that  we 
have  to  be  "  up  and  doing,"  I  prefer — since 
it  supplies  the  only  solid  ground  for  our  ac- 
tivity— to  call  it  The  Helpful  Science. 

But  since  so  much  good  and  solid  work  has 
been  and  is  being  done  in  all  departments 
of  science  and  art ;  since  social  amelioration 
goes  on  apace  and  philanthropy  was  never 
more  active ;  since,  also,  no  good  work  can 
be  done  without  knowing  how  to  do  it,  it 
would  seem  to  follow  that  this  "  helpful  sci- 
ence "  must  be  already  so  widely  known  that 
to  write  about  it  (as  here  proposed),  can  but 
be  superfluous.  Several  meanings,  however, 
attach  to  the  expression  "  to  know,"  and  we 
may  and  do  know  many  things  without  our 
ever  having  explicitly  adverted  to  and  recog- 
nized the  fact  that  we  do  know  them. 

Socrates,  as  we  have  all  read,  used,  when 
addressing  the  men  of  Athens,  to  call  him- 
self a  "midwife ;"  by  which  he  meant  that  his 
business  was  not  really  to  teach  them,  but 
to  draw  forth  from  and  exhibit  to  his  hearers 


10  THE   HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

truths  which  they  bore  unconsciously  in  their 
own  bosoms.  I  would  humbly  follow  in  the 
footsteps  of  that  great  man,  and  endeavor  to 
explicitly  set  forth  certain  very  fundamen- 
tal verities  which  we  all  possess  implicitly, 
though  we  may  never  have  had  the  eyes  of 
our  intellect  directly  turned  upon  them. 

But  here  I  may  at  once  be  met  by  this  ob- 
jection and  a  protest :  "  You  say  you  wish  to 
imitate  Socrates,  but  he  was  a  philosopher. 
Now  we  are  quite  willing  to  be  talked  to 
about  science  and  art,  politics,  morals,  or 
philanthropy;  but,  if  you  please,  no  'phi- 
losophy '  for  us  !  We  detest  metaphysics 
and  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  your  'quid- 
dities '  and  '  essences/  '  the  transcendental ' 
and  'the  absolute/  all  which  we  consign  with 
a  hearty  execration  to  the  bottom  of  the 
Dead  Sea!" 

I,  nevertheless,  entreat  my  readers  to  grant 
me  a  modicum  of  tolerance  and  to  read  on  a 
little  more.  I  can  ask  this  with  a  better 
grace  since  I  deeply  sympathize  with  the 
feeling  which  might  dictate  such  a  protest  as 
that  I  have  just  supposed. 


"METAPHYSICS"  AND  "PHILOSOPHY"       n 

It  is  indeed  by  no  means  wonderful  that 
men  should  turn  away  in  disgust  from  the 
mere  sight  or  sound  of  the  word  "  metaphys- 
ics " — above  all,  that  English-speaking  men 
and  women  should  do  so.  An  eminently 
practical  set  of  people,  however  energetic, 
could  hardly  be  disposed  to  work,  whether 
with  hand  or  brain,  without  a  fair  promise 
of  some  good  result  —  like  a  squirrel  in  a 
turning  cage.  And  certainly  no  much  better 
result  can  be  expected  from  spending  time 
over  "  philosophy,"  as  it  is  set  before  us  in 
most  modern  works  on  that  subject.  Philos- 
ophy, it  must  also  be  confessed,  has  for  the 
last  few  centuries  had  little  progress  to  boast 
of.  Moreover  it  has  been  presented  in  a 
very  repellent  manner.  Of  course  every 
branch  of  knowledge  has,  and  must  have,  its 
own  technical  terms,  but  it  would  seem  as  if 
the  very  spirit  of  evil  -  speaking  had  taken 
possession  of  most  metaphysicians,  and  as  if 
they  had  deliberately  sought  to  make  them- 
selves as  unintelligible  as  possible  to  the  or- 
dinary run  of  mankind. 

Every  science  and  each  art  has,  as  before 


12  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

said,  its  technical  terms.  The  anatomist  and 
the  lawyer  respectively  find  it  easier  to 
speak  of  the  "fifth  ventricle  "  or  the  "Cestui 
que  trust,"  than  to  denote  such  conceptions 
by  descriptive  phrases  in  plain  words.  Nev- 
ertheless, with  a  little  circumlocution  most 
scientific  statements  could  be  made  in  or- 
dinary language,  and  I  believe  that  all  phil- 
osophical conceptions  can  be  so  expressed,  if 
only  a  little  trouble  is  taken  by  writers  on 
the  subject.  At  all  events  the  present  writer 
thinks  he  can  promise  to  at  least  make  him- 
self intelligible,  and  to  refrain  from  the  use 
of  bewildering  words  in  treating  of  a  matter 
which  readers  will  in  the  end;  it  is  believed, 
see  to  be,  as  before  said,  a  very  practical  one. 

But  will  the  Soeratic  method  really  suf- 
fice? We  cannot  extract  sunbeams  from 
cucumbers !  Can  we  draw  forth  philosophy 
from  clod-hoppers? 

Some  men — we  will  even  dare  to  say  some 
women — are  foolish,  while  others  are  excep- 
tionally gifted ;  but  plain,  ordinary  reason  is 
possessed  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
men  and  women.  Such  ordinary  reason, 


13 

with  a  little  patience  and  perseverance,  are 
all  that  is  needed  for  a  good  insight  into 
"  the  helpful  science." 

For  just  as  science  is  but  ordinary  reason 
carefully  and  exactly  applied  to  the  exam- 
ination of  what  surrounds  us,  so  philosophy 
is  nothing  but  the  same  reason  applied  to 
what  is  most  fundamental  in  all  the  other 
sciences — on  which  account  it  may  be  called 
"  the  science  of  sciences." 

No  educated  man  should  rest  satisfied 
without  trying  to  understand  it,  for  other- 
wise his  knowledge,  sufficient  as  it  may  be 
for  many  purposes,  must  none  the  less  be 
without  a  solid,  logical  basis.  There  are 
certain  questions  which  underlie  all  physi- 
cal science,  and  we  are  persuaded  that  not  a 
few  of  the  readers  of  this  volume  will  like 
to  see  drawn  out  what  those  questions  are, 
and  what  are,  therefore,  the  necessary  foun- 
dations of  all  our  knowledge.  I  have  spo- 
ken of  "  educated  men,"  but  my  experience 
convinces  me  that  a  man  may  be  a  good 
philosopher  with  very  little  education.  In 
considering  the  vulgar  we  are  very  apt  to  be 


14  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

misled  by  small  matters  which  may  strongly 
impress  the  imagination,  but  which  our  judg- 
ment, on  reflection,  must  own  to  be  trivial. 
We  are  sometimes  tempted  to  despise  an 
intellect  which  manifests  itself  only  by  un- 
couth gestures  and  coarse  speech,  wherein 
the  rules  both  of  correct  pronunciation  and 
grammar  are  violated  ;  and  yet  that  intellect 
may  be,  in  fact,  quite  as  good  as  our  own. 
I  have  more  than  once  been  surprised,  'when 
talking  with  peasants,  to  find  how  correct 
was  their  appreciation  even  of  questions  of 
philosophy,  when  once  the  difficulties  aris- 
ing simply  from  our  different  modes  of  ex- 
pressing essentially  similar  ideas  had  been 
surmounted.  If  this  is  the  case  with  farm- 
laborers,  there  must  be  plenty  of  uncon- 
scious philosophers  among  the  keen-witted 
artisans  of  our  large  cities  who  take  an  in- 
terest in  deep  questions.  If,  therefore,  every 
such  man  chooses  to  upbraid  me  with  being 
a  "  philosopher,"  I  can  without  scruple  re- 
spond by  a  Tu  quoque.  For,  in  fact,  every 
sane  man  must,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
have  some  system  of  philosophy  whether 


AMERICAN    TRAITS    AND   TENDENCIES  15 

he  will  or  no.  But  a  reasonable  man  will 
try  and  get  as  reasonable  a  view  of  things  as 
he  can,  and  to  such  a  man  it  will  seem  worth 
while  to  spend  a  little  time  and  take  a  little 
trouble  with  respect  to  questions  which  con- 
stitute the  foundation  of  all  his  knowledge. 

The  present  writer  feels  a  great  satisfac- 
tion in  addressing  an  American  public  on 
such  questions,  because  he  not  only  knows 
that  education  is  highly  prized  and  widely  dif- 
fused in  the  United  States,  but  he  also  be- 
lieves that  in  a  nation  where  every  form  of 
knowledge  is  eagerly  sought  after  there  must 
be  a  vigorous  appetite  also  for  philosophy 
as  soon  as  its  real  nature  is  understood.  In- 
America  there  seems  to  be  a  strong  desire 
to  get  to  the  bottom  of  matters  and  to  know 
what  things  are,  even  though  the  how  and 
the  wherefore  of  their  being  what  they  are 
may  remain  inscrutable.  There  is  a  healthy 
appetite  for  facts,  with  a  remarkable  absence 
of  prejudice  and  a  hearty  wish  to  be  "  thor- 
ough." 

But  the  helpful  science  does  not  alone 
concern  "  knowing,"  but  "  doing  "  also.  It  is 


16  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

at  the  foundation  of  ethics  and  therefore  of 
conduct,  and  thus  considered  its  claim  on 
the  attention  of  the  English-speaking  races 
is  exceptionally  great.  For  they  have  arrived 
at  a  degree  of  self-government,  accompanied 
by  a  combination  of  order  and  freedom,  which 
has  hitherto  been  unknown  elsewhere.  In 
our  race,  then,  it  must  evidently  be  a  mat- 
ter of  the  most  extreme  importance  that 
opinion  should  not  be  misled  in  matters 
which  touch  so  nearly  the  innermost  springs 
of  morality  and  social  life.  It  is  supremely 
important  that  there  should  be  no  doubt  as 
to  the  validity  of  those  declarations  of  reason 
upon  which  our  moral  perceptions  and  all 
our  social  regulations  ultimately  depend.  It 
may  be  thought  that  metaphysical  questions 
concern  the  highly  educated  alone.  But 
this  opinion  is  a  very  mistaken  one,  for  met- 
aphysical doctrines  (it  may  be  in  crude  forms) 
soon  filter  down  to,  and  have  their  full  ef- 
fect on,  the  lowest  classes  of  society.  In 
some  form  or  other  they  come  home  to  al- 
most every  one. 

There  are  few  men  indeed  who  have  never 


LIFE'S  PROBLEMS  17 

thought  about  either  their  origin  or  their 
destiny,  or  the  wonderful  mystery  of  life. 
In  hours  of  sadness  and  trial,  when  some 
object,  aimed  at  for  years,  is  suddenly  seen 
to  be  hopelessly  beyond  reach ;  when  the 
symptoms  of  a  fatal  disease  first  become 
clearly  recognized,  or  when  we  stand  and 
gaze  on  the  marble  features  of  our  much- 

o 

loved  dead,  deep  questions  not  seldom  arise 
in  the  sorrow-laden  mind  :  What  and  whence 
are  we  ?  Why  are  we  here  ?  What  should 
be  our  true  end  ?  What  is  the  real  meaning, 
what  the  good  of  life  ? 

Of  course  there  are  multitudes  of  men 
who,  save  at  such  solemn  moments,  put  such 
questions  on  one  side,  and  get  into  a  habit 
of  going  through  life's  daily  tasks,  taking 
what  pleasure  they  may  on  the  road  and  as 
much  of  it  as  they  can  get.  But,  at  least, 
the  men  and  women  who  address  themselves 
to  the  perusal  of  an  essay  such  as  this  are 
not  likely  to  be  anxious  to  shirk  all  serious 
questions,  or  indisposed  to  take  a  little  trou- 
ble if  they  see  that  such  labor  need  not  be 
fruitless ;  while  they  will  know  well  that  no 


18  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

good  work  can  be  done  without  taking  some 
trouble  about  it. 

The  task  here  undertaken  is  to  show  that 
the  helpful  science  of  philosophy  is  not  only 
a  basis  and  support  absolutely  necessary  for 
every  physical  science,  but  that  it  is  no  less, 
as  before  said,  the  foundation  of  ethics  and 
of  all  right  conduct. 

Nevertheless  no  appeals  will  here  be  made 
to  sentiments  and  feelings,  whether  moral  or 
otherwise.  Appeal  will  be  made  to  the  pure 
intellect  of  readers  and  to  nothing  else. 
And,  indeed,  I  desire  to  take  this  opportu- 
nity plainly  to  declare  that  not  only  here 
and  now,  but  everywhere  and  always,  I  un- 
hesitatingly affirm  that  no  system  can  or 
should  stand  which  is  unable  to  justify 
itself  to  reason.  I  possess  no  faculty  myself, 
nor  do  I  believe  that  any  human  faculty  ex- 
ists, superior  to  the  intellect,  or  which  has  any 
claim  to  limit  or  dominate  the  intellect's  ac- 
tivity. Feelings  and  sentiments  have  their 
undoubted  charm  and  due  place  in  human 
life,  but  that  place  is  a  subordinate  one,  and 
should  be  under  the  control  of  right  reason. 


WHEN   PHILOSOPHY   WAS    FASHIONABLE        19 

Yet  it  is  by  no  means  only  against  those 
who  would  undervalue  reason  for  the  sake  of 
sentiment  that  these  lines  are  written  ;  their 
object  is  to  uphold  the  rights  of  our  rational 
nature  against  all  who,  from  whatever  side 
or  in  the  name  of  whatsoever  authority,  would 
either  impugn  its  sovereign  claim  upon  our 
reverence  or  would  unduly  restrict  the  area 
of  its  sway. 

Five  hundred  years  ago  the  study  of  phi- 
losophy was  the  intellectual  fashion  of  the 
day,  and,  as  we  before  said,  never  were  the 
wits  of  mankind  so  well  polished,  never  was 
the  intellect  provided  with  a  keener  razor's 
edge — to  use  the  best  material  metaphor 
available.  That  it  should  go  out  of  fashion 
was,  however,  inevitable,  since  its  professors 
dealt  too  much  in  verbal  subtleties  while 
neglecting  to  examine  and  experimentally 
interrogate  nature  through  the  senses.  Had 
they  paid  more  attention  to  the  sagacious 
warnings  of  Roger  Bacon  and  to  the  ex- 
ample of  their  great  model,  Aristotle,  mod- 
ern science  might  have  attained  its  triumphs 
by  the  aid  of  men  who  had  never  lost  hold 


20  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

of  many  priceless  philosophical  truths.  If 
ever  a  man  was  "  before  his  age "  it  was 
Roger  Bacon,  who  was  not  only  the  warm 
advocate  of  experimental  physical  science, 
but  boldly  maintained  the  true  principles  of 
modern  Biblical  criticism. 

Yet  his  warnings  and  protestations  were 
of  no  avail.  His  contemporaries  believed 
they  knew  all  things  knowable,  and  pos- 
sessed in  one  or  other  of  their  multitudinous 
pigeon-holes  a  solution  of  every  possible 
problem. 

Thus  a  great  opportunity  was  let  slip,  and 
when  that  change  in  art  and  learning,  the 
Renascence,  took  place,  most  men  turned 
with  a  sense  of  relief  to  new-horn  physical 
science.  Such  of  them  as  still  pursued  phi- 
losophy, welcomed  with  avidity  a  new  philo- 
sophical departure  by  a  scorner  of  the  old 
ways — Descartes — who,  never  having  stud- 
ied the  older  philosophy,  naturally  misunder- 
stood it  and  therefore  despised  it. 

As  we  before  observed,  the  development 
of  natural  science  at  the  Renascence  was 
really  an  analogous  recurrence  of  antecedent 


TWO   NOTABLE    DEFECTS  21 

conditions ;  that  is,  there  was  an  analogy 
between  its  spirit  and  the  spirit  of  the  age 
of  Aristotle.  There  were,  nevertheless,  of 
course,  immense  differences  between  the 
two  ;  but  some  such  return  to  an  antecedent 
state  of  things  was  necessary  for  subsequent 
human  progress. 

Since  that  day  physical  science  has  run 
a  long  and  prosperous  course  indeed.  By  the 
multitude  of  problems  it  has  set  at  rest  it 
has  abundantly  justified  the  questioning  spir- 
it which  is  the  spirit  of  all  science,  and,  as  we 
shall  see,  of  philosophical  science  especially. 
Nevertheless,  physical  science,  however  use- 
ful and  fascinating,  has  two  notable  defects. 
The  first  is  that  it  cannot  answer  the  ques- 
tions men  most  desire  to  know.  It  may  aid 
us  in  performing  our  duty,  but  can  never  tell 
us  why,  or  even  that,  we  should  perform  it. 
It  can  tell  us  the  truth  about  many  things, 
but  can  tell  us  nothing  about  truth  itself. 
It  can  afford  us  good  reasons  for  believing 
various  facts,  but  not  the  grounds  on  which 
we  should  believe  such  reasons.  It  is  essen- 
tially superficial,  and  not  fundamental.  This 


22  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

is  no  cause  why  we  should  disesteem  it,  any 
more  than  we  should  disesteem  our  baker, 
because  he  does  not  know  the  most  recon- 
dite principles  of  biology ;  or  our  butcher, 
because  he  does  not  appreciate  the  bearing 
of  embryology  on  zoological  classification. 
The  mode  of  explaining  the  universe  most 
popular  with  physicists  is  not  regarded  as 
satisfactory  by  many  men  who  feel  very 
deeply  the  problems  of  human  life.  The 
picture  of  an  infinite  aggregate  of  minute 
solid  balls  or  microscopic  ether  whirlpools 
carrying  on  a  very  complex  dance,  even 
though  intelligence  be  deemed  an  accom- 
paniment to  some  of  its  more  involved  fig- 
ures, is  not  satisfactory,  even  as  a  working 
hypothesis,  to  the  deeper  thinkers  among 
us.  But  it  is  the  multitude  of  shallow  think- 
ers who  suffer  on  account  of  the  second  de- 
fect of  physical  science.  This  second  char- 
acteristic is  its  tendency,  by  cheap  and  easy 
appeals  to  the  imagination,  to  stifle  the 
craving  of  the  intellect  to  know  all  that  can 
be  known  of  the  wonderful  universe  which 
on  every  side  surrounds  us.  We  are  open- 


ANOTHER  RENASCENCE  LOOKED  FOR     23 

ly  counselled  to  rest  contented  with  "  ap- 
pearances" (phenomena),  and  to  pass  our 
lives  as  the  witnesses  of  what  we  know  to 
be  but  a  phantasmagoria,  without  trying  to 
obtain — what  we  are  told  we  can  never  ob- 
tain— some  knowledge  of  the  painted  screen, 
the  pigments,  the  lanterns  and  the  actors 
themselves  (so  to  speak)  which  play  off  before 
us  the  set  of  dissolving  views,  the  relations 
between  which  are  all  that  physical  science 
professes,  or  even  hopes,  to  be  able  to  give 
us  any  information  about.  There  are  now 
many  p.ersons,  and  I  am  among  the  number, 
who  think  that  the  time  has  come  for  an- 
other renascence — a  recurrence  of  conditions 
analogous  to  those  which  existed  before 
physical  science  became  the  fashion  of  the 
day.  It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that  the 
present  writer  in  no  way  wishes  to  restore 
medievalism,  even  were  such  an  undesirable 
miracle  possible.  All  he  advocates  is  a  re- 
newed attention  to  principles  and  intellect- 
ual perceptions  which  have  for  a  long  time 
been  too  much  lost  sight  of.  He  is  con- 
vinced that  these  require  to  be  once  more 


24  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

keenly  and  searchingly  scrutinized  in  the 
light  which  four  centuries  of  patient  and 
laborious  work  of  physical  science  have  ob- 
tained for  us. 

This  first  portion  of  our  essay  is,  in  fact, 
a  plea  for  attention  to  questions  the  pro- 
found, though  generally  hidden,  effects  of 
which  on  human  life  and  progress  have  been 
unduly — unreasonably — crowded  out. 

The  time,  it  is  believed,  has  arrived  for 
stimulating  the  spirit  of  inquiry  in  what  is 
for  most  of  our  contemporaries  a  new  di- 
rection. While  carefully  gathering  up  the 
fruits  obtained  for  us  by  physical  science, 
we  must  turn  with  earnestness  and  energy 
to  investigate  the  foundations  of  all  science 
and  of  all  rational  human  activity  of  what- 
ever kind. 

Whoever  would  so  investigate  must  never 
rest  satisfied  with  any  assertion  the  truth  of 
which  is  not  evident  to  his  reason.  He  can- 
not repose  upon  authority,  but  must  see 
clearly  the  truth  of  each  step  he  takes  in 
reasoning ;  otherwise  the  result  cannot  possi- 
bly be  a  satisfactory  one.  He  must  see  the 


NEED   OF   TAKING   TROUBLE  25 

truth  as  to  each  such  step,  and  know  that 
he  sees  the  truth  of  it. 

This  last  necessity  constitutes  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  investigation  for  the  great  ma- 
jority of  men.  We  spoke  of  the  need  of 
being  willing  "  to  take  trouble,"  and  the 
"trouble"  we  referred  to  is  the  trouble  a 
man  often  feels  when,  for  the  first  time,  he 
begins  to  examine  into  his  own  mind  and 
see  what  his  different  mental  acts  are.  This 
trouble  is  not  to  be  avoided.  Every  kind 
of  work  requires  a  proper  handling  of  its 
proper  tools.  We  cannot  cut  down  a  tree 
with  a  painter's  brush,  and  we  cannot  un- 
derstand the  value  of  our  different  beliefs 
and  convictions  save  by  looking  into  our 
own  minds  and  seeing  what  it  is  we  think 
and  know,  and  what  we  are  really  certain 
about. 

The  trouble  which  at  first  attends  upon 
this  process  of  introspection  is  due  to  a 
peculiarity  of  our  organization.  We  are 
spontaneously  impelled  to  notice  surround- 
ing objects,  to  the  apprehension  of  which 
the  mind  applies  itself  with  extreme  facil- 


26  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ity,  but  we  are  not  so  impelled  to  notice 
our  own  various  mental  states.  The  child 
soon  learns  much  about  things  external  to 
it,  but  not  till  long  afterwards  does  it  be- 
gin to  pay  attention  to  its  own  feelings  and 
thoughts ;  yet  the  difficulty  we  may  find  in 
turning  the  mind  inward  upon  itself  can 
soon  be  overcome ;  for  the  faculty  of  intro- 
spection,  like  our  other  faculties,  may  be 
strengthened  by  exercise,  and  all  that  is  or- 
dinarily needed  to  perfect  it  is  patient  per- 
severance* 

In  examining  the  foundations  of  all  sci- 
ence our  inquiry  must  be,  "  What  is  most 
certain  ?"  As  it  is  impossible  for  any  of 
us  to  look  directly  into  any  mind  but  his 
own,  this  inquiry  must  take  the  form,  "  Of 
what  things  am  I  most  certain?"  And  this 
question  may  be  preceded  by  two  others : 
"Are  we  certain  of  anything?"  and  "Does 
such  a  thing  as  certainty  exist?" 

Doubt  and  scepticism  are  not  only  legiti- 
mate but  necessary  in  science.  These  are 
our  safeguards  against  rash  assent  to  prop- 
ositions inadequately  proved.  They  are 


CERTAINTY   INCREASES   AS   SCIENCE   ADVANCES  27 

doubly  necessary  for  the  helpful  science  of 
sciences,  in  studying  which  we,  as  before 
said,  should  assent  to  nothing  which  is  not 
clearly  and  evidently  true  to  our  own  minds. 
Yet  here,  as  elsewhere,  there  may  be  exag- 
geration. It  is  possible  to  be  so  possessed 
by  the  spirit  of  doubt  as  to  forget  the  ex- 
istence and  legitimacy  of  certainty. 

But,  in  the  first  place,  we  are  all  certain, 
as  before  said,  that  science  advances,  and 
it  is  obvious  that  such  advance  would  be 
impossible  if  we  could  not,  by  observations, 
experiments,  and  inferences,  become  so  cer- 
tain with  respect  to  some  facts  as  to  be 
able  to  make  them  the  starting-points  for 
fresh  observations  and  inferences  as  to  other 
facts.  Thus,  as  to  the  earth's  daily  revolu- 
tion, the  stratified  composition  of  its  crust, 
and  the  fact  that  such  strata  here  and  there 
contain  the  fossil  relics  of  ancient  forms  of 
life — as  to  such  things,  educated  men  are 
certain.  No  one  will  probably  deny  that 
we  may  repose  with  absolute  confidence  and 
entire  certainty  upon  a  variety  of  such  asser- 
tions. 


28  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

As  to  matters  of  every-day  life  as  distin- 
guished from  scientific  truths,  though  we 
therein  generally  act  on  reasonable  probabil- 
ities, yet  certainty  meets  us  at  every  turn. 
Thus  we  are  absolutely  certain  that  a  door 
must  be  closed  or  not  closed ;  that  if  having 
been  open  it  is  now  shut,  some  person  or 
thing  must  have  closed  it ;  that  we  cannot 
both  spend  our  money  and  keep  it ;  that  we 
are  warm  or  are  enjoying  a  sweet  taste 
while  we  are  so  doing.  Such  certainty  is 
quite  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt,  and  no 
one  denies  that  while  we  are  actually  expe- 
riencing some  kind  of  feeling,  we  absolutely 
know  and  may  be  certain  that  we  do  feel  it. 

But  it  is  necessary  at  the  outset  of  our  in- 
quiry to  take  very  special  pains  not  to  make 
even  such  assertions  hastily.  Nevertheless, 
every  man  of  science  must  affirm  that  there 
really  is  such  a  thing  as  legitimate  certainty, 
and  that  we  are  all  certain  of  something  ; 
otherwise  there  would  be  no  certain  science 
of  any  kind.  Blind  disbelief  is  as  fatal  to 
science  as  blind  belief,  and  it  is  possible 
for  men  to  get  themselves  into  a  diseased 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM    INDEFENSIBLE          29 

condition  of  general  distrust  and  uncertainty 
— to  acquire  a  sort  of  mental  falling -sick- 
ness. Experience  proves  that  they  may 
bring  themselves  to  doubt  or  deny  the 
plainest  truths,  the  evidence  of  their  senses, 
the  reality  of  truth  or  virtue,  and  even  their 
own  existence.  It  is  necessary,  thet\,  dis- 
tinctly to  recognize  that  there  is  such  a  thing 
as  legitimate  certainty,  not  to  perceive  the 
force  of  which  is  illegitimate  doubt.  Such 
doubt  would,  as  just  observed,  necessarily 
discredit  all  physical  science.  Universal 
doubt  is  simply  an  absurdity  —  it  is  scepti- 
cism run  mad.  If  a  man  doubts  whether 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  rational  speech,  or 
whether  words  can  be  used  twice  over  by 
any  two  people  in  the  same  sense,  then 
plainly  we  cannot  profitably  argue  with  him. 
But  if,  on  account  of  his  very  absurdity,  we 
cannot  refute  him,  it  is  no  less  plain  that  he 
cannot  defend  his  scepticism.  Were  he  to 
attempt  so  to  do,  then  he  would  show,  by 
that  very  attempt,  that  he  really  had  confi- 
dence in  reason  and  in  language,  however  he 
might  verbally  deny  it.  Universal  scepti- 


30  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

cism  is  most  foolish  because  it  refutes  itself. 
If  any  one  were  to  say  "  Nothing  is  certain," 
he  would  necessarily  contradict  himself,  for 
he  would  thereby,  in  the  very  same  breath, 
say  that  "  something  is  certain,"  since  he  says 
"  It  is  certain  nothing  is  certain."  He  says, 
therefore,  something  which,  if  true,  absolute- 
ly contradicts  what  he  affirms.  But  a  man 
who  affirms  what  the  system  he  proposes 
to  adopt  forbids  him  to  affirm,  and  who  de- 
clares that  he  believes  what  he  at  the  same 
time  declares  to  be  unbelievable,  should 
hardly  complain  if  he  is  called  foolish.  No 
system  can  be  true  and  no  reasoning  can  be 
valid  which  inevitably  ends  in  absurdity. 
Such  scepticism,  then,  cannot  be  the  mark  of 
an  exceptionally  intellectual  mind,  but  of  an 
exceptionally  foolish  one,  and  every  mental 
attitude  which  necessarily  leads  to  and  re- 
sults in  scepticism  of  this  sort,  must  be  an 
untenable  attitude  and  a  false  intellectual 
position. 

Let  us  see  a  little  further  how  self-refut- 
ing such  modes  of  thought  are.  Suppose  a 
man  were  to  say,  "  I  cannot  be  sure  of  any- 


ABSOLUTE   CERTAINTY   POSSIBLE  31 

thing,  because  I  cannot  be  certain  that  my 
faculties  are  not  always  fallacious/'  or  "  I 
cannot  be  sure  of  anything,  because  for  all  I 
know  I  may  be  the  plaything  of  some  demon 
who  amuses  himself  by  constantly  deceiving 
me."  In  both  these  cases  such  a  man  would 
simply  contradict  himself ;  for  how  does  he 
know  that  "  constantly  fallacious  faculties  " 
or  "a  demon  deceiving  in  all  things*'  would 
necessarily  deprive  him  of  certainty?  Obvi- 
ously he  can  only  know  this  because  he  sees 
that  it  is  impossible  to  arrive  at  certain  con- 
clusions by  means  of  anything  uncertain  or 
false.  But  if  he  knows  t/mt  truth — if  he  is 
certain  of  that — he  must  know  that  his  fac- 
ulties are  not  always  fallacious  and  that  his 
demon  has  been  unable  to  deceive  him  in 
everything.  Universal  doubt,  then,  is  man- 
ifestly an  absurdity. 

My  object  in  making  these  remarks  is  to 
enable  any  of  my  readers  who  may  need  it 
to  get  clear  of  such  mere  idle,  irrational 
doubts,  and  to  recognize  the  fact  that  they 
already  possess  an  absolute  certainty  as  to 
some  things. 


32  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

We  possess  mental  faculties  whereby  we 
can  and  do  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  some 
truth,  and  if  any  man  professes  to  doubt  or 
deny  their  validity,  we  must  be  content  to 
pass  him  by,  while  calling  his  attention  to 
the  fact  that  he  refutes  himself.  It  is  clear, 
then,  that  we  all  do  know  and  are  certain 
about  something,  as,  for  example,  those  per- 
sons who  read  these  lines  with  a  view  to  con- 
sider the  grounds  of  certainty  may  be  certain 
that  they  are  inquiring  about  the  certainty 
of  knowledge. 

It  being  thus  clear  that  we  are,  all  of  us, 
certain  about  some  things,  let  us  see  a  little 
more  as  to  what  some  of  them  are,  and  why 
we  must  be  certain  about  them.  What  are 
the  grounds  of  our  certainty  ? 

Various  theories  have  been  propounded  on 
this  subject  by  a  number  of  estimable  per- 
sons. Thus  it  has  been  said  that  we  can  by 
reasoning  attain  to  a  solid  support  for  all 
our  beliefs  and  convictions.  But  in  order  to 
prove  anything  by  reasoning,  we  must  show 
that  it  necessarily  follows  as  a  consequence 
from  other  truths  on  the  truth  of  which  its 


SO-CALLED    INDISPUTABLE    PROPOSITIONS        33 

own  truth  depends.  Such  other  truths  must, 
therefore,  be  deemed  more  indisputable  than 
the  thing  they  are  called  on  to  prove.  But 
it  is  evident  that  we  cannot  prove  everything. 
However  long  may  be  our  arguments,  we 
must  at  last  come  to  ultimate  statements, 
which  must  be  taken  for  granted,  as  we  must 
take  for  granted  the  validity  of  the  reason- 
ing process  itself.  If  we  had  to  prove  either 
the  validity  of  that  process  or  such  ultimate 
statements,  then  either  we  must  argue  in  a 
circle  or  our  process  of  proof  must  go  on 
forever  without  coming  to  a  conclusion.  In 
other  words,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as 
proof  at  all. 

It  has,  again,  been  said  that  indisputable 
propositions  are  those  which1  have  not  been 
impressed  upon  us  by  habit  or  by  any  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  but  are  what  they  call  "  the 
genuine  testimony  of  consciousness,"  such  as 
spontaneously  arises  in  the  dawning  intelli- 
gence of  the  infant  mind.  It  is,  to  say  the 
least,  somewhat  difficult  to  see  why  such  a 
surprising  keenness  of  mental  vision  should 
be  attributed  to  babies;  but  as  such  a  test  of 


34  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

truth  is  an  utterly  impracticable  one  and,  like 
the  others  here  referred  to  (as  we  shall  short- 
ly see),  not  really  to  the  point,  no  more  need 
here  be  said  about  it. 

Some  good  persons,  finally,  lay  it  down  as 
our  duty  to  select  as  the  truest  propositions 
those  which,  not  having  been  gained  by 
experience,  are  called  a  priori,  and  have 
been  implanted  in  our  intelligence  by  a  be- 
nevolent and  all-wise  Creator.  That  a  judg- 
ment is  "  God  -implanted"  is  a  very  good 
reason  for  accepting  it  with  those  who  al- 
ready believe  in  "  an  all-wise  and  benevolent 
Creator"  ;  but  that  the  test  is  a  practically 
useless  one  is  plainly  shown  by  the  number 
of  books  which  have  been  written  to  refute 
persons  who  affirm  that  we  have  no  sufficient 
evidence  of  God's  existence  or,  at  least,  of 
his  goodness. 

Other  persons  deny  that  we  can  discover 
any  indisputable  propositions  at  all,  basing 
their  denial  on  the  alleged  fact  that  the 
whole  of  our  ideas  are  simply  derived  from 
ancestral  feelings  of  not  only  countless  gen- 
erations of  mankind,  but  of  an  indefinite 


WHAT  JUDGMENTS   ARE   CERTAIN  35 

number  of  brute  ancestors  in  addition.  But 
why  are  ideas  and  beliefs  to  be  considered 
less  certain  and  ultimate  if  they  are  attained 
by  the  help  of  such  ancestral  experiences 
than  if  they  are  due  to  individual  impulses? 
In  fact,  one  and  the  same  objection  must 
be  made  to  all  these  different  representations. 
The  matters  they  refer  to  are  very  interest- 
ing, but  the  problem  we  have  to  solve  is  one 
entirely  independent  of  them  and  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  problem  concerning  the 
origin  of  our  judgments.  Valuable  as  such 
inquiries  are  for  the  study  of  the  human 
mind,  they  are  quite  out  of  place  in  an  in- 
quiry as  to  what  judgments  are  evidently  and 
supremely  certain.  This  last  inquiry  refers 
to  the  grounds  of  belief  which  any  judgment 
may  exhibit  in  and  by  itself — to  a  criterion 
of  its  truth — and  not  at  all  to  the  causes 
which  have  produced  it.  Yet  there  are  phi- 
losophers who  have  been  so  busy  in  try- 
ing to  find  out  how  different  propositions 
have  come  to  be  believed  that  they  have 
neglected  the  more  fundamental  inquiry  as 
to  why  they  should  be  believed  —  what 


36  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

grounds  of  certainty  they  exhibit.  By  the 
"  grounds  of  certainty  "  which  any  judgment 
can  show,  it  is  not,  of  course,  meant  any- 
thing external  to  it.  Such  a  meaning  would 
imply  a  proof  of  the  judgment,  and  would 
involve  us  in  an  endless  and  resultless  series 
of  arguments,  as  already  pointed  out  with  re- 
spect to  reasoning.  The  only  ground  of  cer- 
tainty which  an  ultimate  and  supremely 
certain  judgment  can  possess  is  its  own 
internal  self-evidence — its  own  manifest  cer- 
tainty in  and  by  itself.  Such  certainty  we 
possess  when  we  recognize  that  we  feel  pain 
or  that  we  have  a  sensation  of  sound  or  a 
taste  of  sweetness.  It  is  manifestly  as  super- 
fluous as  impossible  to  try  and  prove  such 
things ;  their  evidence  is  direct  and  immedi- 
ate, and  whatever  may  be  the  origin  and 
causes  of  such  perceptions,  they  manifest 
their  existence  by  their  own  internal  evi- 
dence. The  slightest  reflection  will  show 
that  it  is  impossible  that  we  can  be  deceived 
about  having  a  feeling  while  it  is  being  ab- 
solutely felt.  Similarly  all  proof,  as  all  rea- 
soning, must  ultimately  rest  upon  truths 


SELF-EVIDENCE    NOT    BLIND    BELIEF  37 

which  carry  with  them  their  own  evidence, 
and  do  not  therefore  need  proof. 

But  some  readers  may  be  startled  at  the 
suggestion  of  believing  anything  on  "  its  own 
evidence,"  and  may  fancy  it  is  equivalent  to 
a  suggestion  that  they  should  believe  some- 
thing blindly.  This  startled  feeling  is,  I  be- 
lieve, due  to  the  circumstance  that  the  great- 
er part  of  our  knowledge  has  been  gained, 
not  by  our  own  observation,  but  by  testimony 
or  else  by  inference. 

We  ordinarily  ask  for  some  "  proof  "  with 
regard  to  any  remarkable  statement,  espe- 
cially if  it  be  one  which  carries  with  it  impor- 
tant consequences.  No  truths  are  brought 
home  to  our  minds  more  forcibly  than  are 
the  truths  of  Euclid,  and  these  have  been 
rigidly  demonstrated  to  us  by  the  clearest 
reasoning.  From  such  habitual  connection 
between  (i)  reasoning  and  (2)  our  apprehen- 
sion of  new  truths,  we  have  acquired  a  feel- 
ing that  to  believe  anything  which  cannot 
be  proved  i-s  to  believe  blindly,  and  have 
therefore  acquired  a  tendency  to  distrust 
whatever  may  be  above  or  beyond  proof. 


38  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

We  are  too  apt  to  forget,  what,  on  reflec- 
tion, is  obvious  enough,  namely,  that  if  it  is 
not  blind  credulity  to  believe  what  is  evident 
to  us  by  means  of  something  else,  it  must  be 
still  less  blind  to  believe  that  which  is  direct- 
ly evident  in  and  by  itself. 

The  most  certain  of  all  judgments,  then, 
must  be  those  which  require  no  proof  and 
are  self-evident.  But  is  it  within  the  bounds 
of  possibility  that  the  most  certain  and  ul- 
timate truths  could  have  any  better  criterion 
or  ground  of  belief  than  they  in  fact  thus 
have? 

All  criteria  or  tests  of  the  truth  of  judg- 
ments must  be  one  of  two  kinds: 

Every  such  test  or  criterion  must  either 
(i)  reside  in  the  judgment  or  perception  it- 
self, and  so  make  it  luminously  self-evident, 
or  it  must  (2)  reside  in  something  external  to 
it.  Now  any  external  criterion,  however 
striking  and  perfect  it  might  be,  could  only 
be  appreciated  by  us  through  our  perception 
of  it  and  our  judgment  about  it.  If  a  prop- 
osition appeared  suddenly  written  up  on  the 
clouds  or  on  the  face  of  the  full  moon,  we 


SELF-EVIDENCE   THE    ULTIMATE   CRITERION     39 

could  not  recognize  such  a  proposition  as 
true  until  after  having  examined  and  care- 
fully considered  much  evidence  about  it. 
Our  first  impression  would  of  course  be  that 
we  were  the  victims  of  an  hallucination,  and 
then  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  com- 
mon hallucinations  would  have  to  be  con- 
sidered. Ultimately  and  at  last,  if  the  truth 
of  such  a  proposition  were  accepted,  it  could 
only  be  accepted  because  we  perceived  that 
our  ultimate  judgments  about  it  were  self- 
evidently  true.  In  fact,  it  would,  for  us,  at 
least,  exclusively  repose  upon  that  very  self- 
evidence^  objections  to  which  have  been  here 
suggested.  By  no  external  criteria,  then, 
neither  by  such  as  the  absurd  one  just  imag- 
ined nor  by  any  other,  could  we  be  made 
any  better  off  than  we  now  are.  We  could 
but  have  self-evidence,  after  all,  as  our  ulti- 
mate criterion.  It  will  be  plain,  on  reflection, 
that  nothing  external — no  common  consent 
of  mankind,  common -sense,  or  testimony — 
could  ever  take  the  place  of  an  ultimate  cri- 
terion of  knowledge,  since  some  judgment 
of  our  own  mind  must  always  decide  for  us 


40  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

with  respect  to  the  existence  and  value  of 
such  criteria.  Self-evidence,  then,  is  the  nec- 
essary and  the  only  criterion  of  truth.  The 
principle  of  evidence  is  one  which  is  really 
ultimate,  and  must  be  accepted  under  pain  of 
either  futile  reasoning  or  complete  intellect- 
ual paralysis.  It  is,  however,  necessarily  in- 
capable of  demonstration,  since  it  depends 
on  nothing  else.  We  all  of  us  assume  it  as  a 
criterion  unconsciously,  and  it  is  confidently 
acted  on  by  every  one  who  reasons.  But 
when  we  ponder  over  the  matter  it  becomes 
clear  that  what  we  have  thus  done,  through 
the  spontaneous  activity  of  our  intellect,  has 
been  done  most  reasonably.  Did  we  not 
adopt  it,  we  should  not  only  be  utterly  un- 
able to  think  logically,  but  should  be  plunged 
into  the  most  utter  and  most  absurd  scepti- 
cism. On  the  other  hand,  by  recognizing 
that  criterion  for  what  it  must  be  and  is, 
we  gain  a  secure  foundation  for  our  knowl- 
edge and  are  enabled  to  make  progress  in 
science.  Our  mental  condition  is  trans- 
formed from  a  hopeless  chaos  to  an  orderly 
cosmos. 


THE   TEST    OF    ABSOLUTE    CERTAINTY  41 

We  end  this  preliminary  part  of  the  pres- 
ent essay,  then,  by  claiming  to  have  shown 
the  attentive  reader  that  his  own  mind  al- 
ready possesses  absolute  certainty  about 
some  things,  and  that  the  declaration  of  his 
intellect  is  that-  things  which  are  clearly 
seen  to  be  evident  in  and  by  themselves 
possess  the  greatest  certainty  which  it  is 
possible  for  the  human  mind  to  have.  If 
any  one  is  so  unfortunate  as  not  to  be  able 
to  see  this  clearly  and  not  to  see  that  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  certainty  with  respect 
to  any  matter,  then  he  had  better  read  no 
further,  and  content  himself  with  simple 
matters,  the  toils  and  the  pleasures  of  every- 
day life,  without  a  thought  beyond.  Fort- 
unately it  is  not  necessary  to  be  a  wise  man 
in  order  to  be  a  good  and  useful  one  in  plain 
and  simple  ways  of  goodness  and  utility. 

But  for  healthy,  normally  constituted 
minds  that  can  appreciate  the  necessary  con- 
ditions which  appertain,  for  us,  to  all  funda- 
mental truth,  it  must  be  evident  that  we 
need  three  things  in  order  to  enter  upon  the 
investigation  of  the  ultimate  foundations  of 


42  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

all  physical  science  and  all  rules  of  conduct. 
These  three  things  are:  (i)  perceptions  of 
certain  general  principles,  (2)  perceptions  of 
certain  facts,  and  (3)  perceptions  of  the  valid- 
ity of  certain  arguments.  Without  a  knowl- 
edge of  certain  general  truths  we  could  not 
argue,  without  a  knowledge  of  certain  facts 
all  our  reasoning  would  merely  concern  ideas 
and  would  have  no  relation  to  reality,  and 
without  some  criterion  of  valid  reasoning  we 
could  never  arrive  at  any  conclusion,  and  all 
argument  would  be  vain.  Since,  however, 
men  of  all  schools  argue,  it  is  plain  they  do 
not  think  all  argument  vain,  and  it  is  no  less 
plain  that  they  must  accept  some  facts  as 
true  and  rely  with  confidence  upon  those 
principles  to  which,  in  their  arguments,  they 
make  appeal.  In  the  next  part  of  this  essay 
we  shall  directly  apply  ourselves  to  consider 
some  of  the  truths  which  are  implied  and 
confidently  relied  on  by  all  followers  of  phys- 
ical science. 


part  1T1T 

THE  object  of  the  first  part  of  this  essay 
was  to  bring  home  to  its  readers  that  certain 
very  practical  questions  have  been  unreason- 
ably crowded  out  in  that  unconscious  compe- 
tition for  the  attention  of  mankind  which 
may  be  called  "  the  struggle  for  life  "  of  the 
arts  and  'sciences. 

Considerations  also  were  therein  proffered 
which  seemed  to  prove  that  some  correct 
study  of  "  the  helpful  science  "  is  incumbent 
on  all  who  desire  to  lead  a  thoroughly  well- 
ordered  and  entirely  reasonable  life. 

It  was  also  pointed  out  that  we  all  possess 
absolute  certainty  about  some  things,  and 
that  the  result  of  self-questioning  is  to  show 
that  nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  what- 
ever is  self-evident  in  and  by  itself.  There- 
fore, all  sciences,  together  with  all  ethical 
precepts,  ultimately  repose  on  certain  truths 


44  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

seen  to  be  evidently  true — an  evidence  than 
which  there  can  be  no  better. 

The  truth  of  whatever  is  true  and  the  evi- 
dence of  whatever  is  evident  can,  of  course, 
only  be  made  known  to  us  as  being  clearly 
true  and  evident  by  means  of  "  thought";  as, 
for  example,  when  the  reader  of  this  page 
turns  his  mind  in  upon  himself  and  recog- 
nizes what  he  is  doing  and  that  he  knows  it. 
Not  to  be  certain  about  such  an  evident 
truth  is  to  be  in  a  mentally  diseased  and 
more  or  less  intellectually  paralyzed  con- 
dition. 

The  author  craves  indulgence  for  such 
seemingly  trivial  assertions,  but  it  is  not  his 
fault  that  he  has  to  make  them.  The  in- 
genuity of  successive  metaphysicians,  each 
trying  to  be  original  and  obtain  renown  by 
some  new  absurdity,  has  made  it  necessary 
for  any  writer  who  aspires  to  be  helpful  to 
make  very  sure  of  the  ground  he  proposes  to 
build  on,  and  that  every  stone  of  the  build- 
ing he  begins  to  erect  should  be  firmly  and 
solidly  set. 

But  here  I  may  be  met  with  the  objection, 


WHAT    IS  THE    ULTIMATE   TEST   OF    CERTAINTY  ?  45 

"  Your  ground  is  not  sure ;  you  represent  all 
truth  as  being  known  by  means  of  'thought' ; 
but  the  railway  I  travelled  by  yesterday  was 
not  '  a  thought,'  and  the  dinner  I  hope 
shortly  to  partake  of  will,  I  trust,  be  made 
of  more  substantial  material.  Thank  God,  I 
have  my  senses  about  me,  and  I  shrewdly 
suspect  thatg  I  begin  to  feel  sensations  a 
considerable  time  before  I  begin  to  think 
about  them.  I  abide  by  my  experience ;  I 
know  my  feelings  and  sensations,  and  I  am 
much  more  inclined  to  regard  all  your  fine 
'  thoughts  '  as  really  built  up  of  them,  than 
to  think  the  cramp  in  my  leg  which  woke  me 
last  night  was  '  a  thought '  or  an  amalgam 
of  4  thoughts.'  I  therefore  demur  to  your 
system  altogether,  and  at  the  very  outset." 

There  are  not  a  few  men  who,  like  my  sup- 
posed opponent,  would  assign  to  our  sensi- 
tive faculty  the  dignity  of  acting  as  our  su- 
preme and  ultimate  test  of  reality  and  truth. 
But  the  following  considerations  will,  it  is 
believedj  suffice  to  show  that  in  this  such 
men  are  greatly  mistaken.  It  is  the  intellect 
which  is  alone  supreme,  and  this  not  only  in 


46  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

judging  about  abstract  or  mental  matters, 
but  also  in  judging  of  matters  of  which  the 
senses  take  cognizance — whether  it  be  rail- 
way trains,  the  courses  of  a  well-ordered  din- 
ner, or  anything  else. 

I  am  not  one  of  those  who  doubt  about  the 
real  existence  of  an  external  world,  or  about 
the  certain  information  our  senses  can  give  us 
concerning  that  world.  Nor  do  I  deny — for 
I  confidently  affirm — that  sensation  precedes 
thought,  and  that  only  after  a  long  course  of 
sensations  felt  does  the  infant  begin  to  think. 
But,  as  pointed  out  in  the  first  part  of  this  es- 
say, the  question  is  not  as  to  the  mode  of  ori- 
gin of  the  intellect's  activity,  but  as  to  the 
value  of  its  declarations  when  mature.  He 
would  not  be  a  very  wise  man  who  in  business 
matters  should  doubt  the  accuracy  of  his  calcu- 
lations because  he  could  not  have  made  them 
when  he  was  a  week  old !  But  even  with  re- 
spect to  the  material  objects  about  us  which 
can  be  submitted  to  the  test  of  our  sensitive 
faculty,  the  last  word,  in  all  cases  of  doubt, 
rests  with  the  intellect  and  not  with  the 
senses.  Let  us  suppose  that  we  are  per- 


SENSATIONS   AN   AID   TO   JUDGMENT  47 

forming  some  chemical  experiments  to  find 
out  the  properties  of  some  newly  discovered 
compound.  Since  in  such  a  case  we  appeal 
directly  to  our  senses  for  information,  it 
might  seem  that  our  ultimate  criterion  must 
be  our  sensations,  and  that  their  declarations 
must  always  be  supreme.  Yet  in  fact  such 
is  not  the  case.  The  enormous  value  of  our 
sensations  is  manifest,  as  well  as  that  the  in- 
formation we  receive  through  them  is  indis- 
pensable. Nevertheless,  it  is  the  judgment 
of  the  perceiving  mind  which  alone  gives 
them  value,  although  its  action  ordinarily 
takes  place  unnoticed.  Let,  however,  some 
distrust  arise  as  to  the  results  arrived  at, 
leading,  perhaps,  to  a  careful  repetition  of 
experiments ;  then,  in  the  last  resource,  when 
we  have  done  observing  and  experimenting, 
how  do  we  know  we  have  obtained  the  re- 
sults we  may  have  obtained,  save  by  the  in- 
tellect ?  How  are  we  to  judge  between  what 
may  seem  to  be  the  conflicting  indications  of 
different  sense-impressions  ?  Nothing  could 
be  more  foolish  than  to  undervalue  the  testi- 
mony of  the  senses,  and  the  senses  are  truly 


48  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

a  test  and  cause  of  certainty,  but  they  are 
not  the  test  of  it.  Certainty  is  not  in  sensa- 
tion, though  sensation  is  so  constantly  our 
means  of  acquiring  it.  Certainty  belongs  to 
thought,  and  to  thought  only.  Self  -  con- 
scious, reflective  thought,  then,  is  our  ulti- 
mate and  absolute  criterion.  It  is  by  thought 
only  —  by  the  self-conscious  intellect  —  that 
we  know  we  have  "feelings"  at  all.  With- 
out that  we  might  indeed  feel  (since  we  often 
come  to  know  we  have  had  feelings  of  which 
we  were  at  the  time  unconscious),  but  we 
could  not  know  that  we  felt.  Our  ultimate 
court  of  appeal  and  supreme  criterion  is  the 
intellect,  and  not  sense;  our  last  appeal  is 
and  must  ever  be  to  a  perception  or  "  intui- 
tion "  of  the  intellect. 

But  not  only  in  such  appeals  to  our  own 
mental  experience  is  there  a  supremacy  of 
"thought"  over  "sense,"  but  every  one  of 
our  perceptions — be  it  of  a  dog  or  a  dollar — 
contains  what  is  altogether  beyond  sense. 
To  perceive  a  dog  implies  a  perception  of 
"  unity,"  and  therefore  of  "  number,"  of  "ex- 
istence," of  "  distinction  "  (as  distinct  from 


AND    " INTELLECTUALS  M  49 

creatures  not  dogs),  of  "  reality  "  (as  not  be- 
ing a  mere  imagination),  and  of  "  truth." 

The  profoundly  irrational  system  which 
would  feign  persuade  us  that  ideas  are  noth- 
ing but  sense-impressions — received,  associ- 
ated, remembered,  etc. — and  that  our  ultimate 
appeal  is  to  the  senses,  may  be  justly  spoken 
of  as  "  Sensism"  and  its  advocates  as  Sensists. 

The  opposite  system,  here  vindicated,  may 
(since  it  recognizes  the  intellect  as  supreme 
over  sense)  be  rightly  termed  IntelUctualism, 
and  its  vindicators — as  alike  opposed  to  all 
forms  of  materialism  or  idealism — named  In- 
tellectualists.  It  is  quite  true  that  multitudes 
of  objects. of  all  kinds  existed  ages  before  our 
intellectual  activity  began,  but  such  things 
were  practically  non-existent  for  us  until  our 
intellect  began  to  think  about  them,  and  so 
furnish  us  with  a  basis  for  an  incipient  de- 
gree of  knowledge.  We  can  feel,  and  origi- 
nally did  feel,  without  exercising  our  intellect. 
But  until  such  sensuous  experience  comes 
within  the  grasp  of  the  intellect — comes  to 
be  an  object  of  our  direct  thought — it  cannot 
constitute  "knowledge." 


50  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

Space  cannot  be  here  afforded  for  any 
lengthened  demonstration  of  the  essential 
difference  which  exists  between  sensation 
and  thought.  It  must  suffice  to  show,  by 
one  or  two  more  examples,  how,  by  the  help 
of  sensations,  the  mind  can  conceive  of  what 
is  altogether  beyond  sensation.  Thus,  for 
example,  we  often  refer  to  some  past  "  ex- 
perience," and  the  idea  is  a  sufficiently  fa- 
miliar one.  Yet  that  idea  cannot  possibly 
be  a  faint  reproduction  of  past  feelings,  for 
"  experience"  is  something  which  was  never 
felt  at  all.  By  receiving,  or  obtaining,  over 
and  over  again,  feelings  of  the  same  or  of 
different  kinds,  we  may  find  it  easier  to  feel 
them ;  or  they  may  become  more  pleasur- 
able to  us  or  (as  is  too  often  the  case)  less 
so.  But  to  undergo  such  changes  of  feeling, 
and  to  obtain  the  idea  "  experience,"  are  two 
very  different  things.  Again,  we  can  all 
form  an  idea  of  the  action  of  our  eyes  in 
seeing  (our  act  of  sight),  yet  that  act  of  see- 
ing was  never  itself  felt,  nor  can  the  idea  be 
decomposed  into  mere  feelings — there  is  in- 
finitely more  contained  within  it.  We  may 


CERTAINTY   WITHOUT   FEELING  55 

have  a  certain  feeling  in  our  eyeballs  while 
looking,  but  even  if  we  could  feel  (which  we 
cannot)  every  minute  action  of  every  part  of 
the  eye's  and  the  brain's  complex  median-, 
ism,  such  feelings  would  be  no  "  idea  of  the 
act  of  seeing."  Among  the  constant  expe- 
riences of  our  daily  life  are  our  perception 
of  different  shades  of  color,  and  different 
feelings  have  gone  along  with  them.  Of 
"  color,"  however,  we  have  never  once  had  a 
feeling,  yet  we  have  a  clear  idea  of  it,  and 
often  speak  thereof. 

We  have  certainly  another  idea  which  was 
never  felt,  and  that  is  our  idea  of  "  nothing/' 
or  u  nonentity."  It  is  very  certain  that  past 
sensations  can  never  account  for  //to  con- 
ception, which  is,  nevertheless,  one  com- 
monly enough  employed.  How  often  do 
we  not  hear  such  expressions  as  "  It  is 
worth  nothing,"  or  "  There  is  nothing 
in  it!" 

So  much  for  the  fact  that  ideas  have 
an  extension  and  validity  beyond  the  do- 
main of  our  mere  sensitive  faculty.  Nev- 
ertheless, I  am  far,  indeed,  from  regard- 


52  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ing  ideas  as  everything  —  which  is  "  Ideal- 
ism." 

It  is  utterly  impossible  in  the  course  of 
this  essay  to  enter  upon  any  examination  of 
that  system  of  thought  which  originated 
with  Bishop  Berkeley,  although  I  shall  have 
some  words  to  say  about  it  later  on.  A  dis- 
belief in — even  a  doubt  about — the  real,  in- 
dependent existence  of  the  material  world 
is,  in  my  eyes,  a  form  of  insanity.  That,  for 
example,  the  numerical  relations  of  things — 
the  facts  concerning  their  numbers  (that,  e.g., 
oranges  on  a  plate  are  three  and  not  five) — 
are  matters  absolutely  real  and  true  in  them- 
selves, and  are  not  dependent  on  my  fac- 
ulties or  the  thoughts  and  perceptions  of 
any  other  man,  is,  for  me,  unquestionable. 
That  the  bodies  about  us  are  really  ex- 
tended— that  the  quality  extension  is  a  real 
one — is  also,  for  me,  unquestionable.  When 
Dr.  Johnson  kicked  a  stone  by  way  of  refut- 
ing idealism  the  action  seemed  absurd,  and 
has  been  long  a  subject  of  ridicule.  For  all 
that,  I  strongly  suspect  that  the  existence  of 
a  direct  perception — an  intuition — of  the  real 


THREE  ORDERS  OF  TRUTH          53 

extension  of  seemingly  extended  things  was 
the  truth  he  intended  to  assert  by  that  rough- 
and-ready  procedure. 

But  it  is  time  to  revert  to  the  considera- 
tion of  some  of  those  truths  which  are  im- 
plied, and  confidently  relied  on,  by  all  fol- 
lowers of  physical  science — a  consideration 
which  it  was  said,  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
first  part  of  this  essay,  should  form  the  sub- 
ject of  its  second  part. 

Those  truths,  as  before  pointed  out,  relate 
to  three  orders  of  truth :  (i)  general  princi- 
ples, (2)  particular  facts,  and  (3)  the  process 
of  reasoning. 

Now  every  reasonable  man,  and  surely, 
above  all,  every  practical  man,  must  need 
some  especially  solid  foundation  as  a  start- 
ing-point, and,  therefore,  I  will  select  from 
the  second  of  the  three  foregoing  categories 
one  special  and  particular  fact  as  an  absolute 
starting-point  in  the  investigation  and  justi- 
fication of"  the  helpful  science." 

Let  us  suppose  that  certain  definite  ob- 
servations and  experiments  have  been  car- 
ried on — such  as  those  which  have  been  per- 


54  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

formed  by  M.  Dareste  in  order  to  find  out 
what  physical  deformities  in  the  embryo  of 
the  chick  may  be  produced  by  certain  excep- 
tional modes  of  treatment  of  the  egg.  Now 
there  is  one  supremely  important  truth  which 
is  implied  in  our  certainty  of  the  result  of 
any  such  experirrient,  whatever  that  result 
may  be.  Unless  we  can  be  sure  that  it  was 
we  who  both  began  the  experiment  and  also 
witnessed  its  conclusion  —  that  there  had 
been  no  change  in  our  personality  while  ex- 
perimenting— such  conclusion  could  not  be 
'confidently  relied  on  by  us.  In  other  words, 
the  truth  implied  in  every  scientific  experi- 
ment is  the  certainty  of  our  knowledge  of 
bur  own  continuous  existence  during  its  per- 
formance. 

But  here  some  of  my  readers  may  very 
naturally  exclaim, "  I  am  not  going  to  waste 
my  time  in  reading  assurances  that  I  know 
I  exist.  I  am  not  an  idiot !"  And,  indeed, 
when  some  one  is  very  sure  about  anything 
he  will  often  say,  "  I  am  as  certain  about  it 
as  I  am  of  my  own  existence."  It  is  no 
wonder-)  then,  that  some  persons  should  feel 


AS   TO    THE   CERTAINTY   OF    OUR    EXISTENCE     55 

disinclined  to  consider  reasonings  about  a 
matter  they  have  never  doubted  in  the  least, 
even  though  they  may  know  that  others 
have  professed  to  doubt  about  it.  "  To 
doubt  one's  knowledge  of  one's  own  exist- 
ence," they  may  say,  "  is  even  more  absurd 
than  to  believe  that  one's  limbs  are  made  of 
glass."  Nevertheless,  we  once  more  beg  our 
readers  to  exercise  yet  a  little  patience  still, 
for  the  question  is  one  of  extreme  impor- 
tance. It  is  denied  by  all  the  modern  fol- 
lowers of  Hume — such  as  Herbert  Spencer, 
Huxley,  Mill,  Bain,  etc. — that  we  have,  or 
can  have,  supreme  certainty  about  our  own 
existence.  Such  certainty,  they  say,  we  can 
only  have  with  respect  to  our  actual  present 
feelings,  or  what  they  call  "  states  of  con- 
sciousness." They  do  not,  of  course,  deny 
the  certainty  of  the  momentary  feeling  of 
existence  which  any  one  may  have ;  what 
they  deny  is  that  we  can  have  any  certainty 
that  our  existence  continues  on,  substantial- 
ly the  same,  during  all  the  various  changes 
of  feeling  we  successively  experience. 

Such  a  "  continuous  self,"  it   is   affirmed, 


56  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

we  can  never  know  apart  from  our  various 
"  feelings "  or  "  states  of  consciousness."  We 
can  never  know  our  own  self,  they  tell  us, 
unmodified ;  that  is,  as  existing  what  they 
call  absolutely,  or,  in  other  words,  by  itself. 
Therefore,  they  argue,  we  can  never  know 
our  own  existence  with  the  greatest  certainty 
possible. 

But,  in  fact,  there  is  nothing  we  can  per- 
ceive which  exists  apart  from  everything 
else  or  "  absolutely  " — as  it  is,  in  my  opinion, 
very  absurdly  called.  Everything  which  ex- 
ists always  exists  in  some  state  or  condition, 
and  stands  in  some  definite  relation  to  other 
things.  Small  wonder,  then,  if  we  do  not 
know  things  in  a  way  in  which  they  never 
do  and  probably  never  can  exist ;  that  is, 
"  unmodified  "  and  "  unrelated."  We  can 
know  nothing  by  itself,  for  the  very  good 
reason  that  nothing  exists  "  by  itself." 
Therefore,  it  is  not  at  all  wonderful  if  we 
only  know  "ourselves"  in  connection  with 
our  various  "  feelings,"  or  vice  versa. 

It  is  quite  true  that  we  never  knew  our 
own  existing  being,  alone  and  unmodified  ; 


OUR   KNOWLEDGE   OF   OURSELVES  57 

but  then  we  have  never  for  an  instant  so  ex- 
isted. Our  knowledge  of  ourselves  is,  in  this 
respect,  just  like  our  knowledge  of  anybody 
else.  Probably  some  of  our  readers  have 
known  the  late  highly  distinguished  bota- 
nist Professor  Asa  Gray;  yet,  if  so,  they  nev- 
er knew  him  except  in  some  "  state  " — either 
talking  or  silent,  at  home  or  away  from 
home,  examining  a  plant  or  not  examining 
one,  with  his  head  covered  or  with  it  uncov- 
ered— and  this  for  the  very  good  and  obvi- 
ous reas.on  that  he  never  did,  or  could,  exist 
for  one  moment  save  in  some  "state."  But 
this  need  not  have  prevented  Professor  Asa 
Gray  from  being  very  well  known,  and  the 
same  consideration  applies  to  our  knowledge 
of  ourselves.  If  the  reader  will  reflect,  and 
consider  what  is  his  primary,  direct  conscious- 
ness at  any  moment,  he  will  find  it  to  be  nei- 
ther a  consciousness  of  a  " feeling"  nor  one 
of  "  his  continuous  existence,"  but  a  con- 
sciousness and  perception  of  doing  some- 
thing (as,  for  example,  reading  this  essay), 
or  else  of  having  something  done  to  him,  by 
some  person  or  thing — it  may  be  being  sup- 


58  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ported  by  a  chair  on  which  he  is  sitting. 
But  this  consciousness  he  will  find  to  be  al- 
ways accompanied  by  some  "feeling"  or 
other",  and  also  by  some  "  sense  of  his  self- 
existence."  He  (it  may  be  he  who  reads 
this)  can,  indeed,  whenever  he  likes,  make 
himself  explicitly  aware  either  of  his  "  feel- 
ing "  or  his  "  sense  of  self-existence." 

He  can  do  this  by  turning  back  his  mind 
upon  itself  for  that  purpose,  and  then  he  will 
be  able  to  say  to  himself  either,  "  I  have  the 
feelings  which  attend  holding  and  reading 
a  book  on  the  helpful  science,"  or  he  may 
say  to  himself,  "  It  is  7  who  have  these  feel- 
ings." But  this  is  not  a  natural  primary  act, 
but  an  act  of  reflection ;  that  is,  a  seconda- 
ry act.  No  one,  when  he  begins  to  think, 
adverts  either  to  his  "  present  feelings  "  or 
to  his  "  continuous  existence."  No  one  be- 
gins by  perceiving  his  act  of  perception  a  bit 
more  than  he  begins  by  expressly  advert- 
ing to  the  fact  that  it  is  he  himself  who 
perceives  it. 

It  is  only  by  reflecting  on  the  direct  spon- 
taneous perception  of  the  mind  that  we  can 


PERCEPTION    OF  "  FEELING  "  AND    OF  "  SELF  "  59 

see  (by  such  a  reflex  or  secondary  act)  that 
our  perceptions  and  feelings  are  perceptions 
and  feelings,  or  that  it  is  truly  we  who  per- 
ceive and  feel.  Let  us  suppose  two  men  to 
be  engaged  in  a  fencing-match.  Each  man, 
while  he  is  parrying,  lunging,  etc.,  has  his 
"  feelings  "  or  "states  of  consciousness  "  and 
knows  very  well  that  it  is  he  who  is  carrying 
on  the  struggle.  Yet  it  is  neither  his  "  state 
of  consciousness"  nor  "the  persistence  of  his 
being"  which  he  directly  regards.  What 
he  directly  regards  is  what  he  is  doing  and 
what  is  being  done  to  him  in  attack  and  de- 
fence. He  can,  of  course,  if  he  likes,  direct 
his  attention  either  to  the  feelings  he  is  ex- 
periencing or  to  his  underlying  continuous 
personality.  Should  he  do  so,  however,  a 
hit  from  his  adversary's  foil  will  be  the  prob- 
able result. 

But  to  become  aware  that  one  has  any 
definite  "  feeling  "  is  an  act  of  reflection  at 
least  as  secondary  and  posterior  as  it  is  to 
become  aware  of  the  "self"  which  has  the 
"  feeling."  We  say  "  at  least,"  but  I  believe 
that  of  the  two  perceptions  —  (i)  that  of 


60  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

"feeling,"  and  (2)  that  of  "self"— it  is  the 
"self"  which  is  the  more  prominently  given 
in  our  primary,  direct  cognitions. 

I  believe,  nay,  I  am  sure,  in  my  own  case, 
that  a  more  laborious  act  of  mental  digging 
is  needed  to  bring  explicitly  before  the  mind 
the  "  feeling "  implicitly  contained  in  any 
perception  than  to  bring  explicitly  before 
the  mind  the  sense  of  "  self-existence  "  im- 
plicitly contained  in  any  such  supposed  per- 
ception. 

Men  continually  and  promptly  advert  to 
the  fact  that  actions  and  sufferings  are  their 
own  (they  will  quickly  claim  the  merit  of  the 
former,  or  cry  out  against  the  supposed  un- 
deservedness  of  the  latter),  but  do  not  by 
any  means  so  continually  and  promptly  ad- 
vert to  the  fact  that  the  feelings  they  expe- 
rience are  "  existing  feelings." 

Therefore  I  am  profoundly  convinced  that 
one  of  the  greatest  and  most  fundamental 
errors  of  eccentric  writers  and  lecturers  of 
our  own  day  is  the  mistake  of  supposing  that 
we  can  know  our  "  mental  states  "  or  "  feel- 
ings" more  certainly  and  directly  than  we 


DIRECT   PERCEPTION  6l 

can  know  the  "continuously  existing  self" 
which  has  those  feelings. 

To  make  my  contention  still  plainer,  let 
us  suppose  that  a  man  of  ordinary  suscepti- 
bility has  received  a  slap  in  the  face.  What 
is  his  immediate,  explicit  perception  ?  Not 
that  a  certain  "  state  of  consciousness  "  ex- 
ists, nor  that  there  is  an  "  enduring  self" 
which  has  become  newly  modified.  His  di- 
rect perception  is  that  he  has  been  struck, 
and  different  "  feelings  "  will  accompany  that 
perception  according  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  case.  He  may  then,  if  he  pleases, 
either  explicitly  examine  his  "  feelings,"  or 
explicitly  consider  "  himself  "as  affected  by 
what  has  occurred ;  and  in  each  case  he  will 
by  so  doing  hold  up,  as  it  were,  to  his  mind's 
eye  the  "  feelings"  and  the  "  self,"  and  re- 
gard them  by  that  second  application  of  the 
intellect  which  I  have  before  termed  "  re- 
flex." But  he  cannot  so  examine  his  "  feel- 
ings" without  a  perception  that  they  are  his 
own;  nor  examine  "himself"  without  a  per- 
ception of  the  more  or  less  vivid  "  feelings  " 
which  have  just  been  aroused  in  him. 


62  THE   HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

I  am  at  this  very  moment  writing.  I  feel 
the  pen  and  I  feel  the  motions  of  my  hand 
and  arm.  But  ordinarily,  when  writing,  I 
no  more  advert  to  such  "feelings"  than  I 
advert  to  the  feelings  in  and  the  movements 
of  my  legs  as  I  am  running  up-stairs.  It  is 
plain  that  we  do  not  so  advert ;  for  as  sure- 
ly as  our  attention  is  so  directed,  our  writing 
movement  is  hampered  in  the  one  instance, 
and  a  stumble  on  the  staircase  is  very  likely 
to  occur  in  the  second.  Much  less  inconve- 
nience ensues  from  turning  the  mind  inward 
(while  writing  or  running  up-stairs),  and  rec- 
ognizing the  fact  that  it  is  we  ourselves  who 
are  in  the  act  of  doing  either  one  or  the 
other  of  these  things.  Thus  here,  again,  we 
may  recognize  the  fact  that  of  the  two  cer- 
tainties, the  certainty  of  our  own  existence 
is  more  easily  attained  than  is  the  certainty 
as  to  what  the  nature  of  the  various  feel- 
ings which  accompany  the  actions  may  be, 
whether  we  are  writing,  running  up-stairs, 
or  whatever  we  may  be  doing. 

This  truth  is,  I  believe,  the  most  impor- 
tant and  fundamental  of  all  the  truths  our 


OUR   OWN    EXISTENCE  A    CERTAINTY  63 

minds  can  give  us  any  information  about — 
not  on  its  own  account,  but  on  account  of 
the  consequences  which  follow  its  distinct 
recognition.  We  have  but  to  turn  our  minds 
inward  and  advert  to  what  our  conscious- 
ness tells  us,  in  order  to  be  able  clearly  to 
see  that  the  fact  of  our  own  existence  is  a 
truth  which  carries  with  it  its  own  evi- 
dence, and  is  absolutely  certain  in  and  by 
itself. 

It  is  not,  however,  a  momentary  exist- 
ence which  it  suffices  for  us  to  recognize. 
If  our  experiments  have  (as  supposed)  been 
directed  to  ascertain  any  kind  of  scientific 
truth,  it  is  evident  that  we  must  be  sure  that 
our  existence  has  persisted  from  the  begin- 
ning of  such  experiments  till  their  conclu- 
sion ;  otherwise  all  scientific  certainty,  as 
before  observed,  would  be  at  an  end.  We 
may  be  sure,  then,  that  we  can  know  not  only 
our  actions,  sensations,  imaginations,  remi- 
niscences, emotions,  perceptions,  and  concep- 
tions, but  also  our  own  substantial  and  con- 
tinuous personal  existence.  The  fact  that 
we  possess  this  knowledge,  however,  implies 


64  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

another  most  important  truth,  namely,  the 
validity  of  our  faculty  of  memory. 

And,  indeed,  this  is  necessarily  implied  in 
the  pursuit  of  physical  science.  We  have 
spoken  of  M.  Dareste's  experiments  with 
eggs,  but  it  must  be  plain  to  every  one  that 
no  result  could  be  arrived  at,  let  such  ex- 
periments be  ever  so  carefully  performed,  if 
we  could  not  trust  our  faculty  of  memory. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  we  may  make 
mistakes  as  to  particular  things,  and  defects 
of  memory,  which  occasionally  occur,  are 
very  various — affecting  only  certain  parts  of 
speech  or  other  limited  department  of  the 
mind.  But  such  exceptional  phenomena  do 
not  tell  against  the  fact  of  the  general 
trustworthiness  of  memory. 

It  is  also  plain  and  obvious  that  the 
trustworthiness  of  memory  is  implied  in  our 
knowledge  of  our  own  existence,  since  we 
could  never  know  either  what  (i)  our  re- 
cently experienced  "  feelings "  or  (2)  our 
"  perceptions  of  self "  have  been,  save  by 
the  aid  of  memory.  Therefore,  the  cer- 
tainty we  have  as  to  the  one  or  the  other 


WHAT   IS   MEMORY?  65 

of  these,  carries  with  it  a  certainty  as  to  our 
act  of  memory. 

But  what  is  memory?  Evidently  we  can- 
not be  said  to  remember  anything  unless  we 
know  that  the  thing  we  so  remember  has 
been  present  to  our  mind  on  some  previous 
occasion.  A  mental  image  might  present 
itself  to  our  imagination  a  hundred  times, 
but  if  each  time  that  it  so  presented  itself 
it  seemed  to  be  something  altogether  new 
and  unconnected  with  the  past,  we  could 
not  be  said  to  remember  it.  It  would  rather 
be  an  example  of  extreme  forgetfulness  than 
of  memory. 

By  asserting  the  general  trustworthiness  of 
our  faculty  of  memory  we  do  not,  as  before 
said,  mean  to  deny  that  mistakes  are  often 
made.  Nevertheless  we  are  all  of  us  certain 
as  to  some  past  events.  Probably  every 
reader  of  this  essay  is  absolutely  certain  that 
he  was  doing  something  else  before  he  began 
to  read  it.  Memory  gives  us  as  much  cer- 
tainty concerning  some  portions  of  the  past 
as  we  can  have  with  respect  to  some  por- 
tions of  the  present. 

5 


66  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

If  we  could  not  trust  our  faculty  of  mem- 
ory all  science  would  be,  for  us,  a  mere  pres- 
ent dream.  But  the  veracity  of  this  faculty 
is  a  self-evident  truth.  It  can  never  be 
proved.  There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a 
proof  of  it,  because  we  cannot  argue  at  all 
unless  we  already  trust  it.  Yet,  marvellous 
to  say,  Professor  Huxley  has  declared  that 
we  may  trust  our  memory  because  we  learn 
its  trustworthiness  by  experience  !  This  dec- 
laration amounts  to  a  demonstration  of  the 
Professor's  incapacity  in  matters  of  philos- 
ophy. Surely  never  was  fallacy  more  glar- 
ing !  How  could  we  ever  gain  experience  at 
all,  unless  we  trusted  our  memory  in  gain- 
ing it?  Professor  Huxley  has  thus  said, 
in  effect :  "  You  may  trust  your  present 
memory  because  experience  has  confirmed 
it,  while  you  can  only  know  that  it  has 
confirmed  it  by  trusting  your  present  mem- 
ory !" 

Memory,  as  we  shall  see,  directly  performs 
a  yet  more  wonderful  office  than  any  I  have 
yet  referred  to.  Before,  however,  stating 
what  it  is,  I  think  it  well  to  explain  the  only 


"  FACTS  "   AND    "  FEELINGS  "  67 

two  technical  terms  of  which  I  propose  to 
make  use. 

These  two  terms  may  be  represented,  to  a 
certain  extent,  by  the  familiar  words,  "facts" 
and  "feelings"  The  technical  terms  which 
correspond  therewith  respectively  are :  (i) 
things  which  are  "  objective"  and  (2)  things 
which  are  "subjective" 

Every  "  feeling,"  "  thought,"  "  sensation," 
or  other  "  state  of  consciousness"  present  to 
the  mind  of  whoever  is  the  subject  of  it,  is 
spoken  of  as  being  "  subjective.5'  It  is  a 
thing  which  pertains  to  the  subject — to  the 
mind  which  feels  or  thinks.  The  whole  of 
such  experiences  taken  together  constitute 
the  subjective  world  or  the  sphere  of  sub- 
jectivity. 

On  the  contrary,  everything  whatever 
which  exists  externally  to  our  present  con- 
sciousness or  feelings,  is  spoken  of  as  being 
"  objective,"  and  all  that  is  thus  external  to 
the  mind  constitutes  the  objective  world  and 
is  the  region  of  objectivity. 

It  is  the  world  of  real  objects  which  occa- 
sions thought  or  feeling,  as  opposed  to  the 


68  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

subjective  modifications  of  him  who  thinks 
or  feels. 

Everything  which  is  subjective  pertains  to 
the  self  or  ego  during  the  time  in  which  that 
"  self  "  is  feeling  or  thinking. 

Everything  which  is  objective  is  external 
to  the  self  which  is  feeling  or  thinking,  so 
that  all  states,  even  of  the  "  self"  or  "  ego," 
which  are  anterior  to  the  time  when  that 
self  or  ego  feels,  is  also  objective  —  an  ob- 
ject of  thought,  indeed,  but  not  the  thought 
or  feeling  of  the  thinking  subject — not  sub- 
jective. 

Now  the  wonderful  office  above  spoken 
of  as  being  performed  by  memory  concerns 
this  distinction  between  objectivity  and  sub- 
jectivity, and  is,  in  fact,  the  bridge  which 
exists,  in  our  being,  between  the  two. 

It  is  memory  which  enables  us  to  get,  in- 
tellectually, outside  our  present  selves  and 
our  present  feelings  and  sensations,  in  a  way 
the  truth  of  which  no  sane  man  can  ques- 
tion. 

For  memory  informs  us  with  absolute  cer- 
tainty as  to  some  events  of  our  own  past 


POWER   OF    MEMORY  69 

history.  But  such  events  are  beyond  our 
present  experience ;  therefore  they  possess  a 
truth  which  extends  back  beyond  any  pres- 
ent feeling.  They  are  realities  which  are  an- 
terior to  our  existing  feelings,  and  they  are, 
therefore,  objective. 

Thus  memory,  inasmuch  as  it  reveals  to 
us  part  of  our  own  past,  reveals  to  us  what 
is  "  objective,"  and  so  actually  introduces  us 
into  the  realm  of  objectivity,  shows  us  more 
or  less  of  "  objective  "  truth,  and  carries  us, 
as  before  said,  into  a  real  world,  beyond  the 
range  of  our  own  present  feelings. 

The  power  which  memory  possesses  of 
thus  lifting  us,  as  it  were,  out  of  our  present 
selves,  and  showing  us  facts  which  otherwise 
we  could  never  know,  is  certainly  a  most 
wonderful  power ;  and  the  plain  fact  that  if 
we  admit  the  validity  of  memory  in  the  least 
— if  we  can  be  certain  of  even  one  single 
thing  which  took  place  only  a  few  hours  ago 
— it  is  indisputable  that  we  can,  and  that  we 
do,  learn  real  objective  truth,  and  can  be  cer- 
tain of  more  than  mere  "  appearances,"  or 
"  our  present  feelings  only."  The  fact  that 


70  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

we  can  certainly  know  these  two  truths: 
(i)  that  we  can  really  know  our  own  exist- 
ence, and  (2)  be  certain  of  some  facts  an- 
terior to  our  present  feelings,  is  a  truth  fruit- 
ful in  far-reaching  consequences.  The  reader 
may,  perhaps,  at  first  be  disposed  to  consid- 
er the  two  truths  here  pointed  out  as  being 
too  obvious  and  trivial.  But  it  would  be  a 
great  mistake  so  to  consider  them,  as  will  be 
plainly  seen  in  the  concluding  portion  of 
this  essay.  They  carry  with  them,  indeed, 
tremendous  implications. 

Such  being  the  case,  it  will  be  well  for  the 
student  of  "the  helpful  science"  here  to 
pause  a  little  and  well  consider  these  two 
truths,  so  that  he  may  see  they  are  abso- 
lutely certain  ones,  though  necessarily  inca- 
pable of  proof,  while  they  carry  with  them 
their  own  evidence.  He  may  also  reflect 
that  the  real  validity  of  all  science  hangs 
upon  them,  although  such  dependence  is 
rarely  adverted  to.  The  veracity  of  our 
faculty  of  memory,  and  our  knowledge  of 
our  own  existence,  are  both  implied  in  every 
scientific  observation  which  we  regard  as 


UNITING  THE   PAST   WITH   THE   PRESENT       71 

certain,  and  in  every  mercantile  transaction 
in  which  we  have  entire  confidence. 

We  can  know  the  result  of  such  observa- 
tions and  experiments  (as  before  said)  and 
we  can  carry  on  such  mercantile  transactions 
only  through  memory,  by  the  help  of  which 
we  are,  each  of  us,  enabled  to  unite  the  past 
with  the  present  and  say  "I  am."  These 
two  words  have  an  immense  significance  for 
any  one  who  will  carefully  ponder  over  them. 
They  signify  that  he  who  utters  them  intel- 
ligently recognizes  certain  past  acts  as  his 
own  acts,  and  that  a  continuous  unity  (him- 
self) has  endured,  essentially  the  same,  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  time  and  has  had  more  or 
less  varied  experiences.  He  who  utters  them 
also  thereby  indicates  that  he  has  the  power 
of  knowing  at  least  one  objective  existence 
which  his  senses  cannot  perceive. 

Such  must  be  the  case,  because  our  senses 
can  only  feel  what  is  present  to  them  ;  they 
can  never  feel  the  past.  The  very  fact  of 
our  feeling  anything  shows,  with  absolute 
certainty,  that  something  is  actually  present 
which  occasions  that  feeling.  But  it  is  clear 


72  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

to  every  one  that  his  intellect  can,  by  the 
help  of  memory,  know  with  certainty  some- 
thing which  is  far  from  being  present  here 
and  now — namely,  some  event  of  his  past 
life.  Similarly  he  is  enabled  to  perceive  his 
own  continuous  existence — which  is  certain- 
ly a  thing  which  cannot  be  felt. 

Our  body  can,  of  course,  be  felt  as  often  as 
we  like,  in  different  ways  at  once  and  as  long 
as  we  choose.  Nevertheless,  each  time  we 
feel  it  we  can  but  experience  the  present 
feeling,  and  without  memory  and  without 
reflex  acts  of  the  intellect,  we  cannot  know 
that  our  body  has,  and  has  had,  a  continuous 
and  enduring  existence.  It  can  never  be 
"  felt "  as  enduring,  although  by  the  aid  of 
repeated  sensations  it  can  be  recognized  by 
our  intelligence  as  enduring.  But  the  intel- 
lect, aided  by  memory,  can  know  very  well, 
by  itself,  and  directly,  that  it  has  an  en- 
during permanence,  and  that  the  thought 
of  the  day  before  yesterday  was  its  own 
thought.  It  can  know  this  with  a  degree  of 
certainty  which  it  is  impossible  to  attain  to 
with  respect  to  anything  else.  To  doubt  the 


FACULTY  OF   MEMORY   A   VALID    FACULTY      73 

continuous  existence  of  our  body  would  be 
absurd  indeed  and  a  sign  of  lunacy ;  but  to 
doubt  the  continuous  existence  of  the  in- 
tellect, while  illuminated  by  memory  as  to 
some  of  its  past  acts  known  with  certainty, 
would  be  infinitely  more  absurd  still ! 

This  power  of  memory,  however,  is  so  won- 
derful, and  the  consequences  it  carries  with 
it  are  so  profound,  that  it  is  hardly  surpris- 
ing that  some  persons,  in  the  interests  of  a 
philosophical  system  essentially  irrational 
(as  we  shall  see  later  on),  should  have  at- 
tempted to  impugn  its  validity.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  it  is  simply  impossible  for  them 
to  do  so  without  contradicting  themselves 
and  committing  intellectual  suicide  by  falling 
into  a  fatuous  system  of  universal  scepti- 
cism. The  self-evident  truth  that  our  fac- 
ulty of  memory  is  a  valid  faculty,  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  the  full  recognition  of 
what  is,  for  us,  the  first  and  most  certain  of 
all  facts,  namely,  the  fact  of  our  own  exist- 
ence. 

If  I  have  insisted  on  these  truths  with  some 
tediousness  of  iteration,  it  is  because  the 


74  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

whole  of  my  future  contention  depends  upon 
them.  My  readers  will,  I  trust,  therefore 
pardon  me,  as  unless  the  certainty  of  what 
is  contended  for  in  this  second  part  of  my 
essay  were  made  plain  and  indisputable, 
"  the  helpful  science  "  could  never  be  estab- 
lished. 

The  certainty  of  these  two  preliminary 
"  facts  "  being  now  clearly  seen,  we  may  next 
proceed  to  consider  one  of  the  two  other 
things  I  before  represented  as  constituting 
the  foundation  of  all  science  and  art :  (A) 
"  perceptions  of  certain  general  truths,"  and 
(B)  "  perceptions  of  the  validity  of  certain 
arguments." 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  better  to  begin  with 
the  last-mentioned  category  and  consider  it 
in  relation  to  what  we  said  in  the  first  part 
of  this  essay :  the  assertion  that  "  the  value 
of  science  and  the  fact  of  its  progress  are  un- 
questionable." 

Physical  science,  as  we  all  know,  advances 
by  means  of  careful  observations  and  by  ex- 
periments. But,  as  we  said  also  in  the  first 
part  of  this  essay,  not  only  observations  and 


PROCESS   OF    DEDUCTION  75 

experiments  are  necessary,  but  inferences  are 
necessary  also.  It  cannot  get  on  without 
them.  Therefore  the  mere  fact  of  scientific 
progress  suffices  to  show  that  we  must  place 
confidence  in  the  process  of  reasoning — in 
that  peculiar  perception  of  the  mind  which 
we  express  by  the  word  "  therefore."  When 
we  use  that  word  we  mean  to  express  by  it 
that  there  is  a  truth,  the  certainty  of  which 
is  shown  by  the  help  of  other  things  which 
have  been  previously  ascertained  to  be  true, 
and  whose  truth  involves,  and  carries  with 
it,  the  truth  of  the  thing  they  are  called  in  to 
prove.  This  is  the  process  of  deducing  one 
truth  from  other  truths  previously  known. 
It  is  the  process  of  deduction,  and  every  one 
who  reasons  shows  by  so  doing  that  he 
thinks  it  possible  to  draw  valid  inferences, 
and  implies  that  he  himself  has  confidence 
in  the  principle  of  "  deduction,"  and  recog- 
nizes the  force  of  that  unique  word  "  there- 
fore." He  implies  that  there  is  at  least  one 
truth  the  certainty  of  which  is  shown  through 
the  help  of  facts  or  principles  which  them- 
selves are  known  to  be  true. 


76  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

The  process  of  deductive  reasoning  has 
long  been  familiarly  illustrated  as  follows : 

All  men  are  mortal  (major  premise). 

Socrates  is  a  man  (minor  premise). 

Therefore  Socrates  is  mortal  (conclusion). 

This  form  of  reasoning  (consisting  of  two 
premises  and  a  conclusion)  is,  as  doubtless 
all  my  readers  well  know,  termed  a  "  syllo- 
gism." 

Now  it  is  sometimes  objected  to  deductive 
reasoning — to  the  syllogism — that  it  really 
teaches  us  nothing  new,  all  that  is  contained 
in  the  conclusion  being  already  contained  in 
the  premises.  Opponents  of  the  syllogism 
say:  "  Whoever  has  said  '  all  men  are  mortal,' 
has  thereby  also  already  said  that  '  Socrates 
is  mortal.'  The  so  -  called  '  conclusion  '  is 
therefore  but  a  repetition  of  part  of.  the 
major  premise,  'all  men  are  mortal.'  Here 
then  we  really  have  no  inference  at  all,  but 
merely  a  restatement.  We  do  not  in  truth 
1  conclude'  that ^ Socrates  is  mortal,  but  we 
only  say  over  again,  with  the  mention  of  his 
name,  what  was  said  before  without  the  men- 
tion of  his  name." 


IMPLICIT   AND    EXPLICIT    KNOWLEDGE  77 

I  have  wished  to  draw  out  this  objection 
to  the  syllogism  as  distinctly  as  possible,  be- 
cause most  important  consequences  follow 
from  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  valid- 
ity of  the  deductive  process. 

There  is  really  no  force  whatever  in  the 
above  objection.  Such  force  as  it  may  appear 
to  have  simply  arises  from  ignorance  on  the 
part  of  the  objector  of  the  great  difference 
which  exists  between  implicit  and  explicit 
knowledge.  To  cause  a  knowledge  which 
we  only  possess  "implicitly"  to  become 
" explicitly"  present  to  our  minds,  may  often 
be  to  practically  give  us  a  knowledge  of 
something  of  which  before  we  had  no  avail- 
able or  conscious  knowledge  at  all. 

Let  us  suppose  that  a  youth  has  learned 
by  heart  the  characters  which  respectively 
distinguish  the  four  classes  of  back -boned 
animals — beasts,  birds,  reptiles,  and  fishes — 
but  that  he  has  seen  and  knows  very  little 
about  specimens  of  different  kinds.  It  would 
not  be  wonderful  that  such  a  youth  should 
take  a  porpoise  to  be  a  fish.  But  his  teacher 
might  remind  him  that  all  creatures  possess- 


78  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ing  certain  characters  of  brain  and  heart  were 
beasts ;  and  he  could  thereby  come  to  see 
that  the  creature  he  took  to  be  a  fish  must, 
since  it  has  those  characters,  be  a  beast.  Re- 
ferring again  to  the  characters  of  the  class 
of  beasts,  he  might  further  exclaim,  "  This 
fish -like  thing  when  alive  must,  as  being 
really  a  beast,  have  had  warm  blood."  Of 
course  his  conclusion  would  be  quite  right, 
and  so  such  inferences  would  have  supplied 
him  with  knowledge  which  he  certainly  did 
not  possess  before. 

So  great  indeed  is  the  difference  between 
explicit  and  implicit  knowledge  that  the  lat- 
ter may  not  deserve  to  be  called  real  knowl- 
edge at  all.  No  one  will  be  so  absurd  as  to 
affirm  that  a  student  who  has  merely  learned 
the  axioms  and  definitions  of  Euclid  has 
thereby  obtained  such  a  real  knowledge  of 
all  the  geometrical  truths  the  work  contains, 
that  he  will  fully  understand  all  its  proposi- 
tions and  theorems  without  having  to  study 
them.  Yet  all  the  propositions,  etc.,  of  Eu- 
clid are  implicitly  contained  in  the  definitions 
and  axioms.  Nevertheless,  the  student  will 


A   COMPLETE   INDUCTION  79 

have  to  go  through  many  processes  of  infer- 
ence by  which  these  implicit  truths  may  be 
explicitly  recognized  by  him  before  he  can 
be  said  to  have  any  real  knowledge  of  them. 

Of  course,  in  the  very  rare  instances  in 
which  the  major  premises  express  a  truth 
which  has  been  arrived  at  by  an  examination 
of  every  fact  referred  to  in  it  —  a  process 
which  is  known  as  a  "  complete  induction  " 
— there  is  nothing  implicit. 

Thus  if  we  knew,  with  absolute  certainty, 
that  every  man,  woman,  and  child  in  some 
Indian  village  was  a  leper,  then  to  say  that  a 
man  came  from  that  village  would  be  equiv- 
alent to  saying  explicitly  that  he  was  a  leper ; 
there  would  then  be  no  evolution  of  an  im- 
plicit into  an  explicit  truth.  Such  cases  are, 
however,  most  rare.  No  one  can  pretend  to 
know  by  examination  that  all  the  radii  of  a 
circle  are  equal  by  a  complete  induction — 
by  an  examination  of  every  existing  circle. 
Similarly,  if  we  are  shown  a  triangular  figure 
and  are  asked,  "  Are  its  angles  equal  to  two 
right  angles?"  we  shall  not  be  able  at  once 
to  answer  the  question  by  directly  inspect- 


80  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ing  the  figure.  If,  however,  we  already 
knew  that  the  angles  of  every  triangle  are 
together  equal  to  two  right  angles,  then  we 
should  be  able  at  once  to  infer  the  truth,  and 
to  say  that  in  so  far  as  the  figure  approx- 
imated to  an  ideally  perfect  triangle  would 
its  three  angles  approximate  the  two  abso- 
lutely perfect  right  angles.  We  should  ar- 
rive at  this  truth  mediately,  and  reach  the 
conclusion  by  the  help  of  major  and  minor 
premises.  A  very  great  part  of  the  knowl- 
edge we  acquire  throughout  our  whole  lives 
is  acquired  in  this  indirect  way  by  the  help 
of  that  mental  process  which  is  expressed  by 
the  word  "  therefore." 

But  we  have  no  special  reason  to  be  proud 
of  that  word,  since  it  implies  that  we  are 
compelled  to  get  at  truth  by  a  very  round- 
about process.  Were  our  intellect  of  a  much 
higher  order,  it  is  conceivable  that  we  might 
be  able  to  see  equally  well,  and  at  the  same 
time,  all  those  truths  which  a  proposition 
may  contain  implicitly  as  well  as  explic- 
itly. In  that  case,  of  course,  we  should  be 
saved  the  trouble  of  any  process  of  infer- 


TRUTH    BY    MEANS    OF    LOGIC  8 1 

ence.  The  truths  we  now  have  to  gather 
indirectly  would  then  be  directly  evident  to 
us,  just  as  our  own  actual  mental  activity  is 
evident  to  us.  Having,  however,  the  imper- 
fect nature  we  have,  we  must  be  content  with 
the  more  laborious,  though  practically  suffi- 
cient, process  of  inference  or  reasoning.  We 
must  be  content  to  gain  actual  knowledge 
from  implicit  truth  by  placing  propositions 
side  by  side,  and  so  evolving  explicit  truth 
by  such  process  properly  performed.  To 
see  to  the  proper  performance  of  this  proc- 
ess is  the  task  of  logic,  which  is  at  once  a 
science  and  an  art.  It  is  a  science,  in  so  far 
as  it  reveals  to  us  the  laws  which  regulate 
human  thought;  it  is  an  art,  in  so  far  as  it 
teaches  us  how  to  proceed  in  order  that  our 
inferences  may  be  valid  and  true. 

Reasoning,  then,  is  an  indirect  process  of 
attaining  truths,  and  one  which,  when  proper- 
ly carried  out,  we  may  entirely  trust.  Nev- 
ertheless, we  can  already  see  that  it  is  not 
the  highest  kind  of  act  of  which  our  intellect 
is  capable.  Such  highest  act  is  that  by 
which  we  perceive — or  intue — truth  directly 


82  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

and  without  adventitious  aid.  We  perceive 
such  a  truth  in  the  direct  perception  of  our 
own  activity,  and  in  our  apprehension  of 
those  principles  and  necessary  truths  which 
will  occupy  us  in  the  next  portion  of  this 
essay. 

The  three  subjects  which  have  here  occu- 
pied us — (i)  our  perception  of  our  own  exist- 
ence, (2)  the  validity  of  the  faculty  of  mem- 
ory, and  (3)  that  of  the  process  of  inference — 
are  alike  truths  incapable  of  proof,  and  ones 
which  carry  with  them  their  own  evidence. 
If  any  one  were  to  deny  that  the  process  of 
inference  is  a  valid  process,  he  would  be  land- 
ed in  absolute  scepticism,  and  would  there- 
fore commit  intellectual  suicide.  For  if  that 
process  be  worthless,  then  all  argument  must 
be  useless  and  vain.  More  than  this:  not 
only  must  all  reasoning  addressed  to  oth- 
ers be  vain,  but  the  silent  reasoning  of  each 
man's  own  mind  must  be  vain  also.  But 
this  amounts  to  an  utter 'paralysis  of  the  in- 
tellect. It  is,  indeed,  as  we  said  before,  scep- 
ticism run  mad. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  invite  my  readers 


METAPHYSICAL    KNOWLEDGE  83 

to  note  that,  in  recognizing  each  of  these 
three  truths  (our  mental  continuity,  the  trust- 
worthiness of  memory,  and  the  validity  of 
reasoning)  we  have  passed  beyond  what  is 
to  be  perceived  by  our  senses — beyond  things 
physical.  We  have  thus,  without',  I  hope, 
any  undue  strain  upon  my  readers'  minds, 
distinctly  entered  the  domain  of  ultra  phys- 
ical truth,  or  metaphysical  knowledge.  Such 
knowledge,  unnoticed  though  it  be,  lies  at 
the  root  of  all  that  is  either  "  good  "  or 
"true"  in  human  life. 


part  H1Tf 

IN  commencing  this  third  part  of  my  es- 
say on  the  Helpful  Science,  it  may  be  well 
to  address  a  few  words  to  any  of  my  read- 
ers who  may  feel  some  disappointment  at 
not  having  as  yet  found  some  or  other  help 
they  may  have  hoped  to  find  in  it.  Of 
such  I  would  ask  a  little  further  patience, 
and  beg  them  to  reflect  that  no  struct- 
ure can  be  safely  reared  save  on  a  founda- 
tion firm  enough  to  uphold  it.  We  have 
in  the  last  part  laid  three  solid  foundation- 
stones,  and  we  must  lay  yet  two  more 
before  we  can  begin  any  solid  work  of  con- 
struction. 

I  would  also  beg  such  readers  to  note 
that  though  at  first  starting  they  may  not 
have  felt  the  slightest  doubt  about  their 
own  existence,  the  general  trustworthiness 
of  memory,  or  the  possibility  of  arguing 


REAL   HELPFULNESS   OF   METAPHYSICS  85 

logically,  they  may  now  possess  not  only 
a  full  and  explicit  certainty  about  these 
truths,  but  also  a  knowledge,  by  reflexion, 
that  they  can  and  do  possess  it ;  as,  also, 
that  these  are  fundamental  verities  carrying 
their  own  evidence  with  them — an  evidence 
than  which  none  can  even  be  conceived 
of  as  more  satisfactory  and  certain.  There 
is  yet  another  truth  which  we  shall  here- 
after see  to  carry  important  consequences 
with  it,  and  that  is  our  recognition  that  we 
are  beings  possessing  intellects  capable  of 
pondering  about  such  verities  and  seeing 
the  absolute  certainty  of  them.  But,  in- 
deed, we  are  already  in  a  position  to  appre- 
ciate, to  some  extent,  the  real  helpfulness 
of  the  helpful  science  of  metaphysics;  for 
we  have  seen  that  it  is  the  implicit  knowl- 
edge of  the  three  metaphysical  certainties 
(to  the  establishment  of  which  the  second 
part  of  this  essay  was  devoted)  which  has 
alone  rendered  the  progress  of  physical  sci- 
ence a  possibility.  The  utility  of  an  agent 
does  not  necessarily  depend  on  the  recog- 
nition of  that  agent's  utility,  and  still  less 


86  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

on  the  causes  which  have  made  it  useful. 
Atmospheric  and  marine  currents  carried  on 
their  various  agencies,  so  helpful  to  human 
life,  for  ages  before  their  utility  was  recog- 
nized, and,  a  fortiori,  before  the  causes  which 
produced  them  were  satisfactorily  elucidat- 
ed. Therefore,  the  title  of  "  the  Helpful 
Science  "  would  none  the  less  be  truly  and 
really  merited  by  metaphysics,  even  did  the 
implicit  truths,  unconsciously  embodied  and 
latent  in  every  form  of  science,  never  reveal 
themselves  explicitly  to  any  one  for  what 
they  really  are  and  what  we  are  now  recog- 
nizing them  to  be. 

But  in  the  last  part  of  this  essay  its  help- 
fulness will  be  much  more  fully  revealed  and 
made  so  evident  that  denial  will  be  impos- 
sible save  to  those  who  either  wilfully  shut 
their  mental  eyes,  or  are  unhappily  unable 
even  to  open  them. 

One  of  the  most  important  distinctions 
pointed  out  in  the  last  part  of  this  essay 
was  the  distinction  between  what  is  objective 
and  what  is  subjective ;  and  one  of  the  most 
important  facts  therein  put  forward  was 


TRUTH   OBTAINED    BY   EXPERIMENT  87 

the  fact  that,  by  the  aid  of  memory,  we  can 
obtain  entrance  into  the  domain  of  objec- 
tivity, and  know  real  existences  external  to 
our  present  feelings  and  imaginations. 

Bearing  this  supremely  important  distinc- 
tion and  this  fact  in  mind,  let  us  advance 
further,  and  lay  the  fourth  foundation-stone 
for  the  great  temple  of  human  science — be- 
ginning with  the  recognition  of  some  very 
simple  facts. 

Physical  science  is  emphatically  experi- 
mental science.  But  every  experiment,  care- 
fully performed,  implies  a  most  important 
truth,  though  it  is  so  obvious  a  one  that 
nobody  would  usually  pay  the  slightest  at- 
tention to  it.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  ex- 
periment of  cutting  off  a  newt's  leg  has  been 
performed  in  order  to  see  whether  it  will 
grow  again,  and  let  us  further  suppose  that 
it  has  grown  again — as,  in  fact,  it  will  grow 
again.  This  experiment  will  have  demon- 
strated to  us  the  certainty  that  such  a  thing 
is  possible,  because,  in  fact,  it  has  actually 
occurred.  But  that  very  certainty  implies 
a  prior  and  much  more  important  truth.- 


88  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

It  implies  the  truth  that  if  the  newt  has 
come  to  have  four  legs  once  more,  it  cannot 
at  the  very  same  time  have  still  only  three 
legs.  This  may  appear  to  some  of  my  read- 
ers to  be  altogether  too  trivial  a  remark. 
But  there  is  nothing  like  a  concrete  ex- 
ample for  making  an  abstract  truth  plain. 
Besides,  it  is  almost  impossible  in  such 
inquiries  as  these  (metaphysical  or  philo- 
sophical inquiries)  to  be  too  careful  in  mak- 
ing each  step  as  we  go  along  plain,  certain, 
and  unquestionable.  Therefore,  it  will  not 
be  superfluous  here  to  distinctly  note  the 
fact  that  whatever  it  may  be  which  we  have 
become  certain  about  because  it  has  been 
proved  to  us  by  experiment,  is  only  thus 
certain  because  we  know  that  when  a  thing 
has  been  actually  proved,  it  cannot  at  the 
same  time  remain  unproven.  If  we  reflect 
again  on  this  proposition,  we  shall  see  that 
it  depends  on  a  still  more  fundamental  truth 
which  our  reason  recognizes — the  truth,  name- 
ly, that  "  nothing  can  at  the  same  time  both 
be  and  not  be  " — the  truth  known  as  "  the  law 
of  contradiction"  This  again,  like  the  three 


THE   LAW    OF    CONTRADICTION  89 

certainties  laid  down  in  Part  II.,  is  a  truth 
which  carries  with  it  its  own  evidence,  and 
is  incapable  of  proof.  That  such  is  the  case 
a  very  little  reflection  will  show.  We  con- 
stantly act  upon  it  in  daily  life  without  ad- 
verting to  it.  The  simplest  rustic  knows 
that  if  his  wages  have  been  paid  to  him  they 
are  no  longer  owing,  and  that  if  he  has  put 
his  cart-horse  in  the  stable  it  can  no  longer 
remain  between  the  shafts.  Yet  the  "law 
of  contradiction"  is  but  the  summing  up  in 
an  abstract  .form  of  a  multitude  of  particu- 
lar instances  of  this  kind,  as  to  each  one  of 
which  no  doubt  is,  or  can  be  for  a  moment, 
seriously  entertained  by  any  sane  mind. 

If  we  were  really  to  doubt  about  the  law 
of  contradiction  we  should  thereby  be  landed 
in  absolute  scepticism-,  which  we  have  seen 
to  be  mere  folly,  because  all  certainty  would 
be  thereby  destroyed  •;  for,  if -anything  can  at 
the  same  time  both  be  and  not  be,  then 
nothing  can  be  true  without  its  being  possi- 
ble for  it  also  to  be  untrue,  and  this  amounts 
to  a  veritable  paralysis  of  the  intellect,  reduc- 
ing us  to  mental  impotency. 


go  THE    HELPFUL  SCIENCE 

The  excessive  folly  implied  in  any  doubt 
of  the  objective  validity  of  the  law  of  con- 
tradiction has  been  so  well  shown  by  an  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  a  Mr.  E.  T.  Dixon  to 
impugn  its  truth,  that  I  think  I  cannot  do 
better  than  here  call  attention  to  it.  Mr. 
Dixon  affirmed  :*  "  If  any  one  chooses  to 
say  a  thing  both  '  is'  and  '  is  not,'  there  is  no 
law  against  his  doing  so,  only  if  he  does  so 
he  is  not  talking  the  Queen's  English."  To 
which  I  replied :  "  By  so  doing  he  breaks  the 
law  of  reason,  if  not  the  law  of  the  land  ; 
and,  indeed,  to  act  on  such  a  principle  when 
on  oath  in  a  court  of  law  might  have  incon- 
venient consequences."  To  a  verbal  quib- 
ble about  the  word  "  to  be,"  I  replied:  "Let 
us  avoid  the  use  of  the  terms  '  is '  and  '  is 
not ';  they  are  not  necessary.  Does  Mr. 
Dixon  really  doubt  whether  if  he  had  lost 
an  eye  he  would  still  remain,  after  that  loss, 
in  the  very  same  condition  he  was  in  before  ? 
If  any  one  does  not  see  the  objective  im- 


*  See  Correspondence  in.  Nature,  from  December  10, 
1891,  to  February  II,  1892. 


A  LAW  OF  "THINGS"  91 

possibility  of  such  a  thing  everywhere  and 
every  when — i.  e.,  if  he  does  not  apprehend 
the  application  of  the  law  of  contradiction — 
then  he  either  does  not  understand  the  ques- 
tion, or  his  mental  condition  is  pathological." 
The  implications  of  science  are  really  there- 
in implied.  Men  may  pretend  to  doubt 
them,  their  own  existence,  or  the  objectivity 
of  mathematical  truths.  But  their  practice 
demonstrates  their  unfailing  confidence  in 
them  on  each  occasion  ats  it  arises — -as  when 
cheated  by  false  accounts,  personally  injured, 
or  engaged  in  scientific  research.  When  we 
enter  the  laboratory,  we  leave  such  follies 
outside.  That  nothing  can  simultaneously 
be  existent  and  non-existent  does  not  at  all 
depend  on  the  words  employed  to  denote 
that  truth,  but  is  a  law  of  "  things."  It 
would  not  lose  its  validity  and  objective 
truth,  not  only  if  there  were  no  such  things 
as  "  words"  at  all,  but  it  would  not  lose  it  if 
the  whole  human  race  came  to  an  end. 

If  any  one  who  sees  that  the  loss  of  an 
eye  would  modify  his  state  of  being  here 
and  now,  does  not  also  see  that  such  a  truth 


92  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

must  also  apply  everywhere  and  everywhen 
— as  before  said — then  his  faculty  of  mental 
vision  is  one  I  do  not  envy. 

For  if  we  think  of  what  the  condition  of 
things  must  have  been  a  long  time  ago — in 
the  days  of  Julius  Caesar,  or  when  palaeo- 
lithic implements  were  first  fashioned — we 
shall  see  that  the  law  of  contradiction  is  as 
sure  and  certain  with  respect  to  the  past  as 
it  is  with  respect  to  the  present.  We  do 
not  "  think ," we  actually  "  know"  with  "cer- 
tainty" that  had  Julius  Caesar  been  drowned 
off  the  coast  of  England  he  could  not 
also  have  been  assassinated  by  Brutus  in 
the  Roman  Senate ;  and  that  if  an  early 
palaeolithic  flint  man  was  holding  a  flint  in 
his  hand  he  could  not  at  the  very  same  time 
have  had  both  his  hands  empty.  The  same 
certainty  exists  as  to  the  most  distant  re- 
gions. We  are  quite  sure  that  the  moon's  sur- 
face cannot  be  both  irregular  and  absolutely 
smooth ;  and  that  the  spectrum  of  a  remote 
star,  which  shows  certain  definite  lines,  can- 
not, at  the  same  time,  be  devoid  of  them. 
Such  assertions  may  well  seem  utterly  su- 


LAW    OF    CONTRADICTION    A    UNIVERSAL   TRUTH     93 

perfluous,  yet  the  existence  of  men  like  Mr. 
E.  T.  Dixon  shows  that  they  are  not  so,  but 
require  to  be  distinctly  noted. 

When  they  have  been  noted  and  pondered 
over,  then  reflection  reveals  to  us  that  this 
law  of  contradiction  is  not  only  implied  by 
every  physical  science,  and  necessary  to  the 
validity  of  all  our  knowledge,  but  that  it  is 
an  absolutely  necessary  and  universal  truth, 
which  carries  with  it  its  own  evidence. 

But  here,  again,  one  or  two  of  my  readers 
may  be  startled  by  the  words  "  absolutely 
necessary  "  and  "  universal."  They  may  feel 
some  vague  doubt  as  to  how  this  matter 
may  be  in  the  Dog-star  now,  or  how  it  may 
have  been  long  ages  before  our  nebula  was 
churned  into  worlds  —  supposing  the  solar 
system  did  so  arise.  I  may  be  asked,  "  How 
is  it  possible  that  we  men,  mere  insect's,  as 
it  were,  of  a  day,  inhabiting  a  fleeting  atom 
in  an  obscure  corner  of  the  universe,  can 
know  that  anything  is  and  must  be  abso- 
lutely true  for  all  regions  and  the  most  dis- 
tant ages?" 

Yet,  in   fact,  we  know  much  more  than 


94  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

even  this.  We,  poor  and  feeble  creatures 
as  we  are,  are  endowed  with  power  to  see 
necessary  limits  to  the  action  even  of  Om- 
nipotence itself.  For,  let  the  reader  first 
suppose  that  Omnipotence  might  have 
made  our  world  such  as  it  is,  save  that  all 
coniferous  trees  were  excluded  from  it. 
Then  let  the  reader  suppose  that  Omnipo- 
tence might  have  made  our  world  such  as  it 
is,  save  that  all  its  trees  were  conifers.  The 
reader  will  then  see  that  it  is,  and  must  eter- 
nally be,  and  have  ever  been,  absolutely  im- 
possible even  for  Omnipotence  to  have  made 
both  these  possible  states  of  our  world  simul- 
taneously actual.  Having  reflected  on  this 
simple  but  evident  truth,  he  will  be  Jess  dis- 
posed to  doubt  his  powers  of  perception 
with  respect  to  truths  of  a  lower  and  more 
ordinary  kind.  It  is  necessary,  indeed,  to 
be  careful  not  to  declare  anything  to  be  cer- 
tain till  it  has  been  seen  to  be  clearly  and 
indubitably  true,  but  it  is  no  less  necessary 
that  we  should  not  shrink  from  declaring 
that  to  be  true  the  certainty  of  which  is 
evident  to  our  minds,  however  wonderful  it 


THE    HABITS   OF   THE   MIND  95 

may  be,  and  however  inexplicable  is  the  fact 
of  our  knowledge  of  it.  We  are  able  to  ex- 
plain how  it  is  we  know  many  things,  and  as 
time  elapses  we  may  come  to  explain  our 
knowledge  of  very  many  more.  But  how 
we  knoiv  primary  and  fundamental  truths, 
which  are  self-evident  and  necessarily  inca- 
pable of  proof,  must  ever  remain  for  us  en- 
tirely inexplicable.  Were  they  explicable, 
they  could  not  be  ultimate. 

I  think  that  this  feeling  of  distrust  as  to 
our  power  of  knowing  absolute  and  univer- 
sal truths  is  due  to  a  second  habit  of  mind 
which  most  persons  have  formed,  and  which 
runs  parallel  to  the  other  mental  habit  which 
we  before  noted  as  having  given  rise  to  a 
prejudice  against  believing  anything  "on  its 
own  evidence."  This  second  habit  of  mind 
has  been  formed  as  follows :  Things  which 
are  very  distant,  or  which  happened  a  long 
time  ago,  are  known  to  us  only  in  round- 
about ways,  and  we  often  feel  more  or  less 
want  of  certainty  with  respect  to  them.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  have  a  practical  certain- 
ty about  the  circumstances  and  conditions 


Q6  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

which  surround  us  at  the  present  time.  Thus 
we  have  come  to  associate  a  feeling  of  un- 
certainty with  statements  concerning  things 
which  are  very  remote.  But  nothing  can 
well  be  more  remote  for  us  than  the  Dog- 
star,  or  time  before  the  formation  of  the  so- 
lar system.  It  is  not  then,  after  all,  so  sur- 
prising that  this  vague  distrust  should  at 
first  exist  with  respect  to  our  knowledge  of 
truths  as  being  absolutely  necessary  and  uni- 
versal. 

It  is  no  doubt  wonderful  that  we  should 
be  able  to  know  any  necessary  and  universal 
truths ;  but  it  will  be  seen  to  be  less  excep- 
tionally wonderful  if  it  be  well  considered 
in  relation  to  our  other  active  powers.  It 
is  wonderful :  but  then,  deeply  considered, 
so  is  every  other  atom  of  our  knowledge.  It 
is  wonderful  that  surrounding  bodies  should 
be  able  to  excite  feelings  within  us — such  as 
sensations  of  musical  tones,  sweetness,  blue- 
ness,  or  what  not.  It  is  wonderful  that, 
through  sensations  actual  and  remembered, 
we  have  perceptions  of  the  various  objects 
we  from  time  to  time  perceive.  It  is  won- 


THE   MYSTERY  OF   SENSATION  97 

derful  that,  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  per- 
ceptions, we  recognize  our  own  existence 
.past  and  present.  So,  also,  it  is  wonderful 
that  we  recognize  that  what  we  know  is 
cannot  at  the  same  time  not  be.  The  fact 
is  so,  and  we  perceive  it  to  be  so ;  we  know 
things,  and  we  know  that  we  know  them. 
But  how  we  know  them  is  a  mystery  indeed, 
and  one  about  which  it  is,  I  think,  perfectly 
idle  to  speculate.  It  is  precisely  parallel  to 
the  mystery  of  sensation.  We  feel  things 
savory,  or  odorous,  or  brilliant,  or  melodious, 
as  the  case  may  be,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the 
scalpel  and  the  microscope,  we  may  investi- 
gate the  material  conditions  of  such  sensa- 
tions. But  how  such  conditions  can  give 
rise  to  the  feelings  themselves  is  a  mys- 
tery which  defies  our  utmost  efforts  to  pen- 
etrate. I  make  no  pretension  to  be  able  to 
throw  any  light  upon  the  problem  "  How  is 
knowledge  possible  ?"  any  more  than  on  the 
problem  "  How  is  sensation  possible?"  or  oh 
the  questions  "  How  is  life  possible  ?"  or 
"  How  is  extension^  possible?"  But,  Igno- 
rantia  modi  non  tollit  certitudinemjacti; 

7 


98  THE   HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

and  we  know  that  we  are  living,  that  we  feel, 
and  that  we  do  know  something — if  only  that 
we  know  we  doubt  about  the  certainty  of 
knowledge. 

If  we  deny  or  doubt  the  "  law  of  contradic- 
tion," we  fall,  as  before  said,  into  the  unut- 
terable absurdity  of  absolute  scepticism,  and 
we  are  thereby  forced  to  admit  that  law's 
universal  validity.  But  it  is  no  mere  law  of 
our  own  minds,  for  if  we  are  to  listen  to  what 
our  reason  affirms  to  be  evident,  it  is  also  a 
law  which  applies  to  things — to  all  things, 
from  metals  and  other  minerals  to  mental 
states.  Such  is  the  case,  since  we  have  seen 
it  so  declares  with  respect  to  the  various  in- 
stances we  selected  as  examples.  When  we 
say  that  the  number  of  oranges  in  a  bag  cannot 
at  the  same  time  be  both  "  odd  "  and  "  even," 
we  are  certain  that  this  is  not  a  truth  due 
to  our  organization,  but  to  the  real  necessary 
conditions  of  existence  of  the  oranges  them- 
selves. Our  reason  declares  that  the  law  of 
contradiction  is  no  "form  of  thought "  im- 
posed on  our  intellect,  but  objectively  cer- 
tain, independent  of  our  intellect. 


VALIDITY  OF    THE    LAW   OF   CONTRADICTION    99 

To  doubt  this,  then,  would  be  to  destroy 
the  certainty  of  that  which  is  the  most  evi- 
dent to  us  of  all  propositions.  It  is  thus  a 
fundamental  truth,  upon  which  not  only  all 
reasoning  depends,  but  which  applies  to  ev- 
erything which  exists;  since  we  see  clearly 
that  even  a  Supreme  and  Omnipotent  Being 
could  not — however  different  the  existence 
of  such  a  Being  may  be  from  our  own — both 
exist  and  be  non-existent,  any  more  than  such 
a  being  could  cause  one  of  the  stars  to  be, 
simultaneously,  both  entire  and  divided  into 
two  separate  halves. 

Our  perception,  therefore,  of  the  necessary 
validity  of  the  law  of  contradiction  teaches 
us  both  an  absolute  verity  with  respect 
to  objective,  external  existences,  as  well  as 
the  existence  of  our  own  mental  perception 
thereof:  e.  g.,  that  two  things  cannot  be 
four  things,  and  that  we  see  such  to  be  the 
case.  This  double  perception  (as  to  facts 
and  thoughts)  leads  to  the  consideration  of 
the  last  matter  which  it  is  here  proposed  to 
treat  as  fundamental.  This  matter  is  the  an- 
swer to  Pilate's  question,  "  What  is  truth  ?" 


100  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

It  has  been  sometimes  said  that  "truth 
is  what  each  man  troweth,  and  no  more." 
But  no  rational  man  could  seriously  so  af- 
firm, since  by  so  doing  he  would  really  refute 
himself — like  the  sceptic  in  declaring  "  noth- 
ing is  true."  For  if  truth  were  subjective 
only,  that  very  condition  would  be  a  "  fact," 
and  every  "fact"  is  something  "objective" 
— more  than  an  individual  fancy.  Therefore, 
if  any  one  should  say,  "  It  is  a  fact  that  truth  is 
merely  an  individual  fancy,"  he  would  there- 
by affirm,  "  truth  is  merely  an  individual  fan- 
cy and  not  merely  an  individual  fancy,"  and 
so  must  explicitly  refute  himself.  Putting 
aside  such  follies,  it  is  evident  that  no  man 
of  science  can  reasonably  doubt  that  truth  is 
more  than  a  mere  quality  recognized  as  be- 
longing to  a  judgment  by  him  who  emits  it. 
He  must  be  sure  it  has  a  real  relation  to  ex- 
ternal things,  or  else  his  science  could  make 
no  progress.  We  do  not  base  scientific  in- 
ductions and  deductions  on  our  knowledge 
of  beliefs,  but  on  our  knowledge  of  facts ; 
and,  without  a  foundation  of  facts,  beliefs  are 
worthless.  The  truth  of  physical  science  con- 


WHAT   IS   TRUTH?  101 

sists  in  the  agreement  of  "  thought "  with 
"  things  "  ;  of  the  world  of  "  beliefs  "  with  the 
world  of  "  external  existences."  Thus,  if  we 
state  that  "  terrapins  are  toothless,"  we  there- 
by affirm  not  only  a  correspondence  between 
our  subjective  conceptions  of  "  terrapins  "  and 
"  toothlessness  "  and  the  objective  realities — 
the  real  reptiles  and  their  edentulous  condi- 
tion of  jaw — but  also  a  correspondence  be- 
tween our  subjective  judgment  in  making 
the  statement  and  the  objective  coexistence 
of  the  "terrapins"  and  the  condition  we  term 
"toothlessness."  Truth,  then,  cannot  be 
only  "what  each  man  troweth,"  but  must 
be  what  a  man  troweth  when  he  troweth  in 
conformity  with  real  external  coexistences 
and  sequences,  and  with  the  causes  and  condi- 
tions of  the  world  about  him.  Truth,  there- 
fore, is,  and  must  be,  both  subjective  and  ob- 
jective. It  is  subjective  regarded  as  a  quality 
of  any  Judgment  of  our  own.  It  is  objective 
as  a  quality  of  the  judgments  of  any  one  else — 
and  every  one's  judgments  are  objective  save 
to  the  individual  who  so  judges.  The  sim- 
ple, but  fundamental,  truths  to  which  atten- 


102  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

tion  has  here  been  called — as  being  truths 
present,  if  unobserved,  in  the  mind  of  every 
rational  man — have  most  important  and  far- 
reaching  consequences,  and  therefore  merit 
the  attention  of  every  one  who  desires  to  be 
able  to  give  a  rational  account  of  the  con- 
victions of  his  own  mind.  They  are  truths 
which  are  latent  in  every  branch  of  physical 
science,  and  any  real  doubt  about  them  would 
make  not  only  experiment,  but  even  observa- 
tion, logically  impossible. 

And  now  we  may  advance  to  the  first 
practical  application  of  the  various  consider- 
ations which  have  been  here  urged,  and  may 
begin  to  build  upon  the  foundations  (of  all 
our  actual  or  possible  knowledge)  which  we 
have  here  endeavored  to  lay — namely:  (i)  the 
fact  of  our  knowledge  of  our  own  contin- 
uous existence  and  our  successive  states  of 
consciousness  revealed  to  us  by  memory ;  (2) 
the  general  principle  termed  the  law  of  con- 
tradiction ;  and  (3)  the  possibility  of  valid 
reasoning. 

Knowledge  is  valuable  for  its  own  sake; 
the  mind  feels  a  natural  and  legitimate  sat- 


IMPORTANCE   OF   SELF-KNOWLEDGE  103 

isfaction  in  its  acquisition  as  well  as  pleas- 
ure in  its  pursuit,  and  the  pursuit  of  science 
may  be  its  own  abundantly  great  reward. 
Nevertheless,  knowledge  is  for  most  of  us 
largely  esteemed  as  a  means  to  guide  us  to 
useful  and  reasonable  action,  and  our  actions 
are  certainly  guided  by  our  knowledge,  as 
well  as  by  our  sentiments  and  feelings. 
Therefore,  the  more  thorough  and  well- 
grounded  our  knowledge,  the  better  must 
we  be  qualified  for  action;  and  this  especially 
applies  to  our  knowledge  of  ourselves.  That 
knowledge,  then,  must  be  exceptionally  help- 
ful which  best  informs  us  respecting  our  own 
nature  and  our  own  powers.  By  it  we  may 
learn  (i)  not  to  waste  efforts  in  directions 
which  can  lead  to  nothing;  and  (2)  not  to 
neglect  actions  which  our  nature  demands 
we  should  perform,  while  supplying  us  with 
facilities  for  their  performance. 

But  that  we  may  learn  what  our  nature 
really  is  we  must  first  briefly  consider  that 
system  of  thought  which  forms  the  basis  of 
agnosticism,  and  has  become  so  widely  dif- 
fused and  popular.  This  is  the  system  of 


104  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

sensism^  subjectivism,  or  phenomenalism  —  to 
which  I  confidently  oppose  the  system  of 
intellectualism. 

The  whole  scheme  of  human  life — its  pow- 
ers, its  aspirations,  and  its  duties  —  is  most 
powerfully  influenced  by  the  alternative  to 
be  here  adopted.  No  help  can  be  greater 
than  such  help  as  philosophy  can  afford  us 
to  attain  to  a  clear  perception  of  where  the 
truth  lies  in  this  important  controversy. 

The  sensist  position  may  be  thus  stated : 

(1)  All  our  knowledge  is  merely  relative. 

(2)  We  know  nothing  with  certainty  save 
our  own  feelings* 

(3)  We  can  therefore  have  no  knowledge 
of  anything  in  itself— that  is,  as  it  exists  ob- 
jectively and  independent  of  our  knowledge 
of  it. 

The  essential  founder  of  this  system  was 
Hume.  It  was  proclaimed  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  and  has  been  rendered  popular  by 
John  Stuart  Mill,  Alexander  Bain,  G.  H. 
Lewes,  Herbert  Spencer,  and  Professor  Hux- 
ley. 

Some  of  my  readers  may  ask,  "  How  can 


SUPREMACY   OF    REASON  105 

you  venture  to  raise  yourself  up  in  opposition 
to  a  system  which  has  such  sponsors?  To 
this  I  reply,  there  are  two  good  reasons,  one 
or  both  of  which  cause  almost  all  of  the 
above-named  men  to  go  wrong  in  such  a 
matter;  but  I  will  deal  with  these  later  on, 
while  a  very  small  fact  of  recent  history 
gives  me  a  right  thus  to  raise  myself  in  op- 
position. 

But  first  I  would  beg  such  questioners  to 
note  that  philosophy  is  not  a  matter  of  au- 
thority, but  of  reason.  At  the  beginning  of 
this  essay  I  made  my  appeal  to  the  reason 
of  my  readers,  and  I  now  repeat  that  the  au- 
thority of  no  name,  however  justly  or  un- 
justly respected,  can  have  the  least  weight 
in  the  balance  of  science  against  the  clear 
declarations  of  the  individual  intellect. 

The  very  small  fact  of  recent  history  which 
gives  me  some  claim  to  be  heard  in  this 
controversy  is  the  fact  that,  when  my  intel- 
lectual life  began,  I  was  a  student  and  dis- 
ciple of  the  very  school  I  here  oppose.  The 
works  of  Hume,  Hamilton,  Mill,  Lewes, 
Bain,  Spencer,  and  Huxley  I  studied  to  the 


106  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

best  of  my  ability,  while  I  have  had  the  great 
advantage  of  personal  acquaintance  with 
some  of  the  more  distinguished  ones  who 
were  my  contemporaries.  This  has  given 
me  a  much  better  grasp  of  the  system  they 
favored  than  could  have  been  obtained  by 
reading  only. 

Absurd  as  that  system  is,  it  for  a  long  time 
held  my  mind  in  thrall ;  but  if  such  consid- 
erations as  I  have  here  put  forward  had  been 
brought  to  my  notice  in  my  earlier  days,  I 
should  have  been  spared  much  waste  of  en- 
ergy and  much  disadvantage,  and  I  therefore 
feel  keenly  the  evils  of  such  a  system.  As 
it  was,  I  after  a  time  began  to  feel  doubt 
about  the  validity  of  the  system  I  had,  at 
first,  ingenuously  adopted. 

It  took  me,  however,  a  long  time  to  find 
my  way  out  through  the  ingeniously  con- 
structed metaphysical  labyrinth  in  which  I 
had  got  myself  imprisoned.  But  I  escaped 
the  philosophic  Minotaur  (agnosticism)  not 
by  drawing  back  or  shirking  any  difficulty, 
but  by  pushing  forward  and  slowly  working 
my  way  through  its  difficulties  till  I  made 


AS  TO  THE  "RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE"  107 

my  exit,  after  having  thoroughly  traversed  it. 
But  to  return  to  the  system  itself: — 

In  the  second  part  of  this  essay  it  has,  I 
hope,  been  satisfactorily  demonstrated  that 
we  can  know  our  own  continuous  existence, 
and,  by  memory,  obtain  a  knowledge  of 
things  objective.  If  so,  the  second  and  third 
of  the  above  cited  sensist  positions  ipso  facto 
fall  to  the  ground.  But  over  and  above 
memory,  a  comprehension  of  the  law  of  con- 
tradiction also  introduces  us  into  the  domain 
of  objectivity — of  real  things  in  themselves, 
as  distinguished  from  thoughts  and  feelings. 

As  to  the  assertion  that  "  all  our  knowl- 
edge is  merely  relative,"  there  is  a  notewor- 
thy ambiguity.  Of  course,  anything  which 
is  "known  to  us"  cannot  at  the  same  time 
be  "  unknown  to  us  "  ;  and,  so  far  as  this,  our 
knowledge  may  be  said  to  affect  the  thing 
we  know.  A  thing  known  must  stand  in 
the  relation  of  being  known,  and  our  knowl- 
edge is  "  relative/'  inasmuch  as  it  could  not 
be  knowledge  without  that  relation.  But 
this  is  utterly  trivial.  Our  "  knowing"  or 
"not  knowing"  any  object  is  —  apart  from 


108  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

some  act  which  may  be  the  result  of  such 
knowledge— a  mere  accident  of  that  body's 
existence,  which  is  not  otherwise  affected 
thereby.  If  the  fossil  remains  of  three  por- 
poises are  discovered  in  some  rock,  were 
they  not  as  really  there  before  they  were 
known  to  exist,  and  would  they  not  have 
been  there  if  they  had  never  been  discov- 
ered at  all?  As  I  pointed  out  when  con- 
sidering our  knowledge  of  our  own  exist- 
ence, nothing  exists  by  itself  and  unrelated 
to  any  other  thing ;  but  that  does  not  make 
our  knowledge  relative,  save  in  the  above 
mentioned  trivial  sense. 

But,  indeed,  the  system  of  the  "  relativity 
of  knowledge  "  really  refutes  itself ;  for  every 
system  of  knowledge  must  start  with  the  as- 
sumption, implied  or  expressed,  that  some- 
thing is  true  and  known  so  to  be.  By  the 
teachers  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "  relativity 
of  knowledge  "  it  is  taught  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  is  thus  true. 
But  if  we  cannot  know  that  anything  cor- 
responds with  external  reality,  if  nothing  we 
can  assert  has  more  than  a  relative  or  phe- 


A    SYSTEM    OF    PHILOSOPHY   OVERTURNED     109 

nomenal  value,  then  this  character  must  also 
appertain  to  the  doctrine  of  the  "  relativity 
of  knowledge"  itself. 

Either,  then,  this  system  of  philosophy  is 
merely  relative  or  phenomenal,  and  cannot 
be  known  to  be  true,  or  else  it  is  absolutely 
true  and  can  be  known  so  to  be.  But  it  must 
be  merely  relative  and  phenomenal,  if  every- 
thing known  by  man  is  such.  Its  value, 
then,  can  be  only  relative  and  phenomenal ; 
therefore  it  cannot  be  known  to  correspond 
with  external  reality,  and  cannot  be  asserted 
to  be  true.  If  anybody  asserts  that  we  can 
know  the  system  of  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge to  be  true,  he  thereby  asserts  that  it  is 
false  to  say  that  our  knowledge  is  only  rela- 
tive. In  asserting  that  we  can  know  the 
system  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  to  be 
true,  he  who  so  asserts  thereby  proclaims 
that  some  of  our  knowledge  must  be  abso- 
lute ;  but  this  upsets  the  foundation  of  the 
whole  system. 

Therefore,  any  one  who  upholds  such  a 
system  as  this  may  be  compared  to  a  man 
seated  high  up  on  the  branch  of  a  tree  which 


HO  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

he  is  engaged  in  sawing  across  where  it 
springs  from  the  tree's  trunk.  The  position 
and  occupation  taken  up  by  such  a  man 
(whatever  his  name  or  repute  may  be)  can- 
not be  considered  as  evidence  of  his  pos- 
sessing any  exceptional  amount  of  wisdom. 

If,  then,  the  system  of  the  "  relativity  of 
knowledge,"  or  "  sensism,"  be  false,  and  the 
dictates  of  our  reason  when  probed  to  its  ul- 
timate foundations  are  to  be  trusted — i.  e., 
if  we  avoid  the  mentally  diseased  condition 
of  absolute  scepticism — we  have  three  clear 
intellectual  perceptions  or  intuitions :  (i)  a 
perception  or  intuition  of  intelligence,  or 
intellectual  activity,  by  a  consciousness  of 
it  as  existing  in  ourselves — in  our  own  in- 
tellect ;  (2)  a  perception  or  intuition  of 
things  external  to  us  and  of  extension  in  the 
extended  objects  about  us ;  and  (3)  a  per- 
ception or  intuition  of  a  divergence  and 
distinction  of  nature  between  thought  and 
extension — between  these  two  very  different 
kinds  of  existence.  We  can  perceive  in  our 
own  very  self  both  a  continuous  thinking  in- 
telligence and  extended  structures  (such  as, 


THE    MIND    KNOWS    ITSELF  m 

e.g.,  our  hands  and  feet)  which  do  not  think, 
as  we  know  by  our  own  consciousness ;  but  a 
little  more  reflection  on  what  our  own  con- 
sciousness tells  us  about  ourselves  teaches 
us  a  further  more  important  lesson.    For  we 
know  most  intimately,  by  and   in  our  own 
consciousness,  something — our  own  intellect 
— which,  as  we  have  seen,  exists  continuously, 
which  is  conscious  of  successive  objects  and 
events,  and  which,  while  itself  transcending 
them,  can  recognize  them  as  forming  a  series 
which  it  "can  contemplate  as  a  whole  or  in 
parts,  and  in  different  orders  as  may  be  de- 
sired.   In  other  words,  our  mind  knows  some 
of  its  thoughts  and  experiences  of  yesterday, 
and   also   that   itself   is   something  beyond 
them.     It  can  recognize  those  thoughts  and 
experiences  as  having  occurred  in  a  definite 
succession,  and  can   think  of  them   as  one 
whole  ("  the  thoughts  and  experiences  of  yes- 
terday "),  or  of  a  part  of  them,  and  can  think 
of  them  in  the  order  in  which  they  occurred, 
or  the  reverse  order,  or  in  any  order  which  our 
mind  may  for  any  reason  select.     This  in- 
tellectual power  or  principle  (the  mind)  also 


112  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

knows  itself  with  perfect  certainty  (as  we 
have  seen),  is  aware  of  the  kinds  and  di- 
rections of  its  activities,  and  can  regard  them 
as  a  whole,  or  in  groups,  or  singly.  It  can, 
it  well  knows,  perceive  its  own  states  both 
passive  and  active,  and  also  external  objects 
and  events,  recognize  what  it  thinks  they  are, 
and  can  compare  the  relations  between  them, 
returning  upon  itself  at  will  along  different 
lines  of  thought,  and  also  setting  forth  in 
various  directions  a.t  will.  Such  a  power,  or 
principle,  aware  of  all  these  things  and  pres- 
ent to  them  all,  cannot  itself  be  multitudi- 
nous, but  must  be  a  unity  as  complete  as  it 
is  possible  for  us  to  imagine — namely,  a  sim- 
ple unity.  Therefore,  this  principle  can  be 
neither  a  material  substance  nor  a  physical 
force,  but  presents  the  greatest  contrast  to 
both;  and  the  greatest  contrast  to  what  is 
material  is  what  is  immaterial.  Also,  since 
each  man  knows  that  it  is  he  who  not  only 
thinks  but  also  feels,  he  also  knows,  if  he  re- 
flects upon  it,  that  his  body  and  this  think- 
ing principle  are  one  unity. 

Therefore,  each  of  us  is  a  unity  with  two 


EFFECT   OF   OUR    INTELLECTUAL   ACTIVITY       113 

sets  of  faculties  :  material  and  mechanical  on 
the  one  hand,  immaterial  and  unmechanical 
on  the  other.  No  certainty  we  can  attain  to 
about  any  other  object  can  be  nearly  so  cer- 
tain as  is  this  certainty  we  have  about  our  own 
being ;  above  all,  its  dynamic  or  immaterial 
and  active  aspects.  That  each  man  is  a  ma- 
terial, definitely  organized  substance  in  one 
unity,  with  an  active,  immaterial  principle  re- 
vealed in  consciousness,  is  really  the  first 
truth  of  physical  science.  It  is  emphatically 
the  fundamental  truth  of  the  science  of  liv- 
ing organisms  (biology),  for  of  no  other  liv- 
ing thing  can  we  possibly  have  so  complete 
a  knowledge  as  of  ourselves,  since  only  to 
self-scrutiny  can  that,  the  most  direct  kind  of 
knowledge — our  immediate  consciousness — 
be  directly  and  immediately  applied. 

I  have  made  the  preceding  observations 
here  because  I  desire  to  call  special  atten- 
tion to  the  effect  which  the  study  of  our  own 
intellectual  activity  must  have  on  any  com- 
prehension of  the  world  about  us  and  our 
relations  thereto.  In  the  historical  order  of 
knowledge — the  knowledge  of  the  individual 


114  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

as  well  as  of  the  race — the  study  of  what  is 
external  to  us  does  come  (as  before  said),  and 
must  come,  first.  But  as  we  emerge  from 
and  put  away  the  things  of  childhood  we 
have  more  and  more  to  reverse  this  process. 
For  any  satisfactory  comprehension  of  the 
world  and  man,  the  first  and  most  pressing 
need  is  an  adequate  acquaintance  with  our 
own  higher  mental  powers  and  processes. 
The  certain,  though  gradual,  effect  of  their 
faithful  study  will,  I  am  confident,  be  the 
overthrow  of  " sensism"  and  induce  its  re- 
placement by  the  only  system  which  is  sat- 
isfactory in  its  application  on  all  sides,  the 
system  which  distinctly  recognizes  that  the 
basis  of  all  science  must  consist  of  truths 
recognized  by  thought  as  self-evident  and 
necessary — the  system  of  "  intellectualism" 

I  most  earnestly  desire  to  direct  my  read- 
ers' attention  to  the  antithesis  which  exists 
between  these  two  schools  of  thought  and  to 
the  consequences  which  either  involves. 

The  intellectual  world  is  rapidly  dividing 
into  two  camps:  (i)  those  of  one  upholding 
the  validity  of  the  fundamental  dictates  of 


THE   NOBILITY   OF    HUMAN    REASON  115 

reason  with  all  its  consequences ;  (2)  those 
of  the  other  who  refuse  to  admit  the  va- 
lidity of  its  dictates,  and  are  forced  in  con- 
sequence to  stultify  themselves  by  refuting 
their  own  system  and  denying  all  absolute 
and  objective  knowledge,  even  their  percep- 
tion of  their  own  continuous  existence. 

It  is  then,  as  before  said,  my  most  earnest 
desire,  by  appealing  to  the  fundamental  dec- 
larations of  each  man's  consciousness,  to 
make  evident  the  nobility  of  human  reason 
by  showing  its  wonderful  power  of  knowing 
objective  as  well  as  subjective  truth,  and  of 
recognizing  the  actual  certainty  of  that  which 
it  sees  to  be  evidently  true.  This  is  so  su- 
premely important,  because,  if  we  could  not 
trust  its  declarations  as  to  truth,  how  could 
we  confide  in  its  imperative  behests  as  to 
goodness?  And  here  we  touch  the  founda- 
tion of  all  that  is  noblest  in  human  life,  and 
the  final  guide  of  aspiration  and  of  conduct. 

The  greatest  evil  of  such  systems  of  phi- 
losophy as  those  here  combated  is  that,  by 
insidiously  undermining  our  rational  confi- 
dence in  human  reason,  they  weaken  the 


Il6  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

springs  of  vigorous  and  healthy  action.  Such 
systems  may  well  be  called  "  the  art  of  losing 
one's  way  methodically." 

The  indignation  of  any  one  who  values 
our  highest  mental  powers  may  well  be  ex- 
cited by  sophists  who  make  use.  of  excep- 
tional mental  gifts  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
paraging and  virtually  denying  the  existence 
of  that  wonderful  and  admirable  human  in- 
tellect which  they  insult  and  blaspheme. 

The  "helpful  science,"  then,  is  not  only  the 
real,  though  generally  unsuspected,  source  of 
every  scientific  discovery  and  all  artistic  prog- 
ress, but  also  helps  us,  in  a  way  in  which 
nothing  else  could  help  us,  to  appreciate  the 
dignity  of  our  own  nature.  We  have  next 
to  consider,  by  its  aid,  what  that  dignity  in- 
volves. 

An  inevitable  instinct  impels  us  towards 
seeking  our  own  happiness  and  gratifying 
our  desires  and  passions.  But  however  we 
may  allow  ourselves  to  be  carried  along,  our 
reason  can  nevertheless  ask  the  question, 
"  Are  we  really  acting  in  a  reasonable  way  if 
we  make  pleasure  our  deliberate  aim  in  life  ?" 


FEELINGS    ys,    INTELLECTUAL   PERCEPTIONS      117 

Now,  evidently  the  only  rational  aim  of  life 
is  that  which  reason  tells  us  should  be  its 
end.  But  to  say  that  anything  "  should  "  be 
its  end  is  equivalent  to  saying  it  ought  to  be 
its  end,  and  the  word  "  ought "  is  meaning- 
less apart  from  the  conception  of  "  duty." 
Thus  our  reason  tells  us  (however  we  may 
feel  about  it)  that  "duty"  and  not  "pleas- 
ure "  is  the  true  and  proper  end  we  should 
pursue. 

I  have  said  "however  we  may  feel  about 
it,"  because  it  is  all  important  to  bear  in 
mind  the  profound  difference  which  exists 
between  the  "  feelings  "  and  the  "  intellectual 
perceptions "  which  may  accompany  our 
actions. 

Doing  things  which  are  right  and  kind  is 
often  accompanied  by  pleasurable  feelings, 
but  such  things  may  be  very  painful. 

Let  us  suppose  that  a  man  has  found  out 
that  some  property  which  has  enabled  him 
to  support  a  large  family  is  not  really  his 
property,  but  belongs  to  some  one  else,  to 
whom  he  is  bound  to  hand  it  over.  Let  us 
further  suppose  that  he  does  so  hand  it  over, 


118  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

because  he  sees  clearly  that  it  is  his  duty  so 
to  do.  His  perception  as  to  what  is  right 
will  not  prevent  his  feeling  the  material  dis- 
advantages which  attend  his  praiseworthy 
action  or  change  pain  into  pleasure. 

Similarly,  a  man  or  woman  may  judge 
that  it  is  his,  or  her,  duty  to  break  off  an 
intercourse  which  is  against  conscience,  with- 
out its  being  a  bit  less  distressing,  even 
heart-rending,  to  break  it  off. 

It  is  plain  that  we  may  feel  pleasure  in 
doing  things  which  are  wrong,  for  certainly 
they  would  otherwise  never  be  done.  On 
the  other  hand,  much  painful  regret  may 
be  felt  on  account  of  quite  innocent  actions. 
Thus  some  trifling  breach  of  etiquette,  or 
some  harmless  violation  of  social  usage  may 
cause  us  to  blush  and  feel  far  more  shame 
than  might  attend  some  considerable  moral 
delinquency.  Keen  remorse  also  may  be  felt 
on  account  of  having  neglected  some  excel- 
lent opportunity  of  pushing  our  fortune,  or 
even  of  committing  some  very  pleasurable 
but  very  immoral  action.  A  French  writer 
has  said  that  no  regret  is  so  keen  as  the 


WHAT    IS   CONSCIENCE?  119 

regret  which  may  be  felt  for  the  non-com- 
mission of  pleasant  sins  which  might  have 
been  enjoyed. 

Charles  Darwin  has  said :  "  Conscience  is 
that  feeling  of  regretful  dissatisfaction  which 
is  induced  in  a  man  who  looks  back  and 
judges  a  past  action  with  disapproval."  Now, 
"conscience  "  certainly  "  looks  back  and  judg- 
es," but  not  all  that  "  looks  back  and  judges 
with  regretful  dissatisfaction  "  is  conscience. 
Otherwise,  a  libertine  who,  wishing  to  en- 
joy an -exceptionally  immoral  performance, 
found  to  his  surprise  that  he — having  mis- 
taken his  theatre — was  witnessing  an  inno- 
cent one,  might  exercise  his  "  conscience  " 
in  looking  back  and  judging  "with  regretful 
disapproval "  that  he  had  bought  a  wrong 
ticket ! 

"  Conscience  "  is  a  judgment  of  a  particular 
kind — namely,  about  "right"  and  "wrong" 
— and  nothing  else. 

The  man  we  have  supposed  to  be  conscious 
that  he  had  made  some  trifling  slip  in  his 
manners  while  in  company  may  color  up  and 
feel  distressed  and  ashamed,  but  he  will  not 


120  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

on  that  account  judge  that  he  has  committed 
an  action  morally  wrong. 

The  profound  distinction  which  exists  be- 
tween our  ideal  of  " goodness"  and  every  oth- 
er conception  can  be  illustrated  by  any — even 
the  most  trivial — statement  concerning  duty. 
Let  us  suppose,  for  example,  that  any  one  is 
told  he  should  "  pay  his  tailor,"  and  that  the 
assertion  is  disputed  ;  how  should  we  set 
about  trying  to  convince  him  of  its  truth  ? 
Evidently  we  should  have  to  fall  back  upon 
some  more  obvious  and  general  assertion 
about  duty,  such  as  the  assertion,  "  Every 
man  is  bound  to  pay  his  debts." 

If  this  is  again  disputed,  we  should  have 
to  urge  some  still  wider  precept,  such  as  "  A 
man  is  bound  to  carry  out  an  agreement  he 
has  himself  chosen  to  make,"  and  so  on. 

Every  step  we  take  to  explain  why  any 
duty  should  be  performed  must  consist  of 
some  still  more  simple  assertion  of  the  kind, 
till  we  come  to  an  assertion  about  duty,  the 
truth  of  which  is  admitted  to  be  self-evident. 

Now,  all  our  certain  knowledge  must  be  ei- 
ther evident  in  itself,  or  must  depend  upon 


121 


some  other  knowledge  which  is  evident  in 
itself.  As  we  have  before  seen,  we  cannot 
go  on  arguing  forever,  and  every  proof  must 
stop  somewhere  —  namely,  when  we  reach 
What  is  evident  without  proof. 

If,  then,  we  want  to  urge  some  statement 
about  any  particular  action  being  "  right " 
or  "  wrong " !  if  that  statement  be  not  ad- 
mitted to  be  evidently  true,  we  can  only 
prove  it  to  be  so  by  means  of  some  more 
general  and  elementary  statement  of  the 
same  nature.  Therefore,  the  judgments  which 
lie  at  the  root  of  any  system  of  thought  about 
ethics  (about  right  and  wrong)  must  them- 
selves be  ethical. 

This  truth  cuts  the  ground  from  under — 
renders  simply  impossible — the  theory  that 
any  judgment  as  to  moral  obligation  could 
ever  have  grown  out  of  mere  feelings  of  lik- 
ing or  disliking,  sympathy  or  aversion,  good- 
will or  hostility  of  our  fellow-men. 

No  stream  can  possibly  rise  higher  than 
its  source.  "  Social  approbation/'  then,  could 
never  have  produced  the  conception  of  "  right 
and  wrong  "  ;  for  how  could  a  mere  habit  of 


122  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

obeying  society  have  ever  led  a  moral  hero 
to  denounce  that  habit  and  defy  society? 

Yet  there  are  a  number  of  men — such  as 
Mill,  Bain,  Spencer,  Huxley,  etc.  —  who, 
while  they  lay  down  the  law  as  to  what 
"  ought  "  or  "  ought  not  "  to  be  done,  deny 
that  there  is  any  real,  fundamental  distinct- 
ness between  "  virtue  "  and  "  pleasure."  I 
mean  they  deny  that  there  is  any  absolute 
distinction  between  them,  and  affirm  that 
"good  actions"  are  merely  actions  pleasura- 
ble or  useful  to  the  individual  who  performs 
them,  or  advantageous  to  his  fellow- men. 
They  say,  also,  that  it  is  the  pleasurable  or 
useful  results  which  cause  actions  to  be  good 
actions,  not  the  intentions  with  which  the 
doer  may  perform  them. 

It  is  true,  we  say,  "  That  is  a  '  good '  knife," 
because  it  cuts  well,  and  any  weapon,  coat, 
or  other  useful  article  is  said  to  be  a  "good" 
one  if  it  serve  well  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  intended.  But  a  very  little  considera- 
tion will  show  that  such  a  use  of  the  word 
does  not  bring  us  to  the  fundamental  mean- 
ing of  the  term.  For  "  conformity  to  an 


WHY   SHOULD   WE   DO    RIGHT?  123 

end  "  will  not  make  an  action  good  unless 
the  end  aimed  at  is  itself  good  and  agreea- 
ble to  duty — unless  by  conforming  to  it  we 
''follow  the  right  order."  If  a  youth,  care- 
fully instructed  by  Fagin,  conforms  to  his 
end  by  picking  pockets  with  extraordinary 
deftness,  such  "  conformity ''  will  not  make 
pocket-picking  "good." 

But  when  the  end  is  really  good  and  part 
of  our  duty,  if  we  ask,  "  Why  should  we  do 
our  duty?  why  should  we  follow  the  right 
order?"  there  is  no  answer  possible  but,  "It 
is  right  so  to  do." 

If  it  be  urged  in  opposition  that  "  we 
should  follow  the  right  order  because  it  is 
our  true  interest,"  he  who  so  urges  must  ei- 
ther mean  "  we  should  always  follow  our 
own  interest,"  which  is  equivalent  to  aban- 
doning the  rule  of  "  right  and  wrong  "  alto- 
gether, or  he  must  mean  "  we  should  follow 
our  interest,  not  because  it  is  our  interest, 
but  because  it  is  right  " — a  proposition  which 
is  a  mistaken  one,  but  yet  one  which,  in  its 
mistaken  way,  affirms  the  very  rule  of  "  right 
and  wrong"  it  was  designed  to  oppose. 


124  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

But  persons  who  say  that  the  morality  of 
any  action  depends  on  its  results  can  always 
be  refuted  simply  by  examining  into  the  as- 
sertions about  duty  which  they  themselves 
make.  One  most  amusing,  instructive,  and 
memorable  example  of  the  kind  is  afforded 
us  by  no  less  a  person  than  John  Stuart  Mill. 
That  eminent  utilitarian  (i.  e.  denier  of  the 
absolutely  distinct  natures  of  "goodness" 
and  "  pleasure  "),  has  written  *  as  follows  : 

"  If  I  am  informed  that  the  world  is  ruled 
by  a  being  whose  attributes  are  infinite,  but 
what  they  are  we  cannot  learn,  nor  what  are 
the  principles  of  his  government,  except  that 
the  highest  human  morality  which  we  are 
capable  of  conceiving  does  not  sanction  them ; 
convince  me  of  it  and  I  will  bear  my  fate  as 
I  may.  But  when  I  am  told  that  I  must  be- 
lieve this,  and  at  the  same  time  call  this  be- 
ing by  the  names  which  express  and  affirm 
the  highest  human  morality,  I  say  in  plain 
terms  that  I  will  not.  Whatever  power  such 


*  See  his  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Phi- 
losophy, p.  103. 


JOHN   STUART   MILL'S   POSITION  125 

a  being  may  have  over  me,  there  is  one  thing 
which  he  shall  not  do — he  shall  not  compel 
me  to  worship  him.  I  will  call  no  being 
'good'  who  is  not  what  I  mean  when  I  ap- 
ply that  epithet  to  my  fellow-creatures ;  and 
if  such  a  being  can  sentence  me  to  hell  for 
not  so  calling  hjm,  to  hell  I  will  go." 

Now  this  declaration  is  truly  admirable ; 
nevertheless,  it  is  very  much  out  of  place  in 
Stuart  Mill's  mouth,  or  in  the  mouth  of  any 
other  professed  "  utilitarian"  For,  if  actions 
were  "  good  "  or  "  bad  "  merely  according  to 
the  pleasure  or  pain  which  followed  them, 
and  if  by  flattering  a  bad  God  we  could  get 
the  greatest  happiness,  while  by  refusing  to 
do  so  we  should  incur  the  greatest  misery, 
then  clearly  on  utilitarian  principles  (not  on 
those.  I  advocate),  such  flattery  would  be 
"good." 

Stuart  Mill's  position  is  indeed  a  curious 
one  ;  for,  of  course,  he  means  that  other  men 
should  do  as  he  says  he  would  do.  Thus  on 
the  one  hand  he  declares  that  all  men  should 
(as  being  utilitarians)  seek  the  greatest  hap- 
piness for  all,  and  also  that  in  so  doing  they 


126  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

should  all  voluntarily  plunge  into  the  great- 
est misery  ! 

This  is  one  striking  example  of  how  im- 
possible it  is  for  the  most  distinguished  men 
to  go  directly  in  opposition  to  the  principles 
of  the  "  helpful  science  "  without  stultifying 
themselves. 

And  now  as  to  Professor  Huxley's  asser- 
tions (i)  that  it  is  not  the  intention  of  the 
man  who  acts,  but  the  consequences  of  his  act 
which  makes  his  action  "bad"  or  "good," 
and  (2)  that  the  highest  virtue  is  to  do  good 
without  thinking  about  it  : 

Let  us  suppose  that  two  men  have  each  a 
sick  wife,  and  that  the  doctor  has  left  with 
each  man  two  bottles :  one  a  valuable  inter- 
nal medicine,  the  other  a  poisonous  lotion 
to  be  used  externally.  One  of  these  men, 
who  loves  his  wife  fondly,  gives  her,  by  pure 
mistake,  the  lotion  to  drink  and  kills  her. 
The  other  man  desires  to  poison  his  wife, 
but,  by  a  similar  mistake  as  to  the  bottles, 
gives  her,  unintentionally,  the  right  medicine 
and  cures  her.  Can  there  be  any  doubt  as 
to  who  is  the  truly  guilty  man  ?  Who  dare 


"  DOING  GOOD  WITHOUT  THINKING  ABOUT  IT  "     127 

assert  that  the  action  of  the  second  man  was 
a  "  good  "  action  because,  in  spite  of  his  evil 
intention,  it  had  a  good  result? 

Yet  this  must  be  so  if  Professor  Huxley's 
principle  has  any  truth  in  it ! 

Then  as  to  "  doing  good  without  thinking 
about  it " — it  cannot  be  meant  that  it  is  the 
absence  of  thought  which  makes  a  sponta- 
neously performed  useful  action  specially 
meritorious ;  otherwise  we  should  attain  the 
climax  of  virtue  by  performing  beneficial  ac- 
tions unconsciously  in  a  state  of  somnambu- 
lism! 

The  admirable  nature  of  spontaneous  good 
actions  lies  in  their  being  the  result  of  good 
habits,  not  in  the  mere  absence  of  reflec- 
tion. A  man  cannot  appreciate  justice  with- 
out being  able  to  distinguish  it  from  injus- 
tice, and  to  love  "  goodness  "  he  must  at  least 
"  know"  it. 

But  another  objection  to  any  absolute  dis- 
tinction between  "right"  and  "wrong"  is 
sometimes  drawn  from  the  fact  that  differ- 
ent nations  (and  the  same  nation  at  different 
times)  take  different  views  as  to  the  "  good- 


128  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ness  "  of  some  particular  kind  of  action.  But 
this  argument  is  quite  valueless.  It  would 
be  absurd,  indeed,  to  suppose  that  all  men 
were  naturally,  or  supernaturally,  furnished 
with  a  whole  code  of  laws  directing  what  is 
to  be  done  and  what  abstained  from  in  all 
cases.  What  is  affirmed  by  Intellectualists 
is,  that  men  are  naturally  and  universally 
(idiots  apart)  endowed  with  a  perception 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  "  right"  and 
"wrong."  Men  are  not  necessarily  devoid  of 
morality  because  they  draw  their  lines  and 
rules  in  different  places  from  what  we  do. 
The  most  horrible  actions,  such  as  the  delib- 
erate killing  of  aged  parents,  may  really  be 
the  result  of  true  moral  judgments  under  pe- 
culiar circumstances.  Such  is  the  case  in  a 
tribe  the  elders  of  which  desire  death  to  se- 
cure a  happy  immortality.  Men  do  not  al- 
ways agree  about  the  application  of  moral 
principles:  what  they  agree  about  is  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  moral  character 
attaching  to  certain  actions.  Even  an  untu- 
tored savage  would  perceive  that  an  un- 
grateful and  treacherous  injury  inflicted  on 


MOTIVES    AFFECT   JUDGMENT  129 

himself  was  a  wrong,  and  one  that  merited 
chastisement. 

Though  thieving  may  have  been  here  and 
there  inculcated,  there  is  also  the  saying 
"  Honor  amongst  thieves,"  and  the  great- 
est rascals  often  recognize  the  moral  claims 
their  "  pals  "  have  on  them.  Men  have  often 
thought  it  right  to  do  things  which  were 
really  unjust ;  but  they  never  thought  any 
action  to  be  "  right  "  because  it  was  "  unjust," 
or  any  action  to  be  wrong  because  it  was 
"just." 

On  the  other  hand,  we  may  very  properly 
deem  some  actions  to  be  less  virtuous — less 
"  right  " — than  others  because  they  are  useful ; 
and  others  less  "wrong"  because  they  are 
useless.  Thus  we  may  admire  the  devotion 
with  which  a  man  may  minister  to  a  sick 
friend ;  but  if,  after  that  friend's  death,  we 
find  that  the  man  who  ministered  to  him 
has  received  a  rich  bequest,  our  appreciation 
of  his  devotedness  may  be  much  diminished. 

x 

Similarly,  a  woman  may  have  a  sinful  attach- 
ment to  a  man,  but  if  we  find  that  instead  of 
any  worldly  gain  thence  derived,  she  simply 


130  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

sacrifices  herself  for  him,  our  censure  may 
thereby  be  mitigated,  since  it  shows  she 
"has  loved  much." 

Thus  so  essential  is  the  distinction  be- 
tween "the  good"  and  "the  useful"  that 
not  only  does  the  idea  of  "  benefit ''  not  en- 
ter into  the  idea  of  "  duty,"  but  the  very 
fact  of  an  action  not  being  beneficial  may 
make  it  more  praiseworthy.  Its  merit  is  in- 
creased by  any  self-denial  which  may  be  nec- 
essary to  its  performance,  while  gain  tends 
to  diminish  the  merit  of  an  action.  It  is 
not  that  absence  of  gain  or  pleasure  benefits 
our  neighbor  more;  it  is  that  any  diminution 
of  pleasure  which  circumstances  may  occa- 
sion (irrespective  of  any  advantage  thereby 
occasioned  to  our  neighbor)  in  ^^height- 
ens the  value  of  the  action.  But  evidently 
that  can  never  be  the  "substance  of  duty" 
which  increases  "  dutifulness "  by  its  ab- 
sence ! 

We  have  seen,  in  considering  the  principle 
of  contradiction,  that  the  human  mind  has 
the  power  of  knowing  absolute,  necessary, 
and  universal  truth.  Similarly,  reason  shows 


"     CONSCIENCE  SUPREME  131 

us  that  the  commands  of  conscience  are  ab- 
solute and  supreme.  But  if  we  see  that  its 
universal  and  unconditional  authority  can 
never  be  evaded,  then  the  ethical  principle 
must  be  rooted,  as  it  were,  within  the  inmost 
heart,  in  the  very  foundations,  so  to  speak, 
of  the  entire  universe,  which  it  must  pervade 
wherever  any  moral  beings  exist.  The  prin- 
ciples of  the  moral  law  must  then  be  at 
least  as  extensive  and  enduring  as  are  those 
starry  heavens  which  shared  with  it  the  pro- 
found reverence  of  Kant. 

The  conception  of  duty  is  the  conception 
of  something  supreme  and  absolutely  in- 
cumbent upon  us  without  appeal — apart  from 
any  question  of  pleasures  and  pains,  rewards 
and  punishments.  It  is,  in  the  immortal 
words  of  Cicero : 

"  Quod  tale  est  ut  detracta  omni  utilitate 
sive  allis  prczmiis  fructibusque  per  seipsum 
possit  jure  laudari." 


fcart  1TD 

THE  conclusion  we  arrived  at  in  the  third 
part  of  this  essay  was  that  the  ideas  "virtue  " 
and  " utility"  are  fundamentally  distinct,  and 
also  that  the  claims  of  "duty"  are  absolutely 
imperative  and  supreme.  This  conclusion,  it 
was  observed,  had  certain  important  antece- 
dents, and  it  has  also  no  less  practical  conse- 
quences. 

The  antecedents  I  referred  to  were  the 
considerations  which  warranted  that  conclu- 
sion. In  order  to  obtain  a  just  appreciation 
of  these  it  was  necessary  to  dig  down  to  the 
very  foundations  of  human  knowledge  and  so 
ascertain  what  must  be  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  our  beliefs  in  every  proposition  which  we 
regard  as  the  most  certain  and  unquestion- 
able. 

It  is  impossible,  we  have  seen,  to  find,  or 
even  conceive  of,  grounds  more  absolutely 


ULTIMATE  TRUTHS  133 

certain  than  those  which  ultimate  truths 
bear  within  themselves — namely,  their  own 
self-evidence.  The  ultimate  truths  we  have 
recognized  are  (i)  our  own  existence  and  our 
knowledge  thereof;  (2)  the  validity  of  our 
own  perception  of  objectivity  through  our 
faculty  of  memory ;  and  (3)  the  validity  also 
of  logical  reasoning ;  the  certainty  (4)  of  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  and  (5)  the  reality 
and  significance  of  "truth."  By  considering 
the  wondrous  fact  that  the  human  mind 
can  know  a  certain  amount  of  universal  and 
necessary  truth  (as  that  nothing  can  simulta- 
neously exist  and  be  non-existent),  perceive 
the  extension  of  extended  objects  and  the  dif- 
ference between  "thought "  and  "  extension," 
we  recognized  that  our  intellectual  energy 
must  be  an  immaterial  unity  and  one  faculty 
of  our  whole  being,  the  material  nature  of 
which  possessed  the  other  property- — namely, 
"  extension." 

These  truths  follow  one  from  another  as 
necessary  consequences  of  our  fundamental 
perceptions  of  things  evidently  true,  and  are 
the  antecedents  and  justification  of  our  eth- 


134  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ical  perceptions — our  judgments  of  what  is 
certain  in  the  domain  of  morals. 

Let  us  next  turn  to  some  of  the  conse- 
quences of  our  moral  intuitions. 

Every  man  who  has  pondered  over  his 
own  nature  (without  having  accepted  as  sat- 
isfactory any  of  the  current  forms  of  relig- 
ious teaching)  must  have  speculated  about 
his  origin  and  his  destiny,  and  have  proba- 
bly asked  himself,  "  What  is  the  meaning  of 
life?" 

Every  such  man  has  his  own  way  of  re- 
garding the  world,  and,  it  may  be,  has  ar- 
rived at  the  conclusion  that  he  can  attain 
no  satisfaction  about  it.  He  will,  however, 
certainly  admit  that,  to  obtain  answers  to 
such  questions— if  they  can  be  obtained — is 
a  most  practical  matter.  To  such  men  this 
essay  is  offered  as  a  presentation  of  thoughts 
(a  science)  to  them  specially  helpful.  If  the 
rational  end  of  life  is  (as  put  forward  in  Part 
III.)  the  fulfilment  of  duty,  then  no  one  can 
have  an  objectless  existence.  The  poor  no 
less  than  the  rich,  the  foolish  as  well  as  the 
wise,  and.  those  who  are  aged  and  infirm, 


CONDUCT  SHOULD   RECEIVE    ITS  DESERTS         135 

as  well  as  the  healthy  and  young,  have  all 
a  truly  noble  prospect  before  them.  The 
fulfilment  of  duty  has  also,  as  I  think  may 
be  clearly  shown,  its  practically  advanta- 
geous results. 

I  observed,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  last  part 
of  this  essay,  that  reason  shows  us  the  ful- 
filment of  duty  to  be  incumbent  upon  us  apart 
from  any  question  of  prospective  pleasures  or 
pains.  But,  though  duties  are  thus  incumbent 
apart  from  questions  of  rewards  or  punish- 
ments, yet  we  certainly  have  evident  percep- 
tions as  to  justice  with  respect  to  the  conse- 
quences of  our  actions. 

It  is  an  evident  truth  that  every  responsi- 
ble person  deserves  differently  according  to 
the  way  he  has  acted  with  respect  to  his 
responsibilities.  If  he  has  acted  well,  it  is 
plain  that  he  has  so  far  acquired  merit,  and 
has  claims  in  accordance  therewith.  If  he 
has  acted  ill,  it  is  manifest  that  he  has  ac- 
quired demerit,  is  less  to  be  valued,  and  de- 
serves to  be  treated  accordingly. 

Justice  demands  that  each  man  should  be 
dealt  with  exactly  according  to  his  deserts, 


136  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

and  that  happiness  should  (at  least,  ultimate- 
ly) attend  on  virtue,  and  unhappiness  on  vice. 
Not  only  does  the  practice  of  virtue  often 
entail  grave  sacrifices,  but,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  greater  the  sacrifice  the  higher  the  virtue 
and  the  more  evident  the  merit.  Although 
a  virtuous  man  feels,  as  a  rule,  pleasure  in 
his  good  actions,  yet  to  this  there  are  limits, 
and  it  is  surely  desirable  that  evil  should  be 
avoided  and  good  deeds  done  by  the  great 
mass  of  mankind,  who  certainly  have  not  at- 
tained a  degree  of  virtue  which  any  one  need 
term  Quixotic.  It  would  outrage  our  per- 
ception of  what  is  just,  did  we  know  that 
happiness  would  ever  be  finally  divorced  from 
virtue  ;  and  this  perception  is  one  which  for- 
cibly shows  the  close  relation  which  exists 
between  "knowing"  and  "  doing." 

What  are  the  plain  dictates  of  ordinary 
common-sense?  what  maxim  do  we  hear 
urged  in  the  by-ways  of  our  cities  which 
comes  home  not  only  to  the  feelings,  but  to 
the  moral  judgment  of  the  masses?  Surely 
it  is  the  saying  that  a  man  deserves  "a  fair 
day's  wages  for  a  really  fair  day's  work." 


"DAILY  WORK"  REQUIRED  OF  EVERY  ONE   137 

And  as  every  man,  whatever  his  degree, 
needs  his  daily  bread,  so  also  is  a  daily  ^vork 
required  of  him,  as  his  conscience  plainly  tells 
him.  The  daily  work  required  of  every  one 
of  us  is  to  "  do  what  is  right  " — to  "  follow  the 
right  order"  —  according  to  our  various  cir- 
cumstances :  and  this  in  our  secret  thoughts 
as  well  as  in  word  and  deed ;  for  thoughts 
deliberately  entertained  are  actions  begun. 
This  is  the  work  set  before  every  man  and 
woman  to  .do  —  rich  and  poor,  strong  and 
weak,  young  and  old,  learned  and  ignorant 
— and  this  is  the  supremely  "  good  work  " 
which  our  perceptions  of  justice  assure  us 
cannot  ultimately  be  divorced  from  happi- 
ness. Yet  both  ancient  and  modern  writ- 
ings teem  with  protests  against  the  success- 
ful evil-doer,  and  history  is  full  of  examples 
of  apparently  successful  injustice.  It  is  true 
that  some  agnostics  affirm  that  every  man 
receives  microscopic  justice — complete  ret- 
ribution— in  this  life  for  his  every  deed,  word, 
and  thought.  I  recollect,  a  few  years  ago, 
appealing  to  a  leading  agnostic  in  England 
for  a  subscription  towards  maintaining  the 


138  THE   HELPFUL  SCIENCE 

widow  and  children  of  a  poor  but  most  wor- 
thy laborer,  suddenly  killed  by  a  fall  from  a 
house-roof.  He  had  left  behind  him,  bed- 
ridden with  cancer,  a  wife  to  whom,  and  to 
his  young  family,  he  had  been  accustomed 
to  minister  before  setting  out  for  his  daily 
toil.  I  did  not  obtain  one  shilling  from  this 
leading  agnostic.  He  did  not  use  the  pre- 
cise words  "Served  him  right"  (!),  but  he 
said  to  me,  "  How  do  you  know  he  was  not 
entertaining  a  bad  thought  when  he  so  fell, 
and  met  with  his  punishment?" 

So  groundless  a  superstition  as  that  every 
one  has  such  microscopic  justice  awarded  to 
him  here,  hardly  seems  to  me  to  deserve  ar- 
gument ;  but  is  it  possible  to  think  that  the 
poor  boy  who  was  the  son  of  Marie  Antoi- 
nette, and  who  suffered  so  many  cruel  tort- 
ures, could  by  the  actions  of  his  brief  life 
have  merited  so  terrible  a  chastisement  ? 

If,  then,  we  cannot  count  on  justice  here, 
our  ethical  perceptions  seem  to  demand  a 
future  life  as  a  moral  necessity. 

It  surely  must  be  admitted  that  a  strong 
conviction  as  to  a  future  life  is  of  the  utmost 


DOING   GOOD    FOR   THE    SAKE   OF   A    REWARD     139 

practical  importance  with  respect  to  the  moral 
work  we  have  some  of  us  every  now  and 
then  to  do.  If  we  can  attain  a  certain  and 
sure  knowledge  that  such  a  future  is  even 
probable,  such  a  knowing  has  evidently  a 
very  close  and  influential  relation  to  doing. 
I  am  far  indeed  from  meaning  to  imply  that 
we  should  do  good  for  the  sake  of  a  reward, 
but,  knowing  what  sort  of  creatures  we  men 
are,  I  cannot  shut  my  eyes  to  the  fact  that 
for  most  of  us — when  the  will,  under  tempta- 
tion, is  just  trembling  in  the  balance — such 
considerations  must  have,  and  for  reasonable 
men  should  have,  a  decided  influence. 

As  to  the  reasonableness  of  any  confidence 
in  a  future  after  death,  as  considered  with 
the  best  aid  we  can  obtain  from  "the  help- 
ful science,"  I  have  something  to  say  later 
on.  Here,  however,  we  may  at  once  note 
what  considerations  as  to  physiology  may  be 
able  to  teach  us.  But,  in  fact,  the  very  last 
refinements  of  physical  science  do  not  add 
one  jot  to  the  most  commonplace  and  old- 
fashioned  arguments  against  a  future  life.  It 
was  known  centuries  enough  ago  that  "  when 


140  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

the  brains  were  out  the  man  would  die,  and 
then  an  end,"  as  regards  the  life  of  the  body, 
and  we  know  absolutely  no  more  to-day.  We 
are,  of  course,  utterly  unable  to  imagine  the 
soul's  existence  after  death,  because  we  have 
had  no  such  experience,  and  we  can  never 
imagine  anything  whereof  we  have  had  no 
kind  of  experience* 

But  our  inability  to  form  a  mental  picture 
of  anything  is  no  reason  whatever  for  not  be- 
lieving in  its  existence.  Who  can  picture  an 
act  of  thinking  ?•— yet  nothing  is  more  certain 
to  us  than  that  we  not  only  believe,  but  abso- 
lutely know,  with  entire  certainty,  that  we 
can  and  actually  do  think.  Similarly,  our  in- 
tuition of  the  self-evident  character  bf  the 
precept  "  We  should  act  rightly,"  our  respon- 
sibility with  respect  to  our  actions  which  con- 
sciousness reveals,  and  the  manifest  absence 
of  any  complete  system  of  retribution  in  this 
life,  positively  dehiand  a  life  hereafter.  The 
demand  will,  wheri  we  consider  what  has 
been  already  poirlted  out  about  the  varied 
powers  of  our  simple  intellectual  unity  of 
nature,  appear  a  very  reasonable  demand. 


AS   TO  A   FUTURE   LIFE  141 

Either  the  moral  law  is  a  fable,  and  Jack 
the  Ripper  a  utilitarian  who  blamelessly  fol- 
lows after  pleasure  in  his  own  peculiar  way, 
and  the  grossest  and  most  malicious  of  man- 
kind are  alone  right  and  alone  rewarded,  or 
virtue  must  sooner  or  later  be  vindicated  and 
victorious. 

But  these  reasonings  may  be  combated  by 
some  such  objections  as  the  following : 

"  We  can  know  nothing  about  such  mat- 
ters ;  for  a  future  life  in  accordance  with  our 
deserts  implies  a  God,  and  as  to  the  existence' 
of  a  God  we  can  know  nothing.  Eminent 
agnostics  assure  us  that,  ignorant  as  we  are 
of  all  such  matters,  we  are  above  all  inca- 
pable of  knowing  anything  about  a  cause  of 
the  universe.  We  are,  indeed,  rather  proud 
than  otherwise  of  our  ignorance,  since  we  are 
convinced  that  you,  in  thinking  you  know 
something  even  about  a  God,  prove  thereby 
that  you  know  less  than  we  do  ourselves. 
We  altogether  deny  that  any  knowledge  of 
a  cause  is  possible  at  all ;  what  is  called 
' causation'  is  really  nothing  but  invisible, 
unconditional  '  sequence/  We  can  see  that 


142  THE    HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

one  thing,  or  set  of  circumstances,  is  always 
followed  by  another,  but  we  never  do  or  can 
see  any  bond  or  compelling  nexus  between 
them  !" 

In  reply  to  these  objections  a  few  words 
must  be  said  about  our  knowledge  of  causes 
of  any  kind,  before  entering  upon  the  tre- 
mendous question  concerning  the  existence 
and  nature  of  a  cause  of  the  whole  universe, 
and  as  to  the  possible  extent  of  our  knowl- 
edge thereof. 

It  is  quite  true  that  we  never  feel  or  see 
physical  causation,  because  it  is  both  intan- 
gible and  invisible;  but,  though  our  senses 
cannot  perceive  it,  our  intellect  can  and  does. 
When  we  knock  a  nail  into  a  board  with  a 
hammer,  it  is  simply  nonsense  to  tell  us  that, 
because  we  can  only  see  the  nail,  board,  and 
hammer,  we  cannot  know  that  we  exert  a 
force  which  makes  the  nail  go  in.  But  there 
is  one  instance  in  which  a  man  can  be  aware 
not  only  of  an  antecedent  and  consequent, 
and  the  causal  relation  between  them,  but 
also  the  very  bond  or  nexus  between  them 
can  be  distinctly  perceived  by  us.  This  is 


CONFLICTING   MOTIVES  143 

the  case  whenever  a  man  is  in  doubt  about 
what  course  to  pursue,  owing  to  his  being 
drawn  in  different  directions  by  different 
motives.  Then  the  inflow  and  force  of  the 
conflicting  motives  acting  upon  his  own  mind 
can  be  distinctly  perceived  by  him.  We  can 
all  also  perceive  it  when  anything  resists  our 
will.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  stem  of  a  small 
tree  has  been  partly  sawn  through  and  that 
we  then  try  whether  we  can  pull  it  down. 
If  the  coherence  of  the  part  not  sawn  through 
is  still  very  great,  we  may  have  to  exert  all 
our  force  to  overcome  it.  When  at  last  we 
have  succeeded,  and  are  exhausted  with  our 
efforts,  we  may  feel  very  vividly  that  any  one 
who  denied  we  had  caused  the  tree  to  come 
down  must  be  as  great  a  lunatic  as  any  one 
who  denied  the  objective  existence  of  the 
tree  at  all.  In  fact,  the  idea  "  force "  is  a 
primary  and  ultimate  idea  which  cannot  be 
analyzed  into  any  others.  If  any  reader 
doubts  this,  I  can  only  advise  him  to  try  to 
analyze  it. 

But  it  may  be  said — because  such  follies 
have  been  printed — that,  though  we  may  be 


144  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

conscious  of  our  own  force,  we  err  if  we  as- 
sert efficient  causation  in  any  other  instance, 
making  the  mistake  even  of  attributing  to  in- 
animate things  feelings  like  those  we  experi- 
ence in  making  physical  efforts.  Surely  great- 
er nonsense  has  been  rarely  uttered.  Let  us 
suppose  the  partly-sawn-through  tree  to  be 
not  even  touched  by  us,  but  that  a  gale  has 
sprung  up  which,  after  having  swayed  it  to 
and  fro,  breaks  it  off  and  prostrates  it  just  as 
we  have  supposed  it  prostrated  by  human 
efforts. 

Are  we  not  to  say  that  the  wind  has  ex- 
erted as  much  force  as  was  ours?  and  can  we 
not  say  this  confidently,  without  being  such 
idiots  as  to  attribute  "  feelings"  to  the  wind? 

Truly,  then,  we  have  actual  experience  of 
causation,  but  we  have  much  more  than  that, 
for  a  little  reflection  will  be  enough  to  show 
the  reader  that  the  law  of  causation  is  a  nec- 
essary and  universal  truth  which  carries  with 
it  its  own  evidence. 

In  the  first  part  of  this  essay  (among  other  il- 
lustrations of  the  certainties  of  every-day  life) 
we  said  that  if  we  find  a  door  closed  which 


NO   ACTION    WITHOUT    EXISTENCE  145 

we  knew  was  open  some  time  before,  we 
may  be  certain  that  some  person  or  thing 
has  closed  it.  Similarly,  if  we  come  upon  a 
corpse  with  its  throat  cut,  we  know  with  cer- 
tainty the  wound  must  have  been  either  self- 
inflicted  or  been  the  act  of  some  other  person. 
All  certainties  of  that  kind  are  summed  up 
in  the  law  of  causation,  which  declares  that 
"  Every  change  is  due  to  some  cause."  This 
being  a  primary,  ultimate  truth,  cannot,  of 
course,  be  proved  by  any  other  truth,  yet  its 
certainty  may  be  perceived  by  reflection  as 
well  as  directly.  Thus  it  is  plain  that  what 
does  not  even  exist  cannot  act,  and,  conse- 
quently, cannot  be  a  cause.  Therefore,  any- 
thing which  comes  newly  into  being  cannot 
be  caused  by  itself,  because  it  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  acted  before  it  came  into  being. 
It  must,  then,  have  been  brought  into  being 
by  the  agency  of  something  else  which  was 
its  cause.  Every  change  in  anything  which 
already  exists  is,  in  fact,  a  new  mode  of  be- 
ing, and,  therefore,  equally  demands  a  cause 
for  its  existence.  It  must,  then,  be  due  either 
to  some  distinct  existence  or  to  some  other 


146  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

antecedent  mode  of  being  of  that  thing 
which  now  exists  in  its  new  mode.  As, 
when  we  awake  from  sleep,  our  awakening 
must  be  due  either  to  something  external 
which  has  awakened  us,  or  to  some  change 
which  has  taken  place  in  our  own  organism. 
In  the  latter  case,  that  change  or  new  mode 
of  our  being,  which  we  call  "  wakening  from 
sleep,"  had  for  its  cause  an  antecedent  state 
of  our  body — more  vigorous  circulation,  or 
what  not. 

Again,  all  and  every  object  we  see  or 
feel  must,  we  know,  be  the  result  of  the 
action  of  some  or  other  external  cause  or 
causes.  This  is  evident  with  every  object 
made  by  man ;  but  no  stone  we  tread  on, 
no  patch  of  sod  or  mud,  can  have  come  to 
be  what  it  is  save  by  the  action  of  some  an- 
tecedent causes.  And  this  does  not  only 
apply  to  every  complex  structure,  but  to 
the  simplest  material  object,  even  though  it 
consists  alone  of  what  we  call  one  of  the  ul- 
timate chemical  elements;  e.g.,  a  pure  metal 
or  piece  of  crystallized  carbon  —  that  is,  a 
diamond. 


CONDITIONS   DEMAND   A   CAUSE  147 

Any  such  object  demands  a  cause  for  its 
being  in  the  place  it  is  at  the  time  it  is  there, 
for  its  size,  shape,  etc.,  and  for  all  its  rela- 
tions to  surrounding  things,  as  well  as  any 
special  qualities  of  its  own  internal  condi- 
tion. Its  own  special  conditions  would  also 
demand  a  cause,  even  if  such  a  body  existed 
alone  and  by  itself  in  an  otherwise  empty  uni- 
verse— if  we  can  permit  ourselves  to  frame 
for  a  moment  so  absurd  an  hypothesis. 
Therefore,  everything  which  can  be  seen  not 
to  contain  a  sufficient  cause  for  its  own  ex- 
istence within  itself,  must  be  due  to  some 
cause  or  causes  external  to  it.  Only  some- 
thing which  is  absolutely  simple,  indivisible, 
and  eternal  can  escape  from  this  law  of  uni- 
versal causation.  Moreover,  this  perception 
is  not  the  mere  result  of  a  mental  impo- 
tence of  the  imagination — it  is  not  a  nega- 
tive inability  to  imagine  a  complex  thing 
uncaused — but  is  a  positive  and  active  power 
of  perception.  Let  the  reader  first  consider 
his  idea  of  a  stone  of  some  definite  shape 
and  size,  made  of  two  or  more  mineral  sub- 
stances. Then  let  him  ask  himself  whether 


148  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

he  does  not  actively  and  positively  see  that 
its  shape  and  composition  must  positively 
be  due  to  influences  of  different  kinds,  or 
whether  he  finds  himself  merely  passive,  and 
unable  to  help  himself  to  be  certain  of  any. 
thing  about  it. 

This  consideration  does  away  with  an  ob- 
jection made  to  the  law  of  causation  when, 
as  is  often  the  case,  it  is  incorrectly  stated. 
It  is  sometimes  stated  thus:  "Every  exist- 
ence  must  have  a  cause."  Then,  of  course, 
the  objection  at  once  arises  that  thus  we 
have  a  regressus  ad  infinitum,  and,  if  there  is 
a  God,  he  must  have  a  cause,  and  so  on  for- 
ever— which  is,  of  course,  absurd.  It  is  not, 
however,  "  everything  which  exists,"  but  "  ev- 
erything which  newly  exists  and  does  not 
contain  within  itself  a  sufficient  cause  for  its 
being,"  which  alone  demands  a  cause. 

Having  gained  a  clear  perception  of  this 
self-evident  and  necessary  truth,  let  us  con- 
sider the  material  universe  in  the  light  thus 
obtained. 

The  universe  is  the  theatre  of  incessant 
and  apparently  unending  change;  but  our 


NO    BEGINNING   WITHOUT   A   CAUSE  149 

present  object  is  not  to  examine  any  of  those 
changes  or  any  number  of  them,  but  to  con- 
sider them  as  forming  one  great,  unimag- 
inably complex  whole.  Does  science  une- 
quivocally point  to  any  beginning  of  such 
a  whole?  I  do  not  see  that  reason  makes 
it  evident  either  that  the  whole  cosmos  (con- 
sidered as  one  vast  unity)  ever  had,  or  had 
not,  a  beginning,  or  will  ever  have,  or  not, 
an  end.  It  is,  at  least,  conceivable  that  the 
cosmos  may  be  a  real  system  of  perpetual 
motion. 

Of  course,  if  the  whole  universe  ever  had 
a  beginning,  it  must  have  had  a  cause ;  but 
how  is  it  on  the  hypothesis  that  it  never  had 
a  beginning?  We  saw  that  even  a  body 
composed  of  a  single  chemical  element  de- 
mands a  cause  to  explain  its  shape  and  inter- 
nal conditions.  A  fortiori,  a  body  composed 
of  many  substances,  with  a  complex  internal 
structure  and  a  variety  of  internal  energies 
actively  at  work,  demands  a  cause,  and  not 
one  bit  the  less  if  it  exists  eternally. 

This  must  apply  equally  if  we  imagine  this 
body  expanded  indefinitely  till  it  reaches 


150  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

the  extent  of  the  material  universe.  If  such 
a  universe  is  eternal,  it  none  the  less  neces- 
sarily demands  an  eternal  cause.  This  is 
absolutely  certain,  because  the  universe,  as 
one  whole,  could  never  have  been  evolved 
by  a  process  of  natural  selection  —  that  is, 
have  proved  itself  able  to  survive  in  a  com- 
petition with  others — because  the  universe, 
considered  as  one  whole,  could  have  had  no 
competitors,  and  so,  if  it  existed  eternally, 
it  must  have  eternally  existed  by  itself,  with 
the  exception  of  its  cause. 

What,  then,  must  we  say  as  to  the  nature 
and  attributes  of  such  a  first  cause?  The 
universe  known  to  us  is  a  universe  replete 
with  order,  harmony,  and  beauty,  and  is  gov- 
erned by  laws  admirably  correlated.  It  is 
also  the  abode  of  at  least  one  race  of  beings 
(ourselves)  who  possess  intellect,  can  appre- 
hend truth,  goodness,  and  beauty,  and  pos- 
sess a  power  of  will.  Moreover,  we  human 
beings  did  somehow  come  into  existence  in 
a  world  (the  earth)  previously  devoid  of  or- 
ganisms endowed  with  such  marvellous  fac- 
ulties. 


CAUSES   JUDGED   BY   THEIR   EFFECTS          151 

Now  our  reason  assures  us  that  we  can,  to 
a  certain  extent,  judge  of  causes  by  their 
effects.  We  may  be  quite  sure  that  a  don- 
key-engine will  never  draw  a  heavy  train 
from  New  York  to  San  Francisco  ;  and  what- 
ever may  be  produced,  must  have  been  pro- 
duced by  something  adequate  to  produce  it 
— and  this  applies  to  a  first  cause  as  to  every 
other  cause. 

We  too  are,  however,  sometimes  told  that 
we  can  be.no  judges  of  the  adequacy  or  in- 
adequacy of  causes,  and  we  are  asked  how 
we  could  know — a  priori — the  "  adequacy  " 
of  a  piece  of  steel  to  produce  a  wound,  or  of 
a  flame  to  produce  a  burn  ?  To  these  objec- 
tions it  may  be  replied  that  the  "  adequacy  " 
is  not  in  the  steel  or  in  the  flame,  but  in  these 
as  affecting  a  sensitive  organism  which  they 
may  injure.  The  organism  and  the  agents 
are  together  adequate  to  produce  the  effects 
cited,  and  the  reason  can  perceive  their  ade- 
quacy. 

But  the  one  appeal  of  physical  science  is 
to  "  experience,"  and  what  does  experience 
tell  us?  We  have  certainly  no  experience 


152  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

of  life  having  been  produced  from  the  life- 
less, or  of  sensibility  and  intellect  appearing 
without  their  pre- existence  in  the  agents 
which  caused  their  existence.  In  short, 
experience  shows  us  that  "Nemo  dat  quod 
non  habet"  Now,  among  the  effects  pro- 
duced quite  recently  (geologically  speaking) 
in  this  planet,  there  are  three  which  are  not- 
ably distinct  from  all  the  others.  These 
are:  (i)  intellect  which  can  perceive  truth; 
(2)  intellect  perceiving  the  distinction  be- 
tween right  and  wrong;  and  (3)  the  power 
of  will. 

Therefore,  a  first  cause,  as  adequate  to 
produce  such  effects  as  these,  must  possess 
corresponding  attributes — namely,  intellect, 
goodness,  and  will.  Of  such  attributes  our 
own  intellect,  goodness,  and  will,  can  be  at 
most,  as  it  were,  but  faint  reflections.  In 
other  words  the  First  Cause,  as  possessed  of 
intellect  and  will,  must  be  personal — that  is, 
a  Personal  God.  By  the  term  "  personal," 
nothing  more  is  here  signified  than  the  pos- 
session of  these  two  attributes  :  there  can  be 
no  other  resemblance  to  a  human  personality. 


NO   MISTAKE   AS    TO   A    "FIRST   CAUSE"       153 

Intellectualists  are  often  reproached  with 
what  is  called  their  "Anthropomorphism," 
and  are  reminded  of  Voltaire's  saying:  "Si 
Dieu  a  fait  rkomme  en  son  image,  rhomme 
lui  a  joliment  rendu"  But  since  we  are 
mere  human  beings,  it  is  absolutely  impos- 
sible for  us  to  think  at  all,  save  in  human 
terms.  There  is,  however,  no  danger  of  be- 
ing misled.  There  is  no  danger  of  our  re- 
garding the  First  Cause  as  actually  a  man, 
or  as  less  than  a  man,  and  all  we  have  to  do 
is,  while  using  human  language,  to  recognize 
its  necessary  inadequacy,  and  that  it  can 
but  serve  to  indicate  a  true  analogy.  Evi- 
dently it  is  inexpressibly  more  true  to  speak 
of  such  First  Cause  as  powerful  than  im- 
potent, wise  than  foolish,  and  good  than 
bad.  But  so  to  recognize  the  Great  Cause 
of  all  things  is  enough  for  our  practical  pur- 
poses. ' 

Before,  however,  proceeding  to  the  practi- 
cal deduction  we  desire  to  draw  from  this 
branch  of  "  the  helpful  science,"  it  may  be 
well  to  turn  back  and  reconsider  the  real  nat- 
ure of  those  self-evident  primary  truths  the 


154  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

existence  of  which  we  have  already  recog- 
nized. 

These  truths,  as  we  have  seen,  are  self-evi- 
dent and  need  no  proof ;  while,  at  the  same 
time,  they  are  themselves  indispensable  in  or- 
der that  anything  else  may  be  proved.  They 
are  clear  and  certain,  but  they  do  not  explain 
themselves.  The  rays  of  light  they  bring 
to  the  intellect  are  most  luminous,  but  nev- 
ertheless they  are  rays,  and  their  source — 
the  luminary  whence  they  radiate — remains 
hidden  from  our  direct  mental  gaze,  and 
can  only  be  indirectly  known  through  medi- 
ation and  reflection.  Truth,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  a  correspondence  of  thought  with  things. 
What,  then,  is  and  must  be  that  with  which 
these —  at  once  the  highest  yet  most  fun- 
damental of  all  truths — correspond  ?  Upon 
them  all  the  most  certain  deductions  and  in- 
ductions of  science  and  all  the  most  practi- 
cal rules  of  art  ultimately  repose.  The  grade 
of  perfection  of  every  art  and  science  de- 
pends directly  upon  and  varies  with  the 
degree  of  accuracy  wherewith  our  thoughts 
correspond  with  objective  reality.  But  with 


SENSISM   AND  AGNOSTICISM    PERNICIOUS      155 

what  objective  reality  can  those  truths  cor- 
respond which  are  absolute,  universal,  and 
necessary,  except  an  absolute  and  infinite 
First  Cause?  They  must  reflect  upon  our 
minds  illuminating  rays  from  an  inconceiv- 
able source  of  all  light  and  of  all  truth  — 
from  God  ! 

I  am  thus  writing  (as  I  said  I  should)  not 
in  the  interest  of  any  special  form  of  religion, 
but  merely  as  an  earnest  student  of  science 
and  an  uncompromising  upholder  of  the  dig- 
nity and  worth  of  the  human  intellect.  It  is 
in  the  name  of  science,  of  reason,  and  in 
those  names  alone,  that  I  have  made,  and 
again  make,  the  declaration  that  the  system 
of  sensism  and  the  folly  of  agnosticism  are  as 
devoid  of  a  rational  basis  as  they  are  morally 
pernicious ;  as  also  that  the  most  exhaust- 
ive study  of  science — above  all,  of  the  sci- 
ence of  sciences — gives  us  the  most  solid 
ground  for  affirming  the  existence  of  a  most 
wise,  powerful,  and  good  God  as  the  First 
Cause  of  the  universe  which  surrounds  us, 
and,  therefore,  of  our  own  being.  But  our 
knowledge  of  Him  is  due  to  inference,  not 


156  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

to  intuition,  and  still  less  to  any  superra- 
tional,  spiritual  illumination.  Of  such  illu- 
mination I,  at  least,  possess  no  vestige,  and 
my  appeal  as  to  Theism  is  only  to  the  hard 
reason,  the  cold,  dry  intellect  of  my  readers, 
and  not  at  all  to  pious  feelings  or  edifying 
sentiments. 

Our  moral  intuitions  thus  proclaim  the 
existence  of  God  as  the  source  and  cause 
of  such  intuitions,  but  their  absolute  charac- 
ter shows  us  that  they  cannot  depend  upon 
even  a  Divine  will,  but  must  be  of  the  very  es- 
sence of  that  inconceivable  Divinity  itself. 
But  although  morality  is  absolute,  and  does 
not  depend  on  God's  will  or  our  recognition 
of  His  existence,  nevertheless  that  recogni- 
tion most  powerfully  aids  in  and  reinforces 
our  ethical  judgments.  A  climbing  plant, 
though  rooted  in  the  soil,  can  live  indepen- 
dently of  bodies  in  its  vicinity,  yet  it  can 
never  attain  its  perfection  without  external 
aid.  So  moral  aspirations  need  for  their  full 
fruition  the  support  of  Theism.  The  same 
moral  perceptions  also  confirm  that  dictate 
of  our  common  -  sense  which  declares  that 


MORAL    LAW    AND    WHAT   IT    IMPLIES  157 

we  have  power  over  and  are  responsible  for 
some  of  our  actions.  The  very  existence  of 
a  moral  law  implies  and  supposes  the  exist- 
ence of  some  power  on  our  part  of  obeying 
or  disobeying  it — that  we  have  more  choice 
as  to  at  least  some  of  the  resolutions  we 
form  than  a  piece  of  paper  thrown  on  the 
fire  has  a  choice  as  to  whether  it  will  burn  or 
not.  For  our  reason  clearly  affirms  that  no 
one  can  be  justly  blamed  or  punished  fordoing 
anything  he  cannot  possibly  help  doing.  We 
may,  of  course,  shoot  a  madman  if  we  have  no 
other  means  of  saving  our  lives ;  but  though 
we  kill  him,  we  do  not  think  him  wicked, 
but  simply  mad,  and  we  may  truly  pity  him 
all  the  time.  But  we  well  know  that  there 
are  deeds  which  are  really  blameworthy,  and 
there  are  few  of  us  entirely  free  from  self- 
reproach  as  to  some  actions  of  that  kind. 

When  we  recognize  the  certainty  of  God's 
existence  in  connection  with  our  moral  per- 
ceptions, the  argument  in  favor  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  future  life  becomes  greatly  strength- 
ened. We  said  before  that  justice  demands 
a  future  life  ;  and  our  recognition  of  the  be- 


158  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

ing  of  God  removes  all  difficulty  with  respect 
to  its  possibility. 

That  future  existence  can  enable  justice  to 
be  fully  satisfied;  and  not  justice  only,  but 
also  the  deepest  and  most  vivid  aspirations 
of  our  better  nature. 

But  who  can  fulfil  that  expectation  and 
aspiration  of  the  enlightened  conscience,  or 
discern  our  true  merits  or  demerits,  but  an 
infallible  judge  of  conscience — one  who  has 
boundless  wisdom,  irresistible  power,  and  is 
absolutely  just?  It  must  be  He  who  can 
alone  constitute  our  supreme  good,  and  al- 
ienation from  whom  must  therefore  be  our 
direct  ill.  It  must  be  a  First  Cause  who, 
being  the  Author  of  human  nature,  alone 
absolutely  understands  it.  It  must  be  God, 
the  supreme  Legislator,  Judge,  Rewarder, 
and  Chastiser. 

The  truth  that  God  exists  is  thus  evident 
to  whoever  really  understands  what  the  idea 
of  "duty"  implies,  and  it  will  be  the  more 
evident  to  him  the  more  fully  that  idea  is 
understood. 

There  are  three  fundamentally  different 


KNOWLEDGE   AND    GOODNESS  159 

kinds  of  greatness  in  the  world:  (i)  Material 
greatness,  which  our  senses  can  appreciate 
and  imagine ;  (2)  Scientific  greatness,  which 
can  be  apprehended  by  our  intellect,  but  not 
by  our  sensitive  faculty ;  and  (3)  Moral  great- 
ness, which  can  be  adequately  perceived  by 
no  human  being,  as  we  are  not  able  accu- 
rately to  perceive  even  our  own  merits  and 
demerits. 

As  Pascal  has  well  said,  all  merely  mate- 
rial bodies— the  earth  and  all  the  stars  of  the 
firmament — do  not  equal  the  value  of  one 
human  mind ;  for  it  can  know  both  them 
and  itself,  while  such  merely  material  bodies 
know  nothing.  It  is  no  less  clear  that  intel- 
ligence and  knowledge,  however  great,  are 
nothing  when  compared  with  goodness,  and 
moral  truth  is  out  of  all  proportion  the 
most  important  of  all  truth.  Our  reflective 
reason  shows  us  that  the  true  end  of  man  is 
not  that  he  should  be  strong,  handsome,  or 
learned,  but  that  he  should  be  "good."  If 
a  man  were  to  obtain  all  possible  knowledge, 
and  possess  an  inventive  genius  placing  the 
powers  of  nature  at  his  disposal,  yet,  if  he 


160  *THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

were  not  "  good  " — if  he  lived  a  life  divorced 
from  duty — he  would  have  missed  his  true 
"  end,"  and  failed  to  "  follow  the  right  or- 
der." Ethical  (moral)  truths  are,  therefore, 
those  which  most  concern  us  all,  and  are 
of  all  the  most  practical.  The  knowledge 
which  helps  us  to  be  good  is  and  must  be 
more  valuable  than  all  other  kinds  of  knowl- 
edge put  together.  This  is  the  kind  of  "  know- 
ing "  which  helps  the  "  doing  "  of  that  work 
which  is  set  before  every  one  of  us  to  do. 

The  foregoing  considerations  show  us  how 
certain  it  is  that  no  possible  combination  of 
circumstances  can  deprive  us  of  our  true  end 
in  life,  and  nothing  but  a  bad  will  can  divert 
us  from  it.  However  humble  and  obscure  a 
man's  lot  in  life  may  be,  so  long  as  he  con- 
tinues obedient  to  duty,  it  possesses  a  dignity 
and  a  worth  which  cannot  be  overestimated. 
Life,  for  him,  is  never  without  an  adequate 
aim — never  without  utility,  or  deprived  of  a 
sphere  of  meritorious  action.  Further,  no 
event  in  our  lives  can  be  without  signifi- 
cance, and  no  action  can  be  an  indifferent 
one.  A  degree  either  of  merit  or  of  dement, 


BEAUTY   AND    MAJESTY   OF    REASON  161 

however  minute  and  trifling  it  may  be,  must 
accompany  every  one  of  our  conscious  vol- 
untary acts. 

Such  are  the  final  considerations  it  is  here 
desired  to  bring  forward  as  being  the  most 
practical  results  of  such  study  of  "  the  help- 
ful science."  That  science  supplies  us  with 
a  firm  and  sure  support  for  all  those  motives 
which  are  most  conducive  to  the  welfare  of 
the  individual,  the  family,  the  State,  and, 
ultimately,  of.  all  mankind. 

Basing  our  edifice  of  rational  thought  upon 
the  foundations  afforded  by  the  deepest  and 
most  certain  truths  accessible  to  the  mind  of 
man — truths  upon  which  all  science  and  all 
art  must  repose — we  are  enabled  to  recognize 
the  beauty  and  majesty  of  human  reason, 
whose  main  glory  is  the  recognition  of  moral 
worth.  The  validity  of  our  perception  that 
there  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong  and  the  authority  of  con- 
science are,  as  before  said,  guaranteed  by 
the  self-evidence  of  those  fundamental  veri- 
ties which  were  recognized  in  the  second  and 
third  parts  of  this  essay.  They  are  truths 


162  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

which  can  be  recognized,  and  are  fully  with- 
in the  grasp  of  every  ordinary  normal  intelli- 
gence, although  the  subtle  puzzles  of  skilful 
men  may  for  a  time  blind  many  (as  they  have 
blinded  and  do  blind  many)  to  their  certain 
truth.  But  since  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
such  truths  has  the  supreme  importance  here 
set  forth,  the  responsibility  of  those  who,  by 
their  teaching,  would  blind  men  to  them, 
must  be  great  indeed.  Not  less  great  is  the 
obligation  which  binds  men  who  see  through 
such  sophistic  fallacies  to  stand  up  boldly 
and  refute  them,  however  great  may  be  the 
hostility  they  may  thereby  bring  upon  them- 
selves. 

The  system  of  sensism — that  is,  the  sys- 
tem of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  —  pos- 
sesses the  gravest  defects.  It  fails  to  attain 
the  ultimate  foundations  of  all  our  knowl- 
edge, or  to  account  for  and  harmonize  what 
consciousness  tells  us,  by  recognizing  that 
substantial,  persisting  existence  of  which 
each  man's  consciousness,  properly  interro- 
gated, cannot  fail  to  assure  him.  It  fails, 
also,  to  recognize  the  principle  of  contradic- 


"  INTELLECTUALISM  "  163 

tion,  without  which  the  intellect  is  reduced 
to  a  state  of  chaos.  It  is  absolutely  fatal  to 
every  germ  of  morality.  It  entirely  nega- 
tives the  first  principles  of  all  religion,  and, 
finally,  it  stultifies  itself  by  proclaiming  its 
own  untruth — a  proclamation  which  is  con- 
tained in  its  assertion  that  all  our  knowledge 
is  but  phenomenal  and  relative. 

Intellectualism,  on  the  other  hand,  lays  its 
foundations  in  the  deepest  truths  accessible 
to  the  human  intellect,  and  accounts  for  and 
harmonizes  the  declarations  of  consciousness 
by  recognizing  our  substantial  and  persistent 
being.  It  fully  accepts  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction, and  thereby  induces  order  into 
our  thoughts  and  perceptions.  It  supports 
and  enforces  moral  teaching,  and  firmly  es- 
tablishes the  basis  of  all  religion.  Finally, 
it  affirms  and  justifies  its  own  truth  in  dis- 
tinctly apprehending  the  declaration  of  our 
primary  intuitions  which  contain  their  own 
self-evidence,  and  are  recognized  as  so  con- 
taining it. 

How,  then,  can  we  account  for  sensism  hav- 
ing attained  the  wide  acceptance  it  has  ob- 


164  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

tained,  and  how  is  it  that  men  of  undoubted 
intellectual  distinction  support  it  ?  We  have 
already  said  that  there  are  two  good  reasons 
which  account  for  this.  One  reason  is  the 
course  which  human  history  has  taken  dur- 
ing those  alternations  of  fashion,  in  intellect- 
ual as  in  other  matters,  which  were  called  at- 
tention to  in  the  first  part  of  this  essay. 

As  before  pointed  out,  Descartes  first  broke 
with  that  philosophical  system  which  had 
been  elaborated  by  the  keenest  intellects  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  sapped  the  basis  of  all 
certainty.  Abandoning  the  conviction  previ- 
ously entertained  that  we  have  a  direct  per^ 
ception  of  external  objects,  and  basing  his 
system  exclusively  on  ideas,  he  paved  the  way 
for  the  whole  range  of  modern  philosophy. 
But  mental  images  are  but  the  means,  not 
the  objects  of  perception.  We  do  not  per- 
ceive "impressions,"  " images,"  or  "repre- 
sentations "  of  the  objects  about  us,  but  by 
means  of  them  perceive  the  things  themselves. 
An  examination  of  what  our  own  mind  de- 
clares to  us  suffices  to  show  that  our  faculties 
not  only  furnish  us  with  images  or  impres- 


SENSATIONS   AND   PERCEPTIONS  165 

sions  of  things,  but  by  means  of  those  im- 
ages and  impressions,  they  represent — that  is, 
they  make  the  thing  present  to  the  intellect. 
When  we  visit  a  menagerie  we  do  not  per- 
ceive the  sensations  the  animals  within  it 
produce  on  our  organs  of  sense,  but  the  an- 
imals themselves.  Our  sensations  make  bod- 
ies known  to  us  without  being  themselves 
cognized.  They,  as  it  were,  hide  themselves 
from  our  notice  in  giving  rise  to  the  percep- 
tion they  elicit,  and  can  only  be  detected  by 
our  expressly  directing  our  attention  to — 
turning  our  intellect  upon — them.  Through 
Descartes,  and  through  the  ambiguous  sys- 
tem of  Locke,  came  the  long  procession  con- 
sisting of  Spinoza,  Berkeley,  Hume,  Kant, 
Fichte,  Hegel,  and  Schelling,  to  Schopen- 
hauer and  Hartmann,  with  visions  of  rare  and 
elaborate  aerial  palaces  of  cloudland,  togeth- 
er with  the  less  dazzling  constructions  of  the 
brains  of  Mill,  Bain,  Spencer,  etc.,  in  our  own 
day. 

Thus  our  speculative  contemporaries  and 
our  immediate  predecessors  may  claim  some 
indulgence  for  having  accepted  —  taken  for 


166  THE   HELPFUL    SCIENCE 

granted — a  mode  of  thought  so  widely  cur- 
rent, almost  universally  accepted,  since  Des- 
cartes's  day.  Nevertheless,  it  is  the  business 
of  the  philosopher  to  take  no  system  for 
granted,  and  to  bow  to  no  authority.  It  was 
only  by  rebelling  —  after  many  doubts  and 
much  hesitation — against  that  of  Descartes, 
and  severely  scrutinizing  his  position  and  ar- 
guments, that  I  at  last  obtained  intellectual 
freedom  and  full  mental  satisfaction. 

Thus  it  was  that  I  became  convinced  the 
time  had  at  last  arrived  for  another  renas- 
cence— for  the  rejection  of  all  forms  of  Car- 
tesianism,  and  the  construction  of  a  more 
satisfactory  system  based  on  principles  the 
truth  of  which  had  been  formerly  recognized, 
but  without  any  return  to  antiquated  forms 
or  obsolete  prejudices.  This  is  the  system 
of  intellectualism  here  put  forward.  It  is  a 
system  which,  unlike  Cartesianism,  rests  not 
on  ideas  only,  but  also  on  those  direct  per- 
ceptions of  objective  fact  which  take  us  out 
of  ourselves  into  that  objective  world  which 
surrounds  us  on  all  sides,  as  every  healthily 
constituted  mind  well  knows. 


ILL    EFFECTS   OF   A   LOVE   OF    SUPERIORITY      167 

History,  then,  largely  helps  us  to  account  for 
the  pernicious  errors  of  those  who  advocate 
sensism  and  the  relativity  of  knowledge.  They 
are  the  victims  of  long-established  prejudices 
which  they  have  accepted  unquestioningly. 

There  is  another  consideration,  however, 
which  concerns  a  temptation  likely  to  be 
felt  by  some  persons  exceptionally  gifted. 

To  excel  in  anything  which  is  extraordi- 
narily difficult  must  afford  a  special  gratifi- 
cation to  .that  love  of  superiority  which  so 
many  men  possess  who  prize  the  admiration 
of  their  fellows.  And  what  could  well  be 
more  gratifying  to  such  a  man  than  to  have 
it  believed  that  he  apprehends  things  to 
which  the  common  herd  are  blind,  while  he 
sees  clearly  that  those  things  the  vulgar  re- 
gard as  most  certain  (e.g.,  their  own  contin- 
uous existence,  etc.)  are  but  so  many  delu- 
sions which  his  superior  vision  enables  him 
to  recognize  as  such  and  rise  superior  to. 
It  is  but  too  likely  that  this  temptation  has 
had  its  full  effect  on  some  of  those  who  have 
startled  the  world  by  their  bizarre  philosoph- 
ical notions. 


168  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

There  is  yet  another  reason  which  it  is  to 
be  feared  has  actuated,  consciously  or  un- 
consciously, some  members  of  the  sensist 
school.  A  profound  repugnance  to  religion, 
however  discreetly  or  astutely  veiled,  is  at 
the  bottom  of  much  of  the  popular  meta- 
physical teaching  now  in  vogue.  Delenda 
est  Carthago  !  No  system  is  to  be  tolerated 
which  proclaims  the  existence  of  a  personal 
God,  moral  responsibility,  and  future  rewards 
and  punishments. 

Men  who  feel  thus,  and  who  deal  with 
metaphysics,  become  driven  from  one  ab- 
surdity to  another  in  their  struggle  to  main- 
tain  an  essentially  irrational  negative  posi- 
tion. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  all  religion, 
the  existence  of  God,  reposes,  as  we  have 
seen,  on  a  series  of  self-evident  truths,  which 
must  one  after  another  be  denied  if  the  ex- 
istence of  God  is  to  be  impugned.  Accord- 
ingly, because  morality  is  the  most  important 
support  to  Theism,  any  real  distinction  be- 
tween utility  and  virtue  must  be  denied. 
Also,  since  the  principle  of  causation  estab- 


THE   PRINCIPLE   OF    CAUSATION  169 

lishes  the  Theistic  position,  it  is  necessary 
to  deny  the  validity  of  that  principle. 

But  the  principle  of  causation  is  a  self- 
evident  and  necessary  truth  ;  therefore  it  be- 
comes incumbent  on  those  who  deny  the 
certainty  of  our  knowledge  of  God's  exist- 
ence also  to  deny  that  we  can  know  any  self- 
evident  and  necessary  truths  at  all — there- 
fore the  principle  of  contradiction  has  to  be 
denied  along  with  that  of  causation. 

But  those  who  deny  this  are  logically  com- 
pelled to  go  further  still,  and  deny  the  possi- 
bility of  our  knowing  objective  truth  at  all. 
So  to  deny,  however,  involves  the  denial  of 
the  validity  of  memory,  which  (as  we  have 
seen)  introduces  us  to  a  knowledge  of  objec- 
tivity, and  this  denial  carries  with  it  that  of 
any  knowledge  of  our  own  existence. 

Even  thus  the  spirit  of  irrational  negation 
does  not  reach  its  climax.  Not  only  is  it 
necessary  for  these  men  (if  they  would  attain 
their  end)  to  affirm  the  certainty  of  uncer- 
tainty; the  necessity  of  the  truth  which  de- 
clares there  is  no  necessary  truth ;  to  make 
use  of  their  memory  in  order  to  deny  the  va- 


170  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

lidity  of  memory,  and  to  know  their  continu- 
ous existence  long  enough  to  be  able  to  deny 
the  possibility  of  their  knowledge  of  their 
having  any  knowledge  of  it ;  but  they  must 
go  yet  further,  and  deny  the  real  existence 
of  even  thought  itself.  At  a  meeting  of  a 
metaphysical  society  in  London,  it  was  not 
long  ago,  "thought  "  was  expressly  declared 
to  be  a  "  misleading  term,  the  use  of  which 
should  be  carefully  avoided  "  —  and  this 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  utterly  im- 
possible to  form  any  kind  of  judgment  ex- 
cept by  the  aid  of  "  thought,"  and  by  prac- 
tically admitting  its  unique  value.  What 
are  we  to  think  as  to  the  merits  of  men  who 
promulgate  doctrines  the  consequences  of 
which  are  so  extremely  anti-social  ?  Can  we 
say  they  are  only  foolish  ? 

One  thing  at  any  rate  is  certain.  They 
are  unable  to  reply  to  such  criticisms  and 
objections  as  are  here  urged.  It  is  some 
years  since  a  refutation  of  the  system  of 
sensism  and  the  relativity  of  knowledge  was 
published  by  the  present  writer.  Yet  not 
one  of  his  critics  has  ever  ventured  to  tackle 


THE  "FIRST  CAUSE  171 

the  arguments  therein  put  forward,  or  to 
try  and  defend  his  untenable  position. 

But  "  the  helpful  science  "  does  not  only 
serve  as  a  practical  guide  in  life  by  showing 
us  the  true  end  of  human  existence,  but  also 
shows  us  that  the  whole  world  is  replete 
with  purpose,  as  Emerson  has  sung. 

Since  the  Universe  proclaims  to  human 
reason  that  it  has  for  its  First  Cause  a  Being 
possessing  power,will,  intelligence,  and  good- 
ness (such  as  are  inadequately  shadowed 
forth  in  our  own  faculties),  it  follows  that 
such  a  First  Cause  must  be  the  author  of  yet 
another  kind  of  causation,  namely,  final  cau- 
sation. Philosophy  assures  us  that  there  is  a 
reason  why  things  are,  and  why  they  are  such 
as  they  are.  Can  the  science  of  sciences  also 
help  us  to  an  answer  to  this  riddle? 

Directing  our  gaze  on  the  world  of  animals 
and  plants — -or  on  organic  nature — we  find 
that  each  organism  plainly  declares  that  it 
is  the  embodiment  of  both  an  internal  and 
an  external  "  purpose."  Every  organism,  in 
that  it  is  an  organism,  is  a  structure  the 
parts  of  which  are  reciprocally  "ends"  and 


172  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

11  means"  directed  to  the  conservation  of  the 
individual.  But  each  organism  also  proclaims 
itself  to  be  instinct  with  a  finality  not  its 
own — a  purpose  beyond  itself — which  pene- 
trates and  regulates  the  inmost  recesses  of 
its  structure. 

The  phenomena  which  attend  the  devel- 
opment of  the  adult  structure  from  out  of 
its  embryonic  germ  plainly  announce  that 
they  are  directed  towards  a  future  end.  As 
Claude  Bernard  has  said,  in  every  living 
germ  there  is  a  directing  idea  which  develops 
and  manifests  itself  in  and  by  that  germ's 
gradual  organization.  This  truth  is  especial- 
ly manifested  in  those  animal  instincts  by 
which,  in  such  curious  and  complex  ways, 
a  parent  insect  provides  for  the  future  wel- 
fare of  a  progeny  it  is  destined  never  to 
behold.  But  a  careful  study  of  nature  also 
serves  to  reveal  to  us  that  it  consists  of  a 
hierarchy  of  energies  and  faculties;  so  that  a 
successively  increasing  fulfilment  of  "  pur- 
pose" runs  through  the  irrational  creation 
up  to  man. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  but  that  before 


FROM    PLANT    LIFE   TO    MAN  173 

life  existed  on  this  globe  many  ages  passed 
by  while  it  was  but  a  mass  of  inorganic  sub- 
stances, each  possessing  its  own  powers  and 
energies.  Evidently,  also,  the  earth  was 
clothed  with  vegetation  long  before  its 
groves  were  peopled  with  the  higher  forms  of 
animal  life.  For  thousands,  perhaps  mill- 
ions, of  years  its  groves  were  songless,  and 
the  flowers  of  its  herbs  were  insignificant 
and  inodorous.  For  all  we  know  such  life 
might  have  continued  until  now,  for  plants 
can  thrive  without  the  presence  of  animals. 
The  animal  world,  however,  could  not  exist 
without  a  world  of  plant-life,  for  from  plants 
all  animals  must,  directly  or  indirectly,  ac- 
quire their  nutriment. 

We  now  know  how  wonderfully  rich,  in 
both  animals  and  plants,  the  world  was  in 
what  is  called  the  Miocene  period.  Nor  can 
we  find  any  reason  why  such  organisms 
should  not  continue  forever  to  live  on  with- 
out the  risk  of  subjugation  by  a  rational 
creature,  such  as  man. 

When  at  last  men  appeared  they  consti- 
tuted a  race  which,  though  capable  of  living 


174  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

on  vegetable  food  alone,  yet  needed  animals 
— dogs,  horses,  flocks  and  herds — to  attain 
any  high  development  and  complex  social 
organization. 

Thus  an  increasing  service,  and  conse- 
quently an  increasing  dependence,  runs  on 
from  the  world  of  lifeless  seas  and  rivers, 
rocky  mountains  and  sandy  wastes,  through 
vegetable  and  animal  life  up  to  man.  The 
sun's  beams,  though  potent  in  inducing  at- 
mospheric and  aqueous  currents,  neverthe- 
less actually  serve  the  organic  world  far 
more  than  the  inorganic,  and  the  powers  of 
nature  do  more  for  the  animal,  with  all  its 
sentient  faculties,  than  for  the  plant.  But 
they  do  most  of  all  for  man,  since  he  makes 
use  of  all  the  lower  orders  of  existence,  both 
organic  and  inorganic.  Therefore  we  must 
affirm  that  God  has  evidently  willed  most 
service  to  man  of  all  His  earthly  creatures. 

Whatever  purposes  these  two  great  groups 
— animals  and  plants — may  serve,  they  must 
be  affirmed  to  exist  specially  for  man,  since  it 
is  a  fact  that  he  forms  the  culmination  of  all 
those  different  kinds  of  creatures  which  have 


THE    PURPOSE   OF    HUMAN   LIFE  175 

been  caused  to  exist  on  the  surface  of  our 
planet,  and,  as  a  fact,  derives  most  service 
from  them. 

As  to  the  end  of  human  life  itself,  we  have 
already  seen  that  it  is  and  must  be  the  ful- 
filment of  duty — the  exercise  of  will  accord- 
ing to  the  dictates  of  right  reason.  There- 
fore, since  the  lower  forms  of  life  subserve 
his  being,  and  since  the  world  embodies  the 
will  of  an  Intelligent  First  Cause,  we  may, 
with  certainty  and  without  exaggeration, 
declare  that  when  the  first  and  lowest 
forms  of  life  made  their  appearance  in  the 
world,  their  highest  conceivable  purpose  and 
meaning  was  to  bring  about  the  fulfilment 
of  the  moral  law — a  fulfilment  bearing  fruit 
beyond  the  life  of  which  we  have  experi- 
ence. 

So  much  certainly  follows  as  a  deduction 
from  the  facts  and  principles  which  "  the 
helpful  science  "  sets  before  us.  Can  mere 
speculation  carry  us  a  step  further  as  to  the 
wherefore  of  the  world's  existence?  There 
is  one  conception  which  does  seem  to  bring 
us  even  nearer  to  God  than  the  conception 


176  THE   HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

"  duty,"  and  that  is  "  love."  Love  is  the  no- 
blest, most  self-sacrificing,  most  tender,  yet 
most  strong,  energetic,  and  unflinching  of  all 
human  energies,  and  it  is  that  which  binds 
us  to  all  that  is  most  admirable  and  beauti- 
ful in  aspect,  character,  and  conduct. 

May  we  not,  then,  believe  that  through  it 
we  reach  the  truest  analogy,  possible  for  us, 
with  the  ultimate  creative  purpose  of  the 
Divine  First  Cause— an  analogy  perceptible 
to  us  by  means  of  those  certain  and  evident 
intuitions  through  which  God  has  deigned 
to  illuminate  the  intellect  of  man?  Such, 
if  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  the  positive  teach- 
ing, would  appear  to  be  the  most  probable 
suggestion  which  arises  from  the  various 
considerations  which  have  been  here  suc- 
cessively brought  forward,  and  which  de- 
monstrates the  power  and  dignity  of  hu- 
man nature. 

And  now,  in  concluding,  I  venture  to  ex- 
press a  hope  that  the  utility  and  importance 
of  "  the  helpful  science  "  has  been  brought 
home  to  the  minds  of  such  of  my  readers  as 
may  not  before  have  appreciated  those  qual- 


"A  COMMON  FOUNDATION"  177 

ities  as  belonging  to  it.  It  has,  I  hope,  been 
clearly  shown  that  the  first  principles  of  re- 
ligion, morals,  art,  and  science,  all  repose 
upon  a  common  foundation  which  the  "  sci- 
ence of  sciences"  makes  known  to  all  those 
who  are  willing  patiently  to  undertake  the 
needful  self-interrogations  and  observations 
of  things  external. 

By  the  term  "a  common  foundation,"  how- 
ever, I  am  far  indeed  from  meaning  thereby 
that  all  our  knowledge  reposes  upon  any  one 
principle ;  which  was  the  error  of  Descartes 
and  all  his  numerous  followers.  "  The  help- 
ful science,"  as  it  aids  us  in  different  kinds  of 
knowledge  and  different  kinds  of  activity,  so 
itself  demands  for  its  support  the  exercise 
of  very  different  faculties. 

It  reposes  on  the  exercise  of  our  sensitiv- 
ity, and  our  sense-perceptions ;  on  our  direct 
intellectual  intuition  and  the  declarations  of 
reflective  thought ;  on  the  observation  of 
the  bodies  which  make  up  the  material 
world,  and  upon  the  information  we  derive 
from  our  fellow-men.  It  is  emphatically  a 
human  science,  and  responds  to  the  needs  of 


I78  THE    HELPFUL   SCIENCE 

an  intellect  such  as  ours,  which,  wonderful 
and  highly  endowed  as  it  is,  is  none  the  less 
essentially  limited,  as  is  shown  even  by  the 
need  we  so  often  have  of  going  through  proc- 
esses of  reasoning  to  arrive  at  truth.  Being 
so  limited  it  needs  corresponding  aid,  and 
such  aid  has  been  duly  supplied  to  it  through 
the  ministry  of  the  "  helpful  science." 


THE  END 


MENTAL  AND  MORAL  SCIENCE 


THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    ETHICS. 

By  BORDEN  P.  BOWNE,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Bos- 
ton University.     8vo,  Cloth,  $i  75. 

Shows  uncommon  clearness,  penetration,  and  breadth  of  outlook, 
along  with  a  certain  practical  good  sense  which  keeps  the  writer  from 
being  tricked  by  mere  words. — Advance,  Chicago. 

It  is  written  with  the  clearness  and  incisiveness  of  the  author's  best 
style,  and  will  clear  the  minds  of  many  readers  of  confusion  on  serious 
points.— FRANKLIN  CARTER,  President  of  Williams  College. 

METAPHYSICS. 


A  Study  in  First  Principles.     By  BORDEN  P.  BOWNE. 

Svo,  Cloth,  $i  75. 

It  will  take  high  rank  in  the  philosophical  literature  of  the  time. — 
N.  Y.  Tribune. 

We  are  free  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  work  has  real  value.  The 
conclusions  which  he  reaches  will  be  found  especially  useful  to  those  who 
find  themselves  caught  in  the  drift  of  materialism. — N.  Y.  Herald. 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 


By  BORDEN  P.  BOWNE.     Svo,  Cloth,  $i  75. 

One  of  the  simplest  in  statement  and  clearest  in  thought  of  the  many 
works  on  the  subject. — Critic,  N.  Y. 

Epigrammatic  terseness  and  fine  scorn  are  the  delightful  concomi- 
tants of  lucid  reasoning  and  clear  arrangement. — Evangelist,  N.  Y. 

Professor  Bowne  is  an  acute  and  original  thinker  and  profound  logi- 
cian.— Albany  Press. 

INTRODUCTION  TO  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY. 
By  BORDEN  P.  BOWNE.     Svo,  Cloth,  $i  75. 

This  is  not  a  dogmatic  treatise  of  empirical  psychology,  much  less  a 
digest  of  physiological  psychology  and  the  fanciful  theories  that  cluster 
round  that  shadowy  border-land  of  research,  but  a  series  of  essays  in 
pure  psychology,  the  basis  of  the  whole  performance  being  facts,  not 
theories.—  Boston  Beacon. 


MENTAL    AND  MORAL    SCIENCE 


PSYCHOLOGY. 
By  JOHN  DEWEY,  Ph.D.     I2mo,  Cloth,  $i  25. 

As  a  philosophical  text-book  its  claims  to  the  recognition  of  thinkers 
are  very  great,  while  as  an  exposition  of  one  of  the  most  interesting  of 
sciences  it  will  be  a  hand-book  of  inestimable  value  to  students. — Com- 
monwealth, Boston. 

The  book,  I  think,  marks  a  distinct  progress  on  anything,  in  that 
department,  which  has  been  done  in  English,  in  which  most  writers 
have  really  omitted  the  part  of  Hamlet  in  their  psychological  drama- 
— EDWARD  CAIRO,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of 
Glasgow. 

THE    ELEMENTS  OF    DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

By  NOAH  K.  DAVIS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Moral 
Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Virginia.  Post  8vo, 
Cloth,  90  cents. 

The  definitions  are  good,  and  the  expositions  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
subject  are  accomplished  with  enough  fulness  to  be  intelligible  without 
confusion. — Independent,  N.  Y. 

I  am  not  acquainted  with  any  treatise  on  logic  that  contains  within 
the  same  compass  so  much  sound  logical  doctrine  so  perspicuously  ex- 
pressed. It  would  not  be  difficult  to  point  out  in  this  small  work  at 
least  half  a  dozen  distinct  gains  to  the  science. — Professor  COLLINS 
DENNY,  Vanderbilt  University,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

The  Elements  of  Inductive  Logic,  by  the  same  Author,  is 
in  Press. 

THE  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT. 

A  Treatise  on  Deductive  Logic.  By  NOAH  K.  DAVIS, 
Ph.D.,  LL.D.  8vo,  Cloth,  $2  oo. 

A  comprehensive  account  of  the  science  of  Logic  from  its  earliest 
days,  with  every  variety  of  example  to  illustrate  the  principles.  .  .  .  The 
author  is  to  be  commended  for  his  industry,  his  earnestness,  his  intelli- 
gence in  the  arrangement  of  his  material,  and  the  general  excellence  of 
his  literary  style. — Philadelphia  Evening  Bulletin. 


Published  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  New  York 

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per  cent,  should  be  added  for  postage. 


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